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The twenty-third Party Congress

Religion and Soviet Society

The Fate of the Family

Models in the Analysis of Soviet Society

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SURVEY

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MODELS AND ISSUES IN THE ANALYSIS OF SOVIET SOCIETY

Alex Inkeles

I RECENTLY completed a small book, essentially a long essay, called *What Is Sociology?*, the writing of which made me acutely sensitive to the fact that most social scientists approach the subject they are studying with some kind of conceptual scheme which we may call a model. These models play an enormously important role in deciding what is taken into consideration and what is left out, what weight is assigned to one factor as against another, which sets of interrelationships are assumed to exist and which will go largely unnoticed. There is a great deal of debate about models, most of which deals with the question of whether or not a particular model is right or wrong. In my opinion there is no such thing as a right or wrong sociological model. There are richer and poorer ones. There are the more sensitive and less sensitive. There are those which are more appropriate to one time or place than another. All have a piece of the truth, but it is rare that any *one* model is really adequate to the analysis of a richly complex concrete historical case. The object of my talk is to present three important models with a word about the strengths and weaknesses of each, viewed for the most part historically, as we have approached them in Soviet studies.

The first, the model which dominated Soviet studies in the past, may have different labels applied to it but it will be readily recognised as the model of the totalitarian society. We may also speak of it as the model of the Stalinist terror, of the implementation of the concept of the Leninist society, of the distinctive communist polity, or the model of the betrayal of socialism. All these variant perspectives have in common the essential idea that there was created in the Soviet Union under Stalin a fairly distinctive type of social structure with more or less unique characteristics. I am, at this point, reminded of an idea of Henry Murray and Clyde Kluckhohn, who said we should always keep in mind that each man is in some respects like all other men, in some respects like some other men, and in some respects like no other man. The totalitarian model, although it accepted the notion that the Soviet Union was a society like all other societies, and acknowledged it also as one *type* of society, mainly stressed the *uniqueness* of the USSR. Belief in the distinctiveness of the Soviet system, concentration on the special combination of events that made it what it was, was quite reasonable. The Soviet Union was, after all, the first society on the world scene to represent the attainment of power by a group of men who were dedicated to and organised around the principles of communist thought.

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The central elements in the totalitarianism model are well known. These are the themes we regularly write about in our books and refer to in our lectures. If I give you only the key terms, that will suffice. One of the key concepts is the central importance of a concern with power. As we see it, according to the model, the Soviet regime imposed by force, on a nation and a people, an alien system, but one which was self-contained and complete. The themes that we have dealt with in elaborating the model of totalitarianism include the mobilisation of the entire population for the purposes of building a new type of social structure. This mobilisation was characterised, to a very important degree, by the fact that the population did not choose to build this society, but rather was organised for this purpose by the political leadership. Many of the tensions of Soviet society stemmed from this fact. In promulgating the totalitarian model we give great attention, of course, to the central role of the communist party, not only its monopoly of power, but its special internal structure, its peculiar semantics, its history of personal rule in the form of Stalin, its unique reliance on propaganda, its very special use of force as in political terror.

This totalitarian model had great strength. It answered to many of the really basic and distinctive characteristic facts of the situation. The essence of being a Soviet expert, the thing that set them apart from everybody else, was their feeling that here in this model they had the key to Soviet reality. Many a Soviet citizen said that if *Pravda* carried reports of food shortages in Africa, he knew that the next day there would be difficulty in buying grain and meat in Moscow. Just so Soviet experts felt that unless one came to understand the semantics, the complex double-thought, unless one knew how to read *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* between the lines, and possessed the key provided by the model of totalitarianism, one could not be considered qualified to discuss Soviet affairs.

This model also had certain weaknesses. One of the difficulties was that it was relatively insensitive to the sources of social support for the Soviet regime. It represented a screen which did not permit the intrusion of this kind of information, because, naturally, such information was a challenge to the adequacy of the model. Every scientific model is, to a certain extent, an ideology, which screens out information too challenging to the premises of the model. A second great difficulty with the totalitarian model, it seems to me, was that it seriously neglected the degree of Soviet development, or what in Soviet language is called 'socialist construction'. The model was not sufficiently attuned to the fact that, within the Stalinist framework, a very large-scale, complex, and in some ways enormously creative process of building new social forms and new institutions was going on.

There is a term which we could not use for a long time because of its popularity with certain naïve English political commentators who did not understand the totalitarianism model, but who rather referred to

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the Soviet Union as an 'experiment'. I am delighted to hear that word come back. It should be in our vocabulary, because to an extraordinary degree the Soviet Union, even though perhaps an *evil* experiment (as perhaps Stalin was an *evil* genius), *was* an extraordinary experiment. It is true that the experiment rested on the exercise of absolute power, and was perhaps motivated by very unattractive objectives. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was and continues to be a place in which, to an extraordinary degree, a continuous process of social experimentation, or, in different words, planned change, is going on. Sometimes the experimentation was of the most disastrous sort for the people involved, as for example in the collectivisation of agriculture, or in the purge-trials, each a gruesome kind of social invention. (I always think of the trials in terms of the statement made about Stalin being a pragmatic man. It was said that he proceeded by trial and error. It seemed to me that he did indeed proceed by his error and someone else's trial.)

A fourth defect I would like to mention is that this model, as all models, is historically limited. After the death of Stalin there were profound changes in the Soviet social structure. What was formerly a system limited to one country and therefore inextricably identified as parochial, is now becoming to a great degree world-wide; not merely a 'movement', which it had been for a long time, but a standard form of institutional organisation which has been established in many places. Therefore anyone who wants to understand contemporary politics or contemporary social structure in many of its aspects, must confront the new forms which this system has taken.

IN going to conferences on Soviet affairs I sometimes have the feeling that all the Soviet experts were once put in a kind of sealed chamber, something like a bathysphere, and then put on the bottom of the sea where we remain permanently locked up in our small world, breathing our special form of rarefied atmosphere. Occasionally new men were put in and others taken out, but otherwise the basic circle and its standard dialogue has gone on for decades. I suggest we get some new themes, new ideas, new models into the discussion, not just for the sake of novelty, but because I think we are really dealing with a system which is in an important degree changing. But even in our interpretation of the past, new models of analysis may enrich and correct interpretations we have already made. I am reminded here of a statement I heard recently about a corpulent British writer and critic. He said, 'Inside every fat man, there is a thin man crying to get out'. Perhaps we should think of the Soviet system in the same way. Inside its bloated totalitarianism there may all along have been a quite different system struggling to be born.

I suggest that for analysis of the recent past and the contemporary scene in the USSR we need a model different from that developed to deal with totalitarianism. This is not to say we must entirely abandon

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the model we have been using. In many respects it answers extremely well. But we need to put an *additional* model into our work. I think we can best refer to it as the 'development-model'. This model either deals with certain problems common to all developing societies, or tries to treat the distinctive problems of a particular society, but always from the perspective of development. It is quite a different perspective from one which sees society mainly in terms of power and politics. I personally feel that we have seriously neglected looking at the Soviet Union in these terms.

Martin Lipset recently wrote a book about the United States called *The First New Nation.* Perhaps he put the origin of newly-developed nations too far back. If you insist on locating such developments in the more recent past, the Soviet Union probably represents, with the possible exception of Japan, the prime example of the new kind of social and economic development which preoccupies the leaders and the people of many countries and has become one of the central problems of the post-Second World War period. The Soviet Union was the first nation which confronted us with the kind of preoccupation with *growth* which characterises the developing nations, and its history foreshadowed the kinds of solutions which have been typically adopted to meet the distinctive problems facing developing countries (granted that often the problems which are distinctive are so because the leaders have made them so).

The long-standing central concerns of the Soviet regime are in many respects similar to the central concerns of the governments of many of the developing nations of the world. For one thing, the Soviet leaders were enormously preoccupied with developing a highly flexible system of administration responsive to central authority rather than to the general population. In that they are not so different from the leaders of many other developing countries. One of the fundamental concerns, one of the central preoccupations, of the Bolshevik leaders was to organise things so that they really ran. We have been insensitive to the challenge that this would have presented to any Russian government. Another concern they had was to organise political loyalties around a central national image. I shall always remember Professor Karpovich telling me that when the First World War began, he was in a small Russian village to which he often went for vacations. A peasant who knew Karpovich to be a man of learning came up to him and said he hoped he would not mind if he asked a question. The peasant had heard that the Kaiser and the Tsar were at war, and he wondered did that mean that his village and he himself also had to consider themselves at war with the Kaiser. Such an incident had become unthinkable by the time Hitler went to war with Stalin. The analogue to this situation is found all over the world now in the developing countries. For example, in East Pakistan, in a survey I am now conducting, we asked people how they would respond if they

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were travelling in a foreign country and were asked: 'To what *country* do you belong?' About 24 per cent of the people we interviewed named their village or subdivision of origin as the country to which they belonged. Some 66 per cent named their county district. Only 7 per cent named Pakistan!

To take another theme; consider the integration of diverse religious and ethnic groups around a cohesive new sense of national identification. We have usually approached the Soviet nationality problem almost exclusively as an example of the forced imposition on various peoples of membership in an alien national society, of which they very often do not feel a significant part and in which they often do not wish to participate. In part this image is true. But it developed not merely out of Soviet totalitarianism. The process of more or less forced integration of diverse ethnic and religious groups into new amalgams is going on all over the world. It arises inevitably in the course of nation-building.

We may also profitably look at the realm of education. The Soviets were obviously enormously concerned with raising the level of literacy, and then of widely introducing advanced and higher education. I do not think this can be explained exclusively in terms of power, although power surely played a part. No doubt the Soviet leaders wanted to get more people to read and write so that they could be reached by the message of the communist party. But the leaders also encouraged literacy because it was obvious that Soviet Russia could not develop into a modern society unless everyone had equipment so fundamental for participation in the modern world. The Soviet campaign for literacy was an instrument for *modernisation* as well as a tool of political purpose. Similarly, in the case of Soviet preoccupation with establishing a broad base for science and technology, this can be explained by reference to Marxist ideology, which certainly expressed a positive interest in science and technology. But we should also recognise that central to the Soviet leadership's concern for science was its desire to establish a technological basis for the development of a modern society.

TURNING, finally, to the realm of economy, we see again that many of the central preoccupations of the leadership can be better understood if we think in terms of a group of men who, quite apart from the fact that they also happened to be Marxists and communists interested in certain semantics and in the possession of power, were also concerned with developing their country as a great industrial nation. This surely had something to do with the broadening of the central industrial base and the intimately related problem of the neglect of agriculture. Sovietologists have made all kinds of efforts to explain the depressed condition of Soviet agriculture in purely political and economic terms. It is also possible, however, that the Soviet leaders were victims of the same misconception about the 'natural' path of economic development

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as we find among the leaders in almost every underdeveloped country in the world today. This is something that goes beyond Marxism Among the leaders of developing nations there is a widespread mystique about the central role of large-scale industry in nation-building. Ultimately some kind of psychological symbol is involved, and it has led Soviet leaders—as it has led others since—to grossly neglect agriculture in favour of building industry. Their preoccupation with the establishment of new distribution systems, however ineffective they may have been, represents another typical concern. The Soviet leaders' interest in planning is something which is obviously shared in almost all the developing countries. Surely I need not provide more illustrations.

The strengths of the development model are several. This approach is responsive to certain important facts, and it must be given its due. Lenin and Stalin were deeply preoccupied with the problem of development. They were dedicated not merely to seizing and holding power, but also to social development and the construction of a new society, however unattractive many of its features may be to us. The Soviet self-image was above all else the image of the developing society. Furthermore, leaders of most of the developing countries of the world see the Soviet Union mainly as a model of development rather than as a model of politics. They often regard those political issues which are the objects of the Sovietologists' past and present attention as quite incidental. They are, unfortunately, not always impressed by our treatises on liberty and freedom and our strictures on the dangers of totalitarianism. They are more interested in how rapidly they can have good, effective administration, how they can learn to build a school system, to get bridges across rivers, even to get trains to run on time. They want to know what are the devices whereby you build an elite, develop an intelligentsia, or establish a stable bureaucracy. In this connection they see the Soviet Union as a relevant model, whereas, interestingly enough, the United States, Germany, England, and even Japan are often not so regarded even though they, too, once went through a comparable phase of development. Unless we engage ourselves with this issue, we are putting ourselves more and more in the position of talking to ourselves. We are back in the bathysphere! If we wish to find grounds for understanding and communicating with the people in the developing countries we must view the Soviet Union as a problem in development, acknowledge it as one strategy for development, and argue about it on those terms. I do not think that as a rule we do this, nor indeed, are we now well equipped to do it.

The development approach also has some weaknesses. It might be that the model is in fact inappropriate, that the situation is a little bit like the Red Riding Hood tale. The wolf (for whom you may substitute the Soviet Union) has come along and eaten grandma (who to us represents, perhaps, the displaced colonial powers). Now the wolf is in bed with grandma's hat on when little Red Riding Hood (the developing

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countries) comes along. The wolf looks like grandma, but is in fact about to devour Red Riding Hood. There may well be some justice in the analogy. It may also be true that it is inappropriate to speak of Russia as having been a truly underdeveloped country at the time of the Revolution. Russia in 1917 was certainly very far ahead of the point at which most developing countries now start out, and in addition it had a long European tradition. Nevertheless, in many ways Russia was the most backward country in Europe, despite the fact that its industry at the time of the first world war was perhaps the newest and included many of the largest plants in Europe. I do not think it inappropriate, therefore, to think of it as having been a 'developing' country. Certainly Lenin thought of development as perhaps the main problem facing his regime.

Second, it may be argued against the development model that the alleged status of the Soviet Union as a developing country, even if a fact, is a quite incidental one. The most important consideration is the conditions in which this development took place, namely under communist party domination. My answer to this is yes, of course, but development always takes place in *some* conditions. Whether the conditions in which it takes place, or the development itself is the predominant factor, or whether the interaction between the two is more important, constitutes an historical problem which can be solved in each concrete case only by detailed analysis. The most important challenge to the development model, consequently, remains the one I used about the model of the totalitarian system, namely, that this is also an historically limited model.

IF we study the Soviet Union and what is happening in it, we must recognise that a third model is becoming increasingly relevant. It is unfortunately the least developed and least used model. Yet if the development model is the model of the present, this one will be the model of the future. This third is the model of the Soviet Union as a mature industrial society. The industrial model has been used a little at Harvard, where I have emphasised it in my teaching and research. In this, Professor Sorokin anticipated me a long time ago. In his book on *Russia and the United States* (1944), his chief argument was that the correct approach to the Soviet Union was to see it mainly as a large-scale industrial society like the United States. He said there, as a matter of fact, that only foolish people would be preoccupied with what he considers the minor differences between the two nations.

I can more readily accept being a fool than I can accept the differences between the United States and the USSR as minor.[1] Nevertheless, I consider the industrial society model one which can greatly contribute to our understanding of Soviet society. In this perspective politics is

[1] See my article 'Russia and the United States: A Problem in Comparative Sociology', in Philip J. Allen (ed.) *Pitirim A. Sorokin in Review* (Duke University Press, 1963).

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no longer the sole, nor indeed the universally determining force operating; nor is the fact of political *development* the central problem. Instead this approach stresses such things as size, complexity, forms and levels of such social realms as education, stratification, urbanisation, community organisation, social mobility, mass communication, and the like. In the industrial society perspective, we see all these as having a pattern of effects on the social order not mainly because of but often regardless of the political system which prevails.

I know many of you will think it rash—if not a form of madness—for me to assert such ' independence of the political system ' when talking about the Soviet Union. I would rest my main case on the data and reasoning presented in *The Soviet Citizen.*[2] There we showed that in most areas of life the best way to predict the attitudes, values, and orientations of men in the Soviet system is to draw on the general knowledge that we have about men holding comparable positions in western industrial societies. This is not to say there are not some areas of life where the fact of communist party domination is not the prime predictor. Nor would I say that there are not other areas where knowing that we speak of a Russian rather than a Ukrainian is crucial in judging a Soviet man's life-situation and his resultant attitudes. But on most questions, knowing his relative position in a modern large-scale industrial social structure seemed more useful in understanding the attitudes of a Soviet worker or manager than was knowing his party history or his ethnic membership.

The significant advantage of the industrial-society model is that it highlights certain neglected problems. For example, none of the other models provides the possibility of anticipating, or the means of dealing with, the sudden appearance in the Soviet Union of a kind of *jeunesse dorée.* The other models are helpless to explain phenomena such as the middle-class delinquency exemplified by the children of ministers who steal money from their parents, even snatch pocket-books to raise funds for joy-rides to certain fabulous hotels and bars in Minsk, Kiev, Leningrad, and Moscow. There are many aspects of the stratification situation in the Soviet Union which can be understood only if we see them in terms of the problems facing most large-scale industrial social systems.

If we examine the work on Soviet industrial managers,[3] we can see a large number of elements in the life-situation of these men and in their response to it which are indistinguishable from the situation and response of industrial managers in many other parts of the world. Of course this is not to say that this makes them identical. Among the themes spontaneously mentioned in an interview with an industrial manager in the West, labour relations is always one of the most frequent.

[2] By Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer (Harvard University Press, 1959).
[3] See J. Berliner's *Factory and Manager in the U.S.S.R.*, and David Granick's *The Red Executive.*

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In the Soviet Union it is a theme seldom mentioned, and that fact is connected, obviously, with important differences in the socio-economic structures of the systems being compared. But there are many other ways in which a manager from the USSR *is* like one from any western industrial nation. This is so because there are factors in the managers' life-situation as members of an industrial society which over-ride distinctive political and cultural differences. Soviet managers now exert pressure for the adoption of a more rational system of allocation, and increasingly recognise the necessity for using computer techniques out of kinship of experience with managers elsewhere which arises independently of political context and stage of economic development.

The reports that we hear about young people further confirm the appropriateness of the industrial model. We have heard that young artists in the Soviet Union are now ready to say: 'Leave me alone, I am doing serious work'. This cannot be explained in terms of the other models; rather this must be understood by reference to the fact that the Soviet Union is reaching levels and entering realms and beginning to face problems which arise mainly from its maturation as an industrial society. Or consider the role of science and the intellectuals. It is significant that there has been a final end of Lysenkoism. The effort to work out new relationships between science and government in the Soviet Union involves many parallels with the problems scientists report in places which are presumably as different from the Soviet Union as is the United States.

The industrial-society model is especially relevant for the future. As the Soviet Union continues to mature, it is acquiring more and more of the characteristics of the western type of social system. This is accompanied by the erosion of some of its own previously distinctive characteristics like the political terror. New problems will emerge, which again do not eliminate the old but must be dealt with. For example, the problem of the youth culture and the weak integration of the young in all the large-scale societies in the western world, is a problem which requires serious attention. As we have discovered in Berkeley, California, and in Jakarta, it can sometimes have very explosive consequences.

Other shared problems include the results of technological change and consequent unemployment. The Soviet Union is beginning openly to acknowledge what we have known for a long time, namely, that there is enormous underemployment in the Soviet economy. They are entering a new phase in which they openly admit that they do not know what to do with the surplus people who are thrown on the labour market as a result of improved technology of production. The problem of leisure-time and the threat that it poses; the changed nature of old age and the social issues which it presents—more and more of these issues will come to the fore in the Soviet Union as they have in other industrial societies.

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If we want to continue to deal with the Soviet Union as a society, we must deal with these questions and issues. We can of course, if we wish to, remain pure sovietologists, and say: 'No, I'll not deal with that sort of thing. It has nothing to do with communism or the purely Soviet'. I can understand that choice. I am trying here to delineate it, to clarify it, to ask us to face consciously the choice we are making. My feeling is that we will miss a great deal of what is important if we do not accept responsibility for studying these more contemporary and newer issues in Soviet development. But to the extent that we do we will be obliged to draw on analytic models other than the totalitarian or even the developmental.

THIS is a highly-compressed account, and therefore, before leaving the subject of models, I should like briefly to make a few points which may forestall misunderstanding. I should like to stress, first of all, that the models I have presented are certainly not the only relevant ones for the analysis of Soviet society Some of you may know the article by Daniel Bell in which he differentiated ten different approaches to the study of the Soviet Union, and that is by no means exhaustive.[4] I did not put the historical model in the centre here, but I think one certainly might. I personally am a great believer in the relevance of what is sometimes called the 'characterological' or the 'national character' model. This is perhaps another way of stating the historical. I cannot believe that the study of Soviet society can be complete if it does not consider some long-term and deeply-rooted aspects of the Russian orientation to authority-figures. Nor, indeed, can we leave out so general a theory as that which Professor Erlich proposes, since he presumably has in mind some model of human nature which he conceives of as inherently opposed to the nature of the Soviet system. There are, of course, other models of human nature which would argue just the contrary, namely that the Soviet system is the one which most *corresponds* to human nature. The point I am making, of course, is that there are many models, and the three that I selected were by no means meant to exhaust the number of those available, in fact not even to exhaust those that I have myself used at different times.

Second, I should also make it clear that I have no special preference for one model over any of the others. I think they are all interesting and useful, each in its place and time. I am not prepared to commit myself exclusively to one; my purpose has been rather different. I wanted to highlight the existence of the models, and to help us realise that these are the ways in which some of us, indeed all of us in varying degrees, have been thinking about the Soviet Union. My purpose was to make us aware of our thought patterns, sensitive to the strengths and weaknesses of all three of the models.

[4] 'Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior', in *The End of Ideology* (1960).

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Third, I want to stress that these models are abstractions and not reality. In other words, we take these as sets of ideas or concepts which have a certain unity, and then ask how far does reality fit them. They are, therefore, heuristic devices to aid communication and analysis. If I know the model you are using, and you know the same model that I know, and we know the terms in which it is couched, it facilitates our ability to communicate. We are thus brought closer to the style of communication which is characteristic of mathematics, where one works with very precise terms and everyone knows the symbols which represent them and the laws governing their combination. Our great problem in the social sciences is that so much of the time we are so imprecise in our language and so casual in our use of it, not because we are incapable of doing better, but because we have not developed the technique or habit of exact and precise expression.

My fourth point concerns the time factor and the outmoding of models. This is related to the issue of preference. I am not saying that any of these models, in particular the first, is at present *irrelevant* to the analysis of Soviet society. This would be nonsense. The totalitarian model is still highly relevant. Yet if we keep it in mind as a model, we can see how far the Soviets have been moving from it. This also requires that we be more honest, or if you like more precise, in specifying what exactly each model represents. We must somewhere write down exactly what we consider the elements of the model to be, and then later on accept the test of whether something has departed from it or not. Professor Brzezinski at one time defined Soviet totalitarianism to include the terror as we knew it in the thirties as an *essential and defining* feature of the Soviet system. I think he would acknowledge today that the terror, although obviously not eliminated entirely, no longer plays anything remotely like its former role in Soviet society. Now, since we agree on the facts, the problem that he and I would face in a dialogue would be, should we still call the Soviet Union 'totalitarian'? If we would still call it totalitarian, would we not have to go back and revise the earlier model? And if we did not want to revise the model, would not the path then be to elaborate some conception of totalitarianism of the type A, B, or C or a combination of these? This would get very complicated. I think we learn something from this kind of review. Yet to point to the inadequacy of a model as an exclusive or exact guide is not to say that it has completely lost its relevance. My aim was to get a hearing for models which I felt had been relatively neglected, and not mainly to impugn the great relevance in the past of the other models.

A fifth point concerns the combination of models, which Professor Fainsod in particular stressed as being desirable. I am reminded here of a theme that much preoccupied us in the early days of the Russian Research Centre when we talked about the integration of disciplines as a way of studying the Soviet Union. Cylde Kluckhohn used to say

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that the objective is not to have several skulls under one discipline, but rather to have several disciplines under one skull. Now we face something of the same problem when we consider the combination of models. We all generally agree that a combination of models is desirable. But I am not sure we should automatically argue for the combination of models because, as I have tried to point out, every model has its distinctive perspective. By combining the models we inevitably lose the possibility of highlighting some element that we consider critical. I do not, therefore, necessarily make an unreserved plea for the combination of models. I am in favour of both their combination and their maintenance in their distinctive conditions, depending upon the kind of problems we are dealing with and the historic time in which we are operating.

I wish to reiterate that I do not think it necessary to give up the particular insights and contributions of one model in order to bring another one to bear. In order to acknowledge the increased importance and autonomy of the scientific community, it is not necessary to deny the fact that the Soviet Union is still overwhelmingly dominated by the communist party. To be aware that freedom of expression is extraordinarily limited in the USSR, it is not necessary to blind yourself to the fact that in the realm of the family there are currents which are highly spontaneous, quite uncontrolled by the regime, and reflecting something of Russian character and tradition. Indeed, this family may for its members increasingly represent a structure of life which they do not particularly interpret in Russian or communist or totalitarian terms, but rather treat as another situation of life with all its human opportunities and uncertainties. If we take responsibility for Soviet studies rather than for the study of communism more narrowly defined, we must accept an obligation to deal with all the areas and dimensions of Soviet life.

Finally, the time dimension is very much in my mind. If you look at the problem historically, you can see that new models had to be introduced because the old ones no longer served when used exclusively. As Soviet society developed and changed, so we have been obliged either to develop and change our models or continue to analyse Soviet affairs with conceptual tools which did not answer to reality.

BEFORE surrendering the floor I think I should say a few words about the question Dr Kernig raised when he asked: 'What does each discipline, in this case sociology, contribute to Soviet studies?' Perhaps out of modesty I should not answer that question; but I cannot let it go by entirely without saying that I do think that a sociological approach to many issues in Soviet studies, such as the problem of ideology, about which there is so much misunderstanding, would greatly clear the atmosphere. When I say this I am referring particularly to one quality of sociological analysis, its concern to develop precise sets of categories, to develop strictly defined and operationally useful terms

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as a basis for the study of any problem in any particular place or social context. There is persistent confusion between ideology as a formal system for the public justification of action, ideology as a personal orientation of individuals of which they are conscious and which they see as the sum of their individual values, and ideology as an underlying principle in action and behaviour of which the person may even be unaware. Even these simple distinctions would help us to avoid some of the difficulties we get into. It is one of the strengths, I think, of sociological analysis that it insists on such analytic distinctions.

Turning now to the other side of this question: How does Soviet research contribute to the individual discipline? Here I would like to support Professor Grossman's finding that Soviet studies have done something *for* the several disciplines. American sociology can be correctly characterised as being, in general, extremely provincial. Soviet studies have been one of the most important wedges in broadening the perspective of students of society in the United States, encouraging them to consider other social systems, and, in the Soviet case, one which presents very sharp contrasts to their own. In addition, American sociology is enormously fragmented. Each analysis breaks its object down into smaller and smaller elements. Problems are as a rule analysed without consideration for the context in which the phenomenon being studied is set. One of the virtues of Soviet studies, by contrast, is that they approach social phenomena as a whole; all the parts are considered as significantly inter-related. One may not write about the Soviet family without taking into consideration Soviet politics, the changes in the level of economic development, and the shifts in the party line with regard to various issues of a theoretical kind. As an example of integrated societal analysis, this, I think, has been a very positive influence.

Finally, I would like to say a word about sociology in Soviet society. A long time ago, Durkheim specified the conditions for the development of sociology. Among them was the requirement of a relatively free and open society with a peculiar disposition towards self-examination and self-evaluation. This condition is obviously not met in the Soviet Union. Nor will it be met tomorrow. Therefore the prospects for the development of a really critical and evaluative sociology in the Soviet Union are slight. On the other hand, the status of sociology may be taken as a very sensitive indicator of how a society is moving with regard to freedom of thought and expression. Sociological investigation inevitably reveals facts and deals with issues that are disturbing in a completely closed system. Therefore, to the extent that the regime tolerates and indeed fosters sociology, to that extent we are experiencing a political thaw. Indeed to a certain degree we can estimate how far the satellite countries have truly gained freedom from the Soviet type of central control by rating the relative development of sociology in each country.

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As we know, there has recently been a large opening of Soviet sociology to the West, and, interestingly enough, the opening has been mainly via Poland. But behind Poland stands most of West-European and American sociology. There have been changes which have made the development of a fair amount of sociological work possible. For example, we already have a good study of the family, and although I have not yet seen the full published report, the sociologists in Siberia are evidently engaged in large-scale work on urban and industrial sociology. The early preliminary notices suggest this is work of great interest and substantial maturity. As it becomes available, it will greatly enrich our knowledge of what is going on in Soviet society. But I personally believe that there are very severe limits on how far this development will go, and this sets limits on the ultimate dialogue between social scientists in the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union. I think most of the sociology which develops in the Soviet Union will essentially be 'managerial', that is, devoted to collecting the kind of material sought in census-taking. I don't think in the near future we will be seeing in the Soviet Union that kind of sociology which was described by Robert Lynd in his book *Knowledge for What?*, or by C. Wright Mills in his book on *The Sociological Imagination.* I do not think there will be critical study of stratification in the Soviet Union. There may be studies on the number and distribution of occupations, and perhaps some work on the evaluation of occupations, but a discussion which starts with the basic moral and political issues of social stratification does not seem likely in the near future. Neither do I expect that in Soviet sociological literature there will be freedom to explore issues concerning the direction the society should take in the future.

There are other limitations, not the least of which is that the population itself remains very cautious. Even if I received permission to work in Moscow and do a survey there in the next few months, I do not think I could count on spontaneous and frank responses from most of the Soviet citizens. It is a fantasy to assume one could stop people on street-corners in Moscow with such questions as: 'Do you think that the means for the removal of Khrushchev was wholly justified, partly justified, or not justified at all by the norms of Soviet legality?' I would like to try that, and others like it, but I do not think the time has come.

Despite these limitations, I think it very important that serious sociology has now really begun in the Soviet Union. There is a concern with issues, mostly methodological, which nonetheless are the antechamber to a much more involved and serious discussion of more fundamental problems. Of primary importance, however, is the possibility of a dialogue; most Soviet social scientists, at least sociologists, if they come to international meetings, conduct monologues in the old style. But I think work of the new kind as it comes out provides the basis for a more *general* discussion. To the extent that this is true

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and this process goes on, I think the totalitarianism model becomes less and less critical or, if you like, 'relevant', although by no means irrelevant, and the development and industrial society models grow in importance. I know that what I have said about the future of pure sovietology puts me somewhat in the position of the Prime Minister who is accused of having become Prime Minister only to dissolve His Majesty's Empire. As a sovietologist I regret this, but as a sociologist I have no other choice.

(This article is based on a talk given by Professor Inkeles at a conference in Düsseldorf in September 1965. The talk was tape-recorded, and the text as reproduced here was edited by Professor Inkeles.)

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SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Leopold Labedz

IT is now more than ten years since sociology began to be rehabilitated in the countries of eastern Europe. The rehabilitation went furthest in Poland, and with some delay reached Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and even East Germany. All this time a debate about the subject-matter and the scope of Marxist sociology and its relation to historical materialism was going on in the Soviet Union, but no conclusion is yet in sight:

> At present there are different ways of understanding Marxist sociology among Soviet and foreign Marxist scholars. Some consider that Marxism as a whole is in fact nothing else but our sociology. Others link Marxist sociology with the theory of scientific communism. Still others believe that the difference between historical materialism and Marxist sociology is approximately like that between the theoretical and applied fields of one and the same branch of human knowledge. There are other shades of opinion. In a word, there is yet no single point of view.[1]

Ideological obstacles notwithstanding, and despite the fact that Soviet sociological investigations are described as 'philosophical in character', 'concrete' yet not empirical,[2] a certain body of material has been accumulated which throws some light on social change in the Soviet Union. Comparison with the far more revealing and sociologically much more sophisticated (because less ideologically bound) data gathered by Polish sociologists illuminates not only the differences in the treatment of the subject in the two countries, and in the changes themselves, but also the general character of social change in the communist countries.

Social structure: statistics

The first approach to the Soviet social structure must be through Soviet social statistics. During the last decade Soviet economic and vital statistics have increased in volume and improved in quality, but progress in social statistics proper is less marked. In November 1961,

[1] *Sotsiologiya v SSSR*, ed. V. Fokin (Moscow, 1965), vol. I, p. 7. Cf. also *Metodologicheskie problemy nauki* (Moscow, 1964), chaps. 3 and 4 and the 'Introduction' by Maurice Hookham to *Industry and Labour in the USSR*, ed. G. V. Osipov, Tavistock Publications (London, 1966), p. 4. Cf. the author's articles: 'Sociology and Communism, 1957-58', 'The Spirit of Stresa', 'Sociology as a Vocation', in *Survey*, nos. 26, 31, 48. The passage above is taken verbatim from a 1964 speech by the then chief ideologist, Leonid Ilyichev.

[2] Fokin, *Sotsiologiya v SSSR*, p. 7. In Poland they *are* called empirical. Perhaps Soviet usage will now change: an article in *Izvestiya* (12 May 1966), signed by its previous editor Rumyantsev and two others, called for a better examination 'of the results of the development of *empirical* sociology'.

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two years after the last census, during a discussion organised by *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,* Professor P. P. Maslov pointed out that 'in order to formulate more precise statistical indices, which would take into account all the variety and complexity of the social phenomena now taking place in the Soviet Union, it is necesary to have wider free discussion and exchange of views in scientific circles. At present such an atmosphere often still does not exist in statistical institutions '.[3]

Leaving aside the question of statistical definitions, which are inevitably affected by ideological considerations, one can first try to extract as much information as possible from the existing indices, however inadequate or even misleading they may be. The Soviet statistical handbook, *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo,* gave in its 1965 edition the following table on the ' Class composition of the population of the USSR ' (it is supplemented by the data given for 1937 and 1955 in the 1956 edition of the same handbook):

Table I

(In percentages)

(Includes dependants)	1913	1928	1937	1939	1955	1959	1964
Total population	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
of which							
Workers and employees	17·0	17·6	36·2	50·2	58·3	68·3	75·1
Co-operative artisans & kolkhozniks	—	2·9	57·9	47·2	41·2	31·4	24·8
Individual peasants and artisans	66·7	74·9	5·9	2·6	0·5	0·3	0·1
Bourgeois, landlords, merchants, kulaks	16·3	4·6	—	—	—	—	—

This table shows the changes in class composition as defined by the relation between the occupation and the property structure, in line with Lenin's definition of class as ' a group of people differentiated by its place in the historically determined system of production, by its relation to the means of production, by its role in the social organisation of labour, and consequently by the size of and the way they receive their

[3] Reported in *Zycie Warszawy,* 2 December, 1961, p. 3. Cf. P. P. Maslov, ' *Statistika* i Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya ', *Filosofskie Nauki* no. 3, 1965. See also (the late) V. S. Nemchinov, ' Sotsiologiya i Statistika ' in Osipov, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 323-34, and a popular pamphlet by O. O. Yakhot, *Statistika v Sotsiologicheskom Issledovanii* (Moscow, 1966). The official line on statistical definitions and indices is given in two books by A. I. Yezhov: *Statisticheskii Slovar* (Moscow, 1965) and *Sistema i Metodologiya Pokazateley Sovetskoy Statistiki,* (Moscow 1965). The economists have been grumbling about Soviet statistics even more loudly: Agabenyan is reported as saying that he prefers to look to western sources for statistics on the Soviet econmy: Birman wrote that Soviet statistics are ' completely inadequate and unsuitable for use by economists ' (*Novy Mir,* no. 12, 1965), and an editorial in *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta* (*Ekonomika*), no. 1, 1966, declared that ' in spite of a certain expansion of statistical information in recent times, it is utterly insufficient for successful scientific research work '.

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share of social wealth'.[4] The table gives some idea of the changes, but, as the Soviet sociologists themselves indicate in their as yet modest efforts at a more realistic analysis, this definition is inadequate. It may or may not have its advantages in the examination of 'capitalist society', it positively prevents any closer, non-ideological examination of social relations in a 'socialist society', where ownership of the means of production does not determine the size of the share of social wealth, or for that matter of other values sought after and attained by individuals or social groups.

It does not even determine their existence as social groups or classes. In amalgamating 'workers' and 'employees' it harks back to the old Stalinist theory of Soviet social structure, so that even the 'stratum of intelligentsia' disappears from the horizon between the 'two friendly classes: the workers and the collective farmers'. The logical corollary here is that if the kolkhozes were to be transformed into sovkhozes, Soviet society would, by (statistical) definition, become homogeneous, a *reductio ad absurdum* of the premise that nationalisation of the means of production is a sufficient condition of the existence of a classless society.

Clearly, a serious analysis of differences between social groups in the Soviet Union would require other criteria to give a realistic picture of the Soviet social structure. The statistics do, however, provide a general indication of one kind of social change: the peasants who formed in the twenties three-quarters of the population, now constitute less than one-third.

Between 1926 and 1965 the rural population decreased from 82 to 47 per cent. The 1959 census indicated that rural occupations took 38·8 per cent of the total labour force, i.e. 38·5 million, of which 33·9 million were workers and kolkhozniks engaged in physical labour.[5] Thus already in 1959 the kolkhoz and sovkhoz peasants constituted less than one-third of the total labour force, as some of the physical labour in the countryside is not specifically peasant work. Since then rural occupations have fallen to 33 per cent (yearly average 31 per cent) of the total, i.e. 31 million, of whom a proportion were in non-peasant occupations.[6]

Some of the statistical headaches involved here are concerned with census classification. For instance, in the 1937 (suppressed) census 'the occupational and group composition of the rural population was distorted', because of the inclusion in the category of 'workers and employees' of people who should have been classified as 'kolkhozniks'.[7]

[4] This definition is given in Yezhov, op. cit., p. 19.

[5] *Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959 goda* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 110 and 159. The yearly average percentage of rural occupations was 32, i.e. 31·7m. For some puzzles and seeming discrepancies, see Table II.

[6] *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo . . . 1964*, pp. 419, 543. The number of workers and employees in the rural labour force is given as 8·6 m. (p. 546).

[7] P. G. Podyachikh, *Vsesoyuznaya Perepis Naseleniya 1939 goda* (Moscow, 1957), p. 37.

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The doctrinal-lexical confusion involved in Soviet statistical definitions of social and occupational groups is perhaps best illustrated by one specific objection made by the same author in his criticism of the 1937 census, namely, the inclusion of 'the kolkhoz intelligentsia (*agronoms, felshers,* veterinaries, etc.) in the group of employees, although they were members of the kolkhozes and their labour there was paid on the basis of the work-day principle (*trudoden*).

Ever since Stalin said in 1931 that 'no ruling class has managed without its own intelligentsia', there has been the awkward problem of how to define this group and relate it to the general social structure.[8] The kolkhoz intelligentsia has found its way into the statistical group of 'employees' after all. In *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo* . . . 1958 (p. 672) there is a table on the composition of the Soviet intelligentsia where rural intelligentsia forms one of the sub-groups. This table has been dropped from subsequent editions of the handbook, and in the official results of the 1959 census only the category of 'workers by brain', those occupied in mental labour, was used. The exact statistical difference between the three concepts—'intelligentsia', 'mental workers' and 'employees'—has never been made clear. They are obviously not interchangeable, but they stand in close relationship. The figures for the intelligentsia given for 1926 and 1956 are 2·7 million and 15·5 million respectively. The 1959 census gave the figures of 13·8 million of mental workers in 1939 and of 20·5 million in 1959.[9] *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo* . . . 1964 (p. 33) states that at the beginning of 1965 they constituted 25 million, or more than one-fifth of the working population.

The 1959 census gave a more detailed breakdown of the category 'workers and employees', as well as the distribution of the various social groups, as defined in Soviet statistics, between the town and the countryside. On the basis of this information V. S. Semenov constructed the following table about Soviet urban and rural occupational structure in 1959[10]:

The table shows on the one hand the numbers and percentages of each occupational group in the cities and villages (data 'a'—horizontal), and on the other the breakdown for the country as a whole, separate for cities and villages (data 'b'—vertical). It gives separate figures for 'workers' and 'employees', but the figures of the latter (taken from the 1959 census) are said to comprise '*intelligentsia and* employees'.

[8] Cf. the present writer's 'The New Soviet Intelligentsia', in Sidney Harcave (ed.), *Readings in Russian History* (New York, 1962), vol. II, and 'The Structure of the Soviet Intelligentsia', in Richard Pipes (ed.), *The Russian Intelligentsia* (New York, 1961).

[9] *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo . . . 1960,* p. 672; *Itogi* . . . , p. 130. Cf. Alec Nove, *Occupational Patterns in the USSR and Great Britain* (Manchester Statistical Society, 1962).

[10] V. S. Semenov, 'Stiranie sotsialno-klassovikh razlichii i perekhod k bezklassovemu obshchestvu', *Voprosy Filofii,* no. 9, 1965, p. 144. In the 1939 and 1959 census forms two other categories were included in the list of social groups: priests and free professions. Cf. Podyachikh, op. cit., p. 22 and Yezhov, op. cit., p. 20.

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Table II

Working Population	Total			Urban			Rural		
		Mln.	b %		Mln.	b %		Mln.	b %
Working class	a 100·0	46·2	46·6	67·4	31·1	66·5	32·6	15·0	28·7
Kolkhoz peasantry	a 100·0	33·5	33·3	3·8	1·2	2·6	96·2	31·8	60·8
Intelligentsia and employees	a 100·0	19·7	19·8	73·0	14·4	30·7	27·0	5·3	10·1
Individual peasants and non-cooperative artisans	a 100·0	0·3	0·3	28·3	0·8	0·2	71·7	0·2	0·4
Total		99·1	100·0		46·8	100·0		52·3	100·0

It is worth noting that 27 per cent of them are in the villages, and so are 32·6 per cent of the 'working class', these being indications not only of the social or occupational structure but also of Soviet statistical usages and classifications. According to them, in 1959 peasants formed only about 60 per cent of the rural working population. One can also see in the table that, despite the doctrinal preoccupations mentioned before, the rural intelligentsia is presumably not included in the category of kolkhozniks.

Thus the general picture given is that of a country where, despite industrialisation, half of its population is still rural, yet only a quarter of it is peasantry. 40 per cent of the labour force in the villages is working-class (one-third of the country's total) and people engaged in 'mental occupations' (one-quarter of the country's total). Together these form one-fifth of the entire working population and their share in it is growing: 17·5 per cent in 1939, 20·7 per cent in 1959.

Can this first approximation be refined on the basis of the available statistics?

Semenov, using the 1959 census data, constructed a table which gives a rough idea of skill-differentiation among the 'classes and strata' of the Soviet population: in 1962 30–40 per cent of the workers were unskilled, 40–50 per cent were skilled, and 10–20 per cent were highly skilled. Among kolkhozniks the unskilled formed over 80–85 per cent in 1963.[11]

Semenov divided the group of 'intelligentsia and employees' into two categories: the first are occupied in mental work 'in the strict sense of the word' (representatives of the economic-technical intelligentsia, of science and culture, of state and economic administration);

[11] Semenov, loc. cit., p. 143. Cf. also, *Itogi* . . . , pp. 95, 104-109.

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Table III

(percentages)

Working population 1959	Total	Urban	Rural
Working class	46·6	31·4	15·2
Unskilled workers	22·4		
Skilled workers	(18-20)	24·2	
Highly skilled workers	(4-6)		
Kolkhoz peasantry	33·3	1·3	32·0
Unskilled kolkhozniki	27-30·		
Skilled and highly skilled kolkhozniki	3·6		
Intelligentsia and employees ...	19·8	14·5	5·3
Workers-by-brain	12·0		
Service workers	7·8		
Individual peasants and non-cooperative artisans	0·3	0·1	0·2

the second consist of officials, clerks, distributive workers, etc. In 1959 there were 12·8 million in the first category and 8·4 million in the second. As can be seen, even this modest attempt to bring some reality into the concept of intelligentsia or mental workers, by restricting it by implication to the first category, still casts the net unrealistically wide, by making it larger than the second category, which in western terms would be called 'white-collar workers'. But it is a step in the right direction.

Social structure: a closer look

The second approach to the problem of social structure in a communist country can best be made by studying its sociological analysis in Poland, where sociology has reached the greatest degree of emancipation from party tutelage.[12] This is not to imply that the problems of social structure and social change are not different in the Soviet Union and in Poland, that they do not present special characteristics reflecting different historical backgrounds and conditions. Nevertheless, because of the common features—party rule, the goal of classless society as the ideological *terminus ad quem* of the transformation of social structure, state ownership of the means of production in industry—a description of the Polish case provides an illuminating comparison and a useful, because closer, approximation to the problem.

[12] Cf. C. Andrieux, 'La sociologie polonaise', *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, no. 1, 1958, and 'Note sur le développements récents de la recherche en Pologne', *Revue Francaise de sociologie*, no. 1 1960; J. Szczepanski, 'Sociology in Contemporary Poland', *Polish Perspectives*, no. 1, 1958, *Sondages*, no. 1, 1959; 'Current Preoccupations of Social Research in Poland', *International Labour Review*, November 1960; Emilia Wilder, 'Sociology in Poland', *Problems of Communism*, no. 1, 1965; B. A. Osadczuk-Korab, 'Sociologie und Politik in Polen', *Moderne Welt*, no. 1, 1966; L. Labedz, 'The destinies of Sociology in Poland', *Survey*, no. 28.

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Unlike *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo,* the Polish statistical handbook, *Rocznik Statystyczny*, does not contain a table on the 'class composition of the population'. It provides data on urbanisation, employment and family budgets which are relevant for a general picture of social change in Poland, but it does not try to generalise them in a wider framework. This, however, is what some Polish sociologists attempted to do on the basis of population statistics, as well as their own research.

Urban migration in Poland is very similar to that in the Soviet Union. Before the war, in 1938, the urban population constituted 30 per cent of the total [13] (33 per cent in the Soviet Union in 1940). In 1950 the figure for both countries was the same—39 per cent; in 1964 it was slightly lower in Poland (49·2 as against 52 in the Soviet Union). This seems to suggest that the form of agricultural ownership, individual in Poland, collective in the Soviet Union, does not significantly affect urban migration, but is a corollary of industrialisation itself, as in other countries, whether private ownership exists in agriculture or in industry. This is even more striking if one considers the depressed state of the Soviet agricultural population and the relative well-being of Polish peasants. The advantages of urban employment are obviously irresistible, whatever the policies in the countryside. Perhaps the difference affects in a limited way the age composition and the sex-ratio of the rural population, but even here it is a marginal factor, because the general tendency is similar in respect to these two elements as well in both cases. Rural sociology in Poland shows how the changing value-patterns and motivations among peasants, particularly the younger ones, account for this (see below).

In general, Polish sociologists, who are far from being unanimous on the subject, approach problems of social change, not by stressing their conformity with doctrinal postulates, but by putting emphasis on the consequences of 'socialist industrialisation', thus discreetly by-passing the ideological obstacles to the study of social facts.[14] Professor Jan Szczepanski described their task: 'The role of the sociologists in the study of the processes of industrialisation is derived from the fact that they are studying what is really happening . . . . the planned and expected processes, as well as the unexpected and unforeseen phenomena occurring on the basis of the spontaneously operating laws of social life and the nature of the individuals'.[15]

Szczepanski is the sociologist in Poland who, on the basis of a lot of empirical material, has written most about the basic features of social change in the country. He is the editor of a series of monographs on

[13] *Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1965, p. 13.

[14] They are no longer challenging them directly in the way the late Stanislaw Ossowski did, when he wrote about 'the destruction of the official myths which concealed our reality' (*Class Structure and Class Consciousness,* London, 1962 p. 193).

[15] 'Spoleczne Aspekty Industrializacji w Polsce Ludowej', *Studia Socjologiczne,* no. 3, 1965, p. 34.

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the working class and the intelligentsia, published by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The twenty volumes in this series which have appeared so far contain a mass of factual material on social change available neither in such quantity nor quality in any other communist country. With their help, and with the available statistical data, he has written several essays on social change in Poland.[16]

He distinguishes between the changes which have taken place in the 'traditional' (pre-war) classes and strata, and 'the processes of emergence of new differentiations characteristic for the socialist basis'. He doubts whether the latter can be adequately analysed in terms of the former:

> Taking into account the changes in the composition of the traditional classes and strata, in their mutual relationships, and their functioning in society as a whole, is it possible to describe adequately the actual structure of our society in terms of the traditional classes and strata? How does the new economic basis created by the planned economy, the large nationalised or socialised sector, change the class structure and social stratification? Or, to put it differently, what kind of social differentiation, specific for socialist society, but not for capitalist, does it create? This is a most important question, often missed by the theoreticians and practitioners who, fascinated by the social structure of capitalist society and by the task of its transformation, still use the concepts and the framework created by the economic basis of capitalism in studying social change in our country. What can we say now about the new social differentiations already created by the new socialist economy? Unfortunately little. Our sociological research has been conducted so far from the point of view of changes in the traditional classes and strata.[17]

Having asked the pertinent question about the new social structure, Szczepanski is somewhat sceptical about the orthodox doctrinal approach[18]:

> It may be maintained that the foundation of the new structure continues to be the division into four traditional classes and strata: the working class, the peasantry, the 'intelligentsia' and the petty bourgeoisie, i.e. the private owners of small workshops, handicrafts, and retail outlets. But their internal class composition is different in present day Poland, as are their general functions, inter-relations, and interconnections. The ladder of their social status has also altered.

Szczepanski proceeds nevertheless to analyse them within the doctrinally restricted framework, and although the conceptual straitjacket prevents

[16] 'Some characteristics of Contemporary Polish Society', *The Polish Sociological Bulletin*, no. 2, 1964; 'Przemiany Spoleczne w Polsce', *Nauki Polska*, nos. 5-6, 1964; 'Zmiany w strukturze klasowej spolecznestwa Polskiege', in *Przemiany Spoleczne w Polsce Ludowej*, ed. Adam Sarapata (Warsaw, 1965).

[17] Szczepanski, 'Przemiany Spoleczne w Polsce', loc. cit., p. 149.

[18] Szczepanski, 'Some Characteristics of Contemporary Polish Society', loc cit., p. 8.

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a closer examination of social differences and inter-relations, the description and analysis of the content of the social categories in question is based on the 'reality principle' and not on the doctrinal 'pleasure principle'. In other words, it is more concerned with sociologically relevant facts than with what they should, doctrinally, be.

Szczepanski is quite clear that the term 'intelligentsia' should not be applied to all the motley category of white collar workers. None of the social characteristics traditionally attached to the former term applies to the latter. Artists, writers, teachers, journalists, scientists, and the like enjoyed before the war a high social prestige and relatively high standard of living, and these features are characteristic of only a small part, and not of the bulk, of what is now officially called 'intelligentsia'. The actual differences between the 'old' and the 'new' intelligentsia are treated sociologically and not ideologically.[19]

Or almost; occasionally Szczepanski applies the term 'intelligentsia' indiscriminately (i.e. in its Soviet usage), but when making comparisons he makes it clear what actual social groups he has in mind, so as to compare like with like. Here are some of his conclusions:

> In comparison with 1939 the number of mental workers increased (in Poland) more than threefold. This is a tendency which appears in all industrialised countries.[20]
>
> In 1939 the national economy employed more than 700,000 white-collar workers. Together with families, the intelligentsia constituted about 6 per cent of the nation . . . . We have now more than 2,100,000 white-collar workers, i.e. almost a threefold increase compared to 1939.[21]
>
> We should note the rapid growth in the number of office-administrative employees. Compared to the pre-war years, we observe among them an increase in the number of persons without secondary education. The number of persons in the leading posts of the state, industrial administration and in enterprises of various kinds has also increased rapidly.[22]

[19] Cf. J. Szczepanski, '*Inteligencja i Spoleczenstwo* (Warsaw, 1957); 'Changes in the Structure and Functions of the Intelligentsia', *International Social Science Bulletin*, no. 2, 1957; 'Pracownicy umyslowi, proletariat, inteligencja czy klasa srednia', *Przeglad Kulturalny*, nos. 51-52, 1958; *Z badan klasy robotniczej i inteligencji* (Lodz, 1958; 'Inteligencja a pracownicy umy slowi', *Przeglad Socjologiczny*, no. 2, 1959; 'Struktura inteligencji w Polsce', *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, nos. 1-2, 1960; *Wyksztalcenie a pozycja spoleczna inteligencji*, vol. I (Lodz, 1959), vol. II (Lodz, 1960), in particular 'Conclusion', pp. 445-510; 'The Polish intelligentsia: Past and Present', *World Politics*, no. 3, 1962.

[20] J. Szczepanski, 'Przemiany Spoleczne w Polsce', *Nauka Polska*, nos. 5-6, p. 145.

[21] J. Szczepanski, 'The Social Structure of Polish Society', *Kultura*, 22 December, 1963. It is interesting to note that between 1931 and 1959 they increased from 2·1 to 8·1 per cent of the total population, while industrial workers increased during that time from 3·5 to 8·5 per cent. Cf. M. Charkiewicz, *Kadry kwalifikowane w Polsce* (Warsaw, 1961). *Rocznik Statystyczny* in its 1965 edition gave the number of mental workers for 1960 as 2·4 million, compared with 2·1 million in 1956 (p. 35).

[22] Szczepanski, ibid. According to the estimate by J. Madej in his book *O funkcjonowaniu gospodarki narodowej* (Warsaw, 1963), one of each 26 gainfully employed persons in the Polish economy is involved in planning (pp. 31-7). According to Glushkov, if the present Soviet planning methods are not reformed, by

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> The internal differentiation and stratification of the new intelligentsia has also undergone important changes . . . . The creative intelligentsia numbers about 50,000 people; experts and the leading personnel—about 650,000; administrative and office workers—about 1,300,000 . . . . All these processes of change have transformed the intelligentsia completely and destroyed its internal cohesion. As a result of numerical growth, professions became the focal points, the intelligentsia ceased to be a cohesive stratum with its own social selfconsciousness and is becoming a collection of professional categories fulfilling specialised tasks, whose social position and prestige are determined by the social division of labour and the importance of these tasks for the development of a society undergoing industrialisation.[23]

Unlike the 'intelligentsia', the petty bourgeoisie has not been the subject of systematic sociological research in Poland. Szczepanski includes in this category owners of small enterprises, individual traders, and self-employed artisans (Marxist criteria notwithstanding, individual peasant proprietors are not included).

In 1927 the petty bourgeoisie was estimated to number (with families) about 3·3 million, in 1931 3·5 million, about 11 per cent of the total population. A large proportion of them were Jews. Their destruction by the Nazis and the impact of the German occupation did not bring the extinction of the petty bourgeoisie in Poland. After the war there were about 400,000 small enterprises in existence which, as a result of communist economic policy, dwindled to 150,000 in the middle fifties. After 1956 their number started growing again and reached about 190,000 in 1961. Since then it has been more or less stationary, despite some fluctuations which led Szczepanski to stress that

> It is a fluid class. The number of enterprises is changing every year. It is a class which exists without any prospects for the future. It does not maintain its old traditions and virtues, but calculates the possibilities of immediate survival within the framework of the socialist economy.[24]

Such survival depends of course on the policy of the party, so that it is not surprising that this affects the social character of this class, which shows a tendency to seek a more legitimate status by penetrating the co-operative sector of the economy. In many cases the 'co-operative' label still covers the reality of private enterprise, a repetition of a phenomenon known in the twenties in the Soviet Union as '*Odeskii artel*.'

1980 the whole adult population of the Soviet Union would have to be employed in planning activities (quoted by A. Zauberman in *Survey*, no. 47, p. 100, from *Planovoe Khozyaistvo*, October 1962, p. 5).

[23] J. Szczepanski in *Przemiany Spoleczne w Polsce Ludowej*, ed. A. Sarapata (Warsaw, 1965), pp. 33–36.

[24] *Rocznik Statystyczny* 1965, p. 535; Szczepanski, 'The Social Structure of Polish Society', *Kultura*, 22 December, 1963.

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In dealing with the peasantry, Szczepanski openly admits that he is disregarding 'the classical definition of social class', but thinks that it is possible to regard the agricultural rural population as a whole in view of some of its social characteristics.[25] He excludes, however, from his definition of peasantry agricultural labourers, who are landless and do not work for themselves, while the peasants working on collective and state farms are in the process of becoming separate strata (in 1964 they worked 1 per cent and 13 per cent of the total land area respectively [26]).

In 1931 the rural population in Poland numbered about 19 million, of whom more than 16 million were peasant proprietors and their families. Rural occupations engaged 60 per cent of all the gainfully employed; by 1960 they had fallen to 38·2 per cent. (11·2 million), of whom peasants occupied in private farming constituted by far the largest part. The rest belonged to the following categories: (1) collective farmers—about 135,000 (with families) in 1961; (2) peasant-workers—about 820,000 in 1960 (of whom 670,000 get the greater share of their income from non-agricultural work); (3) peasant-officials engaged in clerical and administrative duties in the villages; their number increased greatly at the time of enforced collectivisation, and they still number 100 to 150 thousand, or perhaps more. There are also peasant-entrepreneurs and peasant-artisans, but they form a marginal percentage of the total. The internal differentiation of the peasantry is, according to Szczepanski, the most important of the social changes affecting them, and this is reinforced by the effects of the steadily diminishing size of individual holdings, which forces the peasants to seek other or additional employment (hence the increase in the number of peasant-workers).

Agricultural workers are officially part of the working class. In 1931 there were about 3 million (with families), or 9 per cent of the country's population. The post-war land reform and industrial expansion resulted in a steep fall in the number of agricultural labourers. In 1961 there were 280,000 on state farms, and over 14,000 employed on private farms; about 30,000 were mechanics and tractor drivers, and about 13,000 were employed on state farms in non-agricultural occupations. Altogether there are about 350,000 agricultural hired labourers, and even if this figure is an underestimate—as it almost certainly is—it indicates how this category has dwindled.

Urban workers with their families constituted about 20 per cent of the population in Poland in 1931; the wage-earners themselves numbered about 2·8 million, of whom about 830,000 were industrial workers. In 1964 total employment outside agriculture and forestry had risen to 7·6 million, of whom 2·6 million were industrial workers, a threefold

[25] Szczepanski in Sarapata (ed.), op. cit., p. 48; theoretically, this is of course the thin edge of the wedge. If it is possible to disregard 'the relation to the means of production' as the paramount class-determining factor in the case of peasants, it is possible to do so in other cases and multiple-factor analysis has to be admitted.

[26] *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1965*, p. 118.

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increase.[27] Szczepanski considers that despite the great influx of peasants, the new working class is beginning to show signs of stabilisation. It is, however, very different from the pre-war working class, and, as sociological studies have shown, the influence of the old workers and their traditions is relatively small. Its position in the new social structure is described by Szczepanski in terms which can perhaps best be defined as the diplomatic coexistence of sociology and doctrine [28]:

> The working class became the ruling class, but its rule has a different meaning from class rule in capitalist society. While being a socialist co-owner of industry, the worker has not ceased to be a hired hand, subordinated to his superiors in the management of the enterprise. There are no occupational categories or social strata directly subordinated to the workers. The rule of this class is exercised through the party and the economic, political, and administrative institutions it directs.

This brings us to the third approach in the analysis of the social structure of communist countries. The first is statistical and, strictly speaking, does not concern itself with *social* differentiation ; if it brings occupational or educational differences into the picture, this is only in order to perpetuate the myth of growing social homogeneity.

The second approach is more sociological, but it concentrates on the *internal* differentiation of the traditional groups and classes. It falls short of a frank analysis of relations *between* them and of their wider implications. But if the doctrinal obstacles make the emphasis here somewhat sociographic, some sociologists in Poland (and Czechoslovakia), unlike their Soviet colleagues, point out in a restrained way that there are unacknowledged problems involved, even though they do not study them closely. Szczepanski makes this explicit in his conclusion (p. 78):

> I would like to stress that I have been using the traditional class divisions and stratification characteristic of capitalist society, in order to make the social changes stand out more sharply, although I realise quite well that these divisions are not very useful for the study of the functioning and of the stratification system of socialist society . . . . In order to present a complete picture of the social changes which have taken place and are taking place in our society, it would be necesary to describe the macro-structure of the pre-war society on the basis of the criteria of divisions which were then obligatory, to describe also the macro-structure of contemporary society, but on the basis of the new criteria of divisions, and then to compare the two, using detailed monographic studies.

Although such studies of the new social stratification are lacking, the theoretical recognition of some of the most sensitive ideological questions about the new social structure is not far from the surface, despite

[27] *Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1965, pp. 60-141 ; Szczepanski, in Sarapata, op. cit., p. 66.
[28] Ibid. p. 72.

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ideological resistance. This comes out quite clearly in some of the sociological writings and discussions in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but not in the Soviet Union.

Social structure: theoretical considerations

The treatment of the problems of social structure and social change by Soviet sociologists remains immaculately doctrinal, despite some effort to bring into the doctrinal framework a certain awareness of the actual social realities. Semenov summarised the accepted approach to the problem:

> Social-class differences are differences among the people based on their position within the system of production relations and, hence, their place in social relations as a whole: political, ideological, cultural, family, and those concerned with living conditions. In the Soviet Union there are the following social-class differences: (1) class differences between the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry, stemming from the existence of the two forms of socialist ownership; (2) social differences between people mainly engaged in physical labour (workers and peasants) and people mainly engaged in mental work, constituting the social stratum of the intelligentsia; (3) socio-economic and cultural differences, as well as differences in living conditions, between cities and villages (based on the level of development of the production forces and the character of labour, the forms of production relations, living conditions, education and culture, degree of popular welfare); (4) social differences within the working class and kolkhoz peasantry, within the intelligentsia and the employees, in the composition of urban and rural labour.[29]

The adequacy of these doctrinal verities for the interpretation of the character of the new social structure was subjected to scrutiny in a sociological discussion in Poland. Szczepanski asked the crucial question in a paper given at a conference in 1963:

> Is it possible to apply the Leninist definition of classes so often quoted, to the analysis of class structure in a society where there is no more exploitation, but where a 'regulated inequality' and a hierarchy of classes and positions continues to exist?[30]

Leaving aside the question of exploitation, one can say that this goes to the heart of the matter. But Szczepanski was not the only one who tackled the theoretical problem of the new criteria of stratification and of the meaning which is to be attributed to the classes and strata of the 'socialist society'. Among those who took part in the discussion or referred to the problem in their writings were B. Minc, J. Wiatr, Z. Bauman, B. Galeski, A. Sarapata, W. Weslowski, S. Widerszpil, M. Dziewicka, and A. Schaff.

[29] V. Semenov, 'Sotsialnaya struktura sovetskogo obshchevsta', *Kommunist*, no. 11, July 1965, p. 39.

[30] J. Szczepanski, 'Zalozenia i zagadnieria badan nad klasa robotnicza', *Studia Socjologiczne*, no. 1, 1964, p. 17.

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Bronislaw Minc was the first to propose a new theory of the socialist social structure to replace Stalin's.[31] He wrote that 'the accepted class and stratification division should logically derive from the character of the ownership of the means of production and correspond to the character of social production and organisation. From this point of view the traditional division into two classes—workers and peasants—and a stratum of intelligentsia fails completely'. He noticed that, for instance, 'a worker on a state farm often performs the same kind of work as a collective farmer, yet one is considered a worker and the other a peasant'. According to Minc classes are determined by the relation to the means of production, and strata by their position in social organisation or their material position. He therefore proposed to carry this logic to its conclusion and to consider that socialist society is divided into two classes: 'the class of the workmen of the state sector of the economy and the class of the workmen of the co-operative sector'.

This thesis was subjected to a barrage of objections from a variety of standpoints, with some critics emphasising the internal inconsistency of Minc's reasoning, some its inconsistency with Marxism, some the basically orthodox position underlying his arguments, some his schematism, and still others, its divorce from social reality. The reply of the late Stanislaw Ossowski was perhaps the most radical and devastating, but he never returned to the discussion, on a detailed basis, whether for lack of opportunity, time, or simply because he did not consider it worth while, having dealt with the subject itself at considerable length. Szczepanski wrote that Minc's scheme of class division in socialist society would result 'in classes being only collections in the logical sense, but what constitutes the real meaning of the class theory, i.e. the fact of social inequality, would disappear'. And he added: 'One cannot consider a minister and a charwoman as belonging to one class because they both work in the state sector of the economy; its employees constitute a class in the logical, but not in the sociological sense'; in the post-capitalist or socialist society the 'relation-to-the-means-of-production' criterion of class division was no longer relevant and its role was ended.[32]

This reasoning, as Minc pointed out in his rejoinder, would lead to the doctrinally most pernicious conclusions:

> For a society where all the means of production are nationalised, the criterion of the relation to the means of production has a basic significance; because on the basis of this criterion, we can affirm that all the members of this society have a uniform relation to the means of production, and therefore that it is a classless society . . . .

[31] B. Minc, 'O klasach i warstwach w socjalizmie', *Polityka*, no. 39 and 42, 1961; 'Klasy, warstwy a demokracja spoleczna', ibid. no. 46, 1961; cf. also his subsequent treatment of the same argument in *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, no. 3, 1963, p. 50. The first article by Minc was followed by two critical letters in *Polityka* (nos. 40 and 41, 1961) by S. Szwalbe and S. Ossowski.

[32] *Przeglad Kulturalny*, 12 October 1961.

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> With a change of the criterion no society can become classless because if it becomes classless according to the previous criterion, it would not be classless according to the new criterion.[33]

Hier liegt der Hund begraben. One can hardly be more candid in the defence of a sociological myth. The discussion has shown that, caught between the doctrine and social reality, between different types of logical and factual difficulties in formulating a theory of social structure in a 'socialist society', those sociologists who want to defend orthodoxy can no longer be consistent, while those who discreetly try to by-pass it dare not yet be so. They can avoid inconsistencies and the sociological surrealism of the doctrinal assumptions by simply abandoning them and by openly admitting their utopian character, but they refrain from carrying arguments to their logical conclusion.

Another attempt to square the doctrine with reality was made by Wiatr, who, unlike Minc, does not push the logic of the Leninist definition to its extreme, but tries a semantic gambit.[34]

> Workers, peasants, and intelligentsia—these are rather the great social strata which do not differ in socialism on the basis of their relation to the means of production, but because of other—previously mentioned—different characteristics.

With this Minc did agree, but, pursuing his doctrinal logic, he repeated that 'as a socialist society is not classless society, one has to assume the existence not only of strata, but also of classes, and these classes can be determined only by the existence of nationalised property and collective property of the means of production'.

Wiatr developed his own interpretation of the 'socialist social structure' in his book *Spoleczenstwo. Wstep do socjologii systematycznej* (*Society. Introduction to systematic sociology,* Warsaw, 1964). Like Ossowski, he admits that the concept of non-antagonistic classes, introduced by Stalin in 1935, is from the Marxist or Leninist point of view a contradiction in terms, and criticises Minc for retaining it, as well as for exaggerating the importance of social differences deriving from the existence of the two forms of socialist property and underestimating other social differences, which may be more important sociologically. To arrive at a 'non-egalitarian classlessness', Wiatr maintains that social strata are the paramount elements of social differentiation in socialism. This type of division is the result of different conditions in town and countryside, of the historical stage of the development of the division of labour, of the differences in skill, education, and income. He gives the following scheme of social stratification under socialism:

(1) Intelligentsia: leading cadres, creative, and technical
(2) Mental workers with average qualifications

[33] *Polityka,* 18 November 1961.
[34] *Zycie Warszawy,* 29-30 October 1961.

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(3) Highly-skilled and average-skilled industrial workers
(4) Low-skilled mental workers, functionaries, and service employees
(5) Peasants on private, collective, and state farms
(6) Unskilled manual workers

Wiatr considers that both from the point of view of hierarchy of prestige and of income differentiation and material benefits in general, this scheme corresponds to social realities, and one could agree, but for the absence of the consideration of the third element in the analytical triad of social stratification; 'class, status, and power'. One has also to note that the scheme reflects some specificities of the Polish social scene and would have to be modified when applied to the Soviet scene.

A Solomonic solution was offered by Z. Bauman, who affirmed that both schemes of class divisions and of stratification are legitimate, as they are concerned with different aspects of social structure,[35] while B. Galeski stressed that occupational structure becomes the basis of the social structure. As a rural sociologist he maintains that in the countryside socialist industrialisation creates a situation in which occupational group and not social class becomes the basis for the emergence of the new social forces, and if this is true in the villages, where the old differentiation in relation to the means of production persists in Poland, it must be also true in the towns, and in fact in respect to society in general, as, with industrialisation, urban occupational structure is gradually becoming the basis of the new social structure. His theoretical explanation of this thesis is somewhat dubious: it is said to be the result of the fact that socialist industrialisation does not bring about the concentration of capital.[36]

A more orthodox position is taken by S. Widerszpil, who is, however, critical of Minc's dyed-in-the-wool doctrinaire position for disregarding, in its abstract model of socialist society, 'the sector of small commodity production [i.e. private peasants, artisans, and traders], as well as the important differences between town and countryside and between mental and manual workers'.[37] He accepts the concept of 'non-antagonistic classes', but is curiously defensive in discussing classes in socialist society, saying that 'the concept of class has not yet completely lost its adequacy in the description of the relations between large groups in our social structure'. He admits, however, that 'among the criteria of class divisions the relation to the means of production is beginning to play a relatively smaller role in comparison with such factors as "the role in the social organisation of production", "the source of income" and "the way of life".'

[35] Z. Bauman, *Zarys Marksistowskiej teorii spoleczenstwa* (Warsaw, 1964), p. 66.
[36] *Studia Socjologiczne*, no. 1, 1963, pp. 60-65.
[37] S. Widerszpil, 'Interpretacja przemian struktury spolecznej w Polsce Ludowej', *Nowe Drogi*, no. 1, 1965. Cf. also articles by the same author in *Zycie Gospodarcze*, 29 October 1961 and *Studia Socjologiczne*, no. 1, 1964.

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Another attempt to find a way out of the difficulties presented by the old theory of the socialist social structure, while remaining within the framework of Marxist categories, was made by Maria Dziewicka.[38] Referring to the theories summarised above, she thought their 'basic fault, whatever the approach and attitude of the author, lies in their treatment of socialist society as in principle a society without conflict, or at least in their treating of the conflicts in this society as a secondary, marginal, transitory, external affair. Yet the very essence of the Marxist analysis of society is to uncover conflict in the very heart of things, the search for the contradictions which give momentum to movement and development'. As a result there is a serious discrepancy 'between what is being said about socialist society *ex cathedra* and what is said or thought about it in a close circle of friends'. The relation to the means of production is a basic Marxist class criterion only in so far as it determines the distribution of the surplus product, it is therefore a subordinate criterion in determining the general social structure of a society based on a given system of production:

> The basic conflict in socialist society is to be sought, as is the case with other societies, in the system of production and in the appropriation of the global product and national income.

The argument is not exactly new; it has been used by some western Marxists to prove the existence of state capitalism in Russia. Dziewicka gives it, however, another twist. She argues that the group conflict over the distribution of goods and values is the paramount factor in the Marxist sociological perspective, and that this basic conflict in a socialist society must therefore be located before its social structure can be properly analysed. If, in capitalist society, it is the conflict between bourgeoisie and the working class, in a socialist society the basic conflict about the appropriation of the necessary and surplus product resides in the clash between the general social interest and individual and group interests. This is of course the precise opposite to the usual Soviet premise which identifies general and sectional interests in a socialist society (for instance, *mestnichestvo*—the sin of localism—while recognised in practice, is disregarded in theory).

Dziewicka regards this conflict as the sociological counterpart of the economic conflict in socialist society between accumulation and consumption, a rather dubious proposition on her own Marxist premises. Moreover, she argues that this conflict is 'non-antagonistic'; in capitalist society, where conflict between the classes is 'antagonistic', the general social interest appears as the interest of the working class; in socialist society, in the absence of antagonistic classes, the conflict takes another form, the general social interest cannot be identified with the interest of any one class and the conflict can be resolved peacefully.

[38] M. Dziewicka, 'W sprawie struktury spoleczenstwa socjalistycznego', *Studia Sociologiczne*, no. 4, 1965.

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The reasoning is ingenious but unconvincing. In the Marxist perspective the general social interest cannot exist as a Platonic idea or a disembodied Hegelian category among the conflicting class interests. Dziewicka realises the internal contradiction of her scheme and, in order to rescue her somewhat shamefaced empirical admissions, she proposes to replace the term 'class'—'indissolubly linked in Marxist theory with the antagonistic conflict of interests'—by another term 'which would facilitate more precise thinking and assessments and would get rid of various misunderstandings'. She insists that although her attempt to consider socialist society as such in accordance with the Marxist method may be 'clumsy', 'it is high time to put boldly forward the general problems of socialist society . . . . Because there are no societies without conflict and no development without conflict'.

THESE successive approximations to the problem of social structure in the communist countries are in fact gradual approximations to social realities by the sociologists in these countries. The admission of the permanence of social conflict is only one such approximation in the shift from Utopia to reality. One is almost tempted to say that, to use the familiar Leninist term, they illustrate the 'law of uneven development'. It is not only that the mixture of sociology (the fact of social conflict) and of Marxist theology (the disquisitions on its antagonistic or non-antagonistic character) is differently perceived at different times and places, but that the genuine elements of social change are being admitted more easily in some countries than in others; this is largely a reflection of the political situation, but also a process in which sociological cognisance in one country may influence its endorsement in others, and in any case affects the contemporary level of doctrinal perception.

Two sensitive points on the road from the recovery from Utopia to the rediscovery of reality are of course the economic differences and the power structure in society. It was the Czechoslovak sociologist Miroslav Jodl who in an article in the French communist journal *Democratie Nouvelle* (No. 1, 1966) approached these two points most explicitly:

> The bankruptcy of utopian socialism did not result in the disappearance of all utopian traces from socialist ideology. In political and journalistic activities many statements and formulas are used as a routine, although on closer examination they turn out to be quite muddled . . . . As a result of the many disappointments we have suffered in our age, their effectiveness seems to have weakened, but they are still used. In all contemporary societies, particularly among the youth, there has risen a wave of scepticism about assumptions and affirmations of a purely ideological character. . . . The characteristic trait of the society we are living in is the elimination of class criteria; differentiation is mainly based on two criteria: participation in power and the material conditions of life.

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> The socialist system eliminated the enormous discrepancy in income in capitalist society between the richest and the poorest strata. But this does not mean that there are no social problems in our society, that we do not encounter social differences, often quite visible differences. We have a category of well-to-do people (with decent incomes, villas, and cars), and we also have a category of people whose material conditions of existence are still very difficult. . . . Incomes are only one element of material existence; there is also housing, the opportunities for additional earnings, the number of gainfully employed members in the family, the number of children, material or other forms of help by parents, etc. . . .
>
> But the most important criterion of social differentiation is the criterion of power. The complicated mechanism of the socialist society is based on a system of rule in which power is institutionally concrete. It is based on a system of steps on a ladder, where people differ among themselves according to the degree of participation in power. Moreover, because of the very tight interdependence between the phenomena of the division of labour and the division of power, and hence of social influence, it is precisely the position of the individual in the hierarchy of power that largely determines his position in the social structure; it is this power position which decisively influences his attitudes and ideological preferences. Because of this differentiation in power and social influence, some categories of people take part in decision-making and others are only the 'objects' of decisions already taken (that a person may, in different situations, be at one time a 'subject' and at another an 'object' does not change the picture).
>
> The abolition of private ownership of the means of production does not yet mean that all members of society find themselves in the same relation towards the means of production. The character of these relations cannot be the same for one who has 'power' and for one at the bottom of the hierarchy. A wide range of differentiation emerges, and its functioning and dynamics seriously affect the life of individuals and of society in general.

In Czechoslovakia sociology began to revive only in the sixties,[39] and yet little has appeared so far in other communist countries which is comparable to the above in its bold approach to the problem. In Poland, since the retreat from October, theoretical formulations in sociology have become subdued; yet the subterranean erosion of ideology by sociology goes on, although in a different way from 1956–57. Ossowski and Malewski are no longer present, but now the defenders of the faith are expressing dangerous thoughts; the period of doubt was

[39] The Czechoslovak Sociological Society was established in April 1964. For a discussion on conditions and prospects of sociological research in Czechoslovakia, see: J. Klofac, 'Social research in our country', *Predvoj*, 28 June 1962; 'What is the state of our sociology?', *Rude Pravo*, 2 November 1963; D. Slejska, 'Do not let us be afraid of sociology', *Osvetova Prace* no. 20, 1963; J. Pasiak, 'What is the matter with our sociology?', *Predvoj*, 14 January 1965, and the report of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPCS, 'The further course for sociological work', *Nova Mysl*, no. 6, 1965.

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followed by the tightening of controls over cultural activities, but it had an effect, even if the scope of research has been restricted.

There are some data on income differences and the hierarchy of occupational prestige, and although sociological research on the party cadres does not throw much light on the power structure, the problem of power has been touched upon in an unprecedented way.

Differences in earnings are of course only one element in the economic differentiation of the population in communist countries. Not all of them are official, and in any case the structure of privilege is not just a reflection of income differentials. With this proviso, it is interesting to note that within the generally more egalitarian income distribution there has been a significant shift from before the war between the working class and white-collar workers. According to the calculations of Professor Michal Kalecki, the real wages of the former have gone up, the salaries of the latter have gone down. The internal differentiation of the two groups in terms of gross income is given in the following table [40]:

Zlotys per month	Manual workers		Mental workers	
700-800	10·7		1·3	
801-1,000	7·2		5·4	
1,001-1,200	8·7		9·1	59·2
1,201-1,500	15·6		17·1	
1,501-2,000	24·7		26·3	
2,001-2,500	15·9		16·3	
2,501-3,000	8·5	33·1	10·4	
Over 3,000	8·7		14·1	
	100·0		100·0	

The table shows that the lower income group contains a greater percentage of manual workers, but that 33·1 per cent of them earn over 2,000 zlotys, while 59·2 per cent of mental workers earn less. This of course is far from a full picture, but it is indicative. Interestingly enough, investigations into the ownership of consumer durables show a similar pattern, [41] while—predictably—there is a far greater expenditure on 'spiritual goods' (books, theatres, etc.) among mental workers.

The question of the power structure and its role in the general social structure is of course the most crucial and at the same time the most sensitive as a subject for discussion and sociological investigation. But if proper research into it is practically taboo, and the Polish studies in the 'sociology of political relations' confirm this, the subject itself is explicitly recognised. It was dealt with extensively, if apologetically,

[40] *Polska w liczbach, 1944-1964,* Warsaw, 1964, p. 104, quoted in W. Wesolowski, *Przemiany spoleczne w Polsce Ludowej,* Warsaw, 1965, p. 119.

[41] J. Kordos, 'Wyposazenie gospodarstw domowych w niektore przedmioty trwalego uzytkowama', *Wiadomosci Statystyczne,* no. 4, 1963, quoted in Wesolowski, op. cit., p. 122.

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in a paper delivered at the third congress of Polish sociologists (in 1965) by W. Wesolowski and J. J. Wiatr [42]:

> The increased role of the state in the life of socialist society brings about the expansion of the ruling apparatus and the emergence of a quite numerous and relatively homogeneous (despite internal differences) group of people, who are professionally occupied with the implementation of political decisions, the realisation of the process of ruling. The character and role of this social group have not yet been subjected to an exhaustive analysis from Marxist positions. . . . It is no secret that anti-communist literature has for years been speculating about the nature of the professional apparatus of power in socialist countries. It sees in it a 'power elite' divorced from the people, or even a 'ruling class' [Djilas, Fainsod, Friedrich, Brzezinski, Wolfe, Rostow, are mentioned here]. The writings of the west European and American 'sovietologists', and the mass-propaganda following in their wake, try to present the problem as though the fact itself of the existence of a separate apparatus of power necessarily signifies the emergence of a 'bureaucracy' as an autonomous stratum and social force, and is even leading to its 'class' rule. . . . The fact that this is a favourite topic of hostile propaganda, not only does not make it taboo, but on the contrary puts upon us the duty of making fundamental scientific studies of the character of the state apparatus itself. Even the partial studies at our disposal—mainly in the military field—contradict the thesis about its 'separate class character' and indicate its open character and its strong links with the rest of society.

When facts can no longer be denied or explained away, apologetics has to take another form. It may perhaps be suggested that a study of the role of the party political elite in the state would be a more appropriate topic for the fundamental studies of the power structure in People's Poland than 'military sociology'. Curiously, it is the ex-diehards rather than the ex-revisionists who are more honest in facing facts. Already in 1961 the 'dogmatist' B. Minc stressed the importance of the 'leadership group', saying that it does not matter what label is attached to it, 'the fact is that this stratum exists'. [43] No less straightforward, but much less dogmatic, is Adam Schaff in his book, *Marxism and the Individual* (Warsaw, 1965):

> According to the Marxist classics the state under socialism will wither away as an apparatus of power, but will retain its function of the administration of things. . . . Assuming even the maximum of democracy and an approximation to the ideal type of a free association of producers postulated by the creators of Marxism, in today's conditions there will be the need, simply for technical reasons, of central direction and government of various aspects of

[42] 'Ksztaltowanie sie instytucji politycznych Polski Ludowej', *Studia Socjologiczne*, no. 3, 1965.
[43] *Polityka*, 18 November 1961.

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> social life, with the state remaining an apparatus-Moloch, an apparatus which must be professional in an age of specialisation. Bureaucracy, with all the democratic correctives subjecting the state apparatus to social control, remains a necessity in today's conditions. We should have no illusions that more can be achieved than that bureaucracy will be reasonable and competent. The state as an apparatus of administration will not wither away; this is a fiction in which the creators of Marxism did not believe in their mature age, and certainly it was not believed by Lenin. . . . The extensive apparatus of power remains, and even if it does not perform the function of coercion it stands over the individual. . . . With all the changes in the contemporary world, with all the radicalism of reforms leading to the democratisation of social life, this life must at some level be organised and centrally directed by a specialised apparatus in respect of which the individual is just a particle. . . . It is questionable whether *such* an apparatus of administration is sharply and radically different from the apparatus of coercion and its functions. . . . Among various possible divisions and criteria (taking into account that the complete equality of people in every respect is a fiction), what comes to the forefront is a division based on the exercise of some kind of power, even of administrative power (in the sense explained above). It is clear that, if the state as an extensive and complicated apparatus for governing social life must remain, there must exist also the group or stratum of people who perform these functions of ruling. . . . In socialist societies the power elite emerges which naturally benefits from its privileged social position. It is quite natural and socially justified, and there is not the slightest reason why it should be concealed by embarrassed silence.

To use Djilas' thesis for conservative purposes, honestly stating 'sociological inescapabilities', is perhaps more indicative of the evolution of communist societies than the thesis itself. The escape from Utopia and from the 'permanent revolution from above' creates the need to legitimise the status quo, not only of the party directing social change, but of the social structure which emerges from it, and of the 'priviligentsia' which rules over it. [44]

What light the detailed sociological studies throw on the problems of social change in communist countries, and what prospects of further evolution they indicate, will be discussed in subsequent instalments of this essay.

[44] It is now sometimes admitted that 'Marx and Engels were wrong in their quick hopes and concrete predictions and propositions about the new division of labour which was to replace the old division in socialist society. In their conceptions of the solution of the problems involved there were undoubtedly Utopian elements' (J. Waclawek, 'The theory of the division of labour and Marx's "Utopia"', *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, no. 4, 1961, p. 95). An indication that reality is breaking through to the surface in Russia is a proposal by F. Burlatsky to establish a Soviet 'political science' ('Politika i Nauka', *Pravda*, 10 January 1965). It is a somewhat ironical proposal after 50 years of 'scientific communism'.

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THE USES OF LEISURE

Paul Hollander

THE emergence of leisure as an issue of public discourse, ideological concern, and sociological analysis is one of the obvious products of post-Stalin social change. While Stalin's jovial proposition in 1936 (about life having become better and gayer) somewhat overstated the case at the time of the Great Purge, from the late fifties life for the Soviet citizen did become less of a burden; consequently a quest for its available and unavailable pleasures began to gain momentum. The results, for Soviet ideologues, are yet another demonstration of the way in which 'consciousness lags behind existence', or of the degree to which individual behaviour emancipates itself from the influence of institutions which were designed to guide it into appropriate channels. Given more (if still not enough) leisure, a great many Soviet citizens either have chosen to follow a path that shows a disturbing similarity to the ways in which citizens corrupted by capitalist societies spend their time, or they have exhibited symptoms of sincere bewilderment and paralysis of initiative. One student of such matters recently noted in *Pravda:*

> It is not a secret that among some of our scientists and practical workers the conviction prevailed . . . that an increase in free time automatically leads to a rise in people's cultural and technical level and in their labor productivity. However, special research conducted by the USSR Academy of Sciences Philosophy Institute showed that it is impossible to avoid serious negative consequences when the working day is shortened without simultaneously expanding the places for cultural recreation and amusement, without improving the organisation of leisure, especially for young people, and without conducting the appropriate ideological preparation. [1]

By now a veritable inventory of the undesirable responses to more leisure has been compiled by Soviet ideologues, journalists, party and komsomol officials, and social scientists. Particularly noteworthy are the time-honoured reliance on alcohol, the spread of hooliganism, street-corner malingering, excessive television watching, and unseemly dances. In the following we shall deal primarily with those aspects of Soviet leisure which reflect peculiarly Soviet conditions.

How did leisure acquire such prominence in post-Stalin Russia? First of all, as Soviet spokesmen themselves point out, 'non-working time' (of which leisure is a part [2]) acquires new importance in proportion

[1] Transl. *Current Digest of Soviet Press* (in the following abbreviated as CDSP), 6 April 1966, p. 5.

[2] '*Non-working time* . . . that which is not directly absorbed by participation in socially productive activities. . . . It includes routine activities of daily life and free time. . . . Free time is the part of non-working time which includes study . . . voluntary public activities, leisure, hobbies, creative activities, etc. . . . Leisure is one of the parts of free time connected with the restoration of the psychic and physical energies of man'. *Sotsiologiya v SSSR* (Moscow, 1965), vol. II, pp. 485, 495.

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to its quantitative increase. The reduction of the workday resulted in the citizens' spending less time in such well-defined settings as the place of work. The official recognition of the ideological-political significance of leisure must also be viewed in the context of diminished coercion. Since overt coercion has ceased to be the most favoured way of exacting conformity, persuasion came to occupy a more prominent place in social controls. Leisure time activities provide, at least in theory, good opportunities for persuasion, yet the official intention to make it functional from the regime's point of view clashes with the popular pressures for making it private and apolitical.

The insistence that communist society is not far away also has implications for leisure (even though this insistence has become somewhat more muted since the end of the Khrushchev era). Blueprints of communism must entail, besides projections of material abundance, what people will be able and expected to do with their free time.

The current official interest in leisure is also a by-product of the concern with the younger generation. Free time plays a much greater part in the lives of the young than in those of adults, and the ways in which they spend this time have a lasting influence upon the formation of their character. Soviet spokesmen find the misuse of free time a source for the development of anti-social attitudes. 'We must always remember that the morale and work of young people depend on how they spend their free time.'[3] And, no doubt, how they spend their free time also depends on their morale.

> Under socialism every worker can make use of his free time as he sees fit. This does not, however, mean that society takes a passive attitude towards the ways in which he utilises his time.[4]

Two major themes permeate the official discussion of leisure. One is the interdependence of leisure and work, that is, the contribution which well-spent leisure can make to efficiency at work; the other is the relationship between leisure and the 'all-round development of the personality'. Thus the desired functionalisation of leisure takes two forms: the morale-building, which has economic, productive relevance, and the ideological, which promotes the integration of the personal and political, or the personal and collective spheres of life. The official approach is frankly utilitarian:

> Free time does not amount to idleness . . . . This is the time devoted to study, the raising of qualifications, self-education and self-development (attending lectures, cultural groups, museums, the reading of fiction, journals, newspapers, etc.), to sports and hobbies (hunting, fishing, photography, etc.), to active rest and rational leisure (visiting places of entertainment, walks and excursions, travelling, open air festivals, creative discussion, and bringing up children, etc.), and also to participation in the life of society.[5]

[3] *CDSP*, 8 December 1965, pp. 15.
[4] G. S. Petrosian, *Vnerabochee Vremya Trudiashchikhsya v SSSR* (Moscow, 1965).
[5] Ibid. p. 16.

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An opinion poll on the preference of theatre-goers included this question: 'Has any production you have seen helped you to decide a vital, personal problem for yourself?' Among the appropriate and exemplary answers we read:

> After seeing 'Irkutsk story' I firmly resolved to get my husband to return to school for further study even though we had a year old child and lived in our own apartment . . . When I saw 'Judge between us, people' I decided to go to night school . . . The production of 'Colleagues' . . . helped me to understand what it means to choose an occupation suited to one's desires and abilities. [6]

While not insisting that all forms of entertainment should have such far-reaching effects on the audience, Soviet spokesmen continually stress its utilitarian rationale. The official conception of the rational uses of leisure time is prim and didactic:

> If in the time spent studying the worker does not learn anything useful and does not raise his qualifications he has spent his time in an irrational way. Time spent on domestic games is rational if it is devoted to such interesting and elevating games as chess, riddles (rebus), viktorina [?], crosswords, charades, etc. Time spent on entertaining or visiting is rational if it is devoted not to gossip, scandalmongering, and guzzling liquor, but to interesting conversation about the achievements of science and technology, about international and domestic political events, about the needs of production, to the exchange of experience about the upbringing of children, to the exchange of opinions about books read, films and plays seen, etc. [7]

To summarise, free time as seen by Soviet ideologues and social scientists should be used for the following purposes:

1. Recreation which helps to restore energy for production and for various useful social purposes.
2. Activities which contribute to the all round development of the personality (i.e. to the creation of the truly new Soviet Man described in the 1961 party programme as one 'who will combine harmoniously spiritual wealth, moral purity, and perfect physique').
3. Activities which raise educational and professional qualifications: formal and informal study, reading.
4. Participation in communal-public affairs of direct or indirect political and economic relevance (e.g. voluntary work for some communal project such as planting trees, improving housing, building cultural facilities, attending meetings, etc.).

The collectivisation of leisure activities is encouraged. The official preference for this needs little explanation: it follows from the disapproval of undesirable trends in its use, e.g. the development of the capacity for reflection, individualistic proclivities, and the taste for

[6] *CDSP*, 23 December 1964, p. 10.
[7] Petrosian, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

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privacy. In the official Soviet interpretation leisure appears more like work than play.

NEEDLESS to say, the desires of the Soviet Government and the recommendations of its ideologues are far from being the sole determinants of how Soviet citizens actually spend their leisure. Among the conditions affecting leisure we find factors which are independent of the official policies or which represent the unintended consequences of them. For example, the expenditure of free time is negatively affected by poor living conditions, the scarcity of consumer goods and household labour-saving devices, the time-consuming nature of routine tasks such as shopping. The priorities of the economy are further reflected in the acknowledged inadequacy of facilities for entertainment and recreation, particularly in the rural areas, small towns, and new industrial settlements. At the same time there is a whole set of factors which exert pressure towards greater popular demand for more and better leisure. If the home, in terms of privacy, comfort, and recreational facilities leaves a great deal to be desired, public places of entertainment become all the more important and alluring.

The limited resource allocation for private telephones, cars, and household articles is also relevant here: all these services and facilities encourage private leisure. This is not to suggest that the economic factors behind these policies are not more weighty than the official fear of privacy; but when funds are available and choices have to be made, the public sector will be given primacy largely for ideological reasons. This is best shown by the contrasting development of telephones and television. The former is a largely private instrument of inconsequential and informal communications, a device for the maintenance of social life and personal relationships. Television, by contrast, is a centrally-controlled instrument of one-way communication, the contents of which are highly standardised. The figures speak for themselves: the number of telephones (this includes close to 3 million public phones and an unknown but high proportion of official ones) is 7 million, while those of TV sets is 15 million. It is unlikely that these discrepancies have much to do with the costs of installing phones vs. manufacturing TV sets and setting up TV stations.

In examining the actual expenditure of free time by Soviet citizens we can find interesting information in the newly fashionable time-budget studies designed to obtain a detailed picture of how selected groups of citizens spend their time.

A major study conducted among industrial workers of six cities, Erevan, Novokuznetsk, Kostroma, Sverdlovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Norilsk, provides many examples of the persisting deficiencies in the use of non-working time. Among them is the fact that free time constitutes only 16·8 per cent of the non-working time, while domestic work and household care consume 22·3 per cent. Activities related to work, i.e.

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transportation, changing from one shift to another, also account for an excessive amount of non-working time: together with domestic work and personal care, twice the amount of free time. Here lies one of the principal causes for concern and the mainspring of such studies; the large areas of inefficiency which surround the place of work and which would create problems, even if it were assumed that at the work place itself exemplary order and organisation prevailed. Among the sources of the irrational use of time—which leads to its being swallowed up by domestic work and other trivia—the author mentions the underdeveloped state of 'housing, communal, sanitary-medical, commercial, cultural, transport and other kinds of services . . . those of children's and pre-school establishments, enterprises for communal feeding, places of entertainment, and so on'.[8] This is seen as largely a problem of regional differences, and in particular of the surviving gap between rural and urban areas. Indeed, as all the studies show, the widest gulf in the pattern of recreation appears to be between the rural and urban population as a whole. Collective farm peasants are the single most disadvantaged group, if not in terms of absolute amount of time available for leisure, then in the accessible opportunities for its use. The most alarming expression of this lack of opportunities is the escape of the young from the villages and the resulting manpower shortage, and the reluctance of professionals and experts to accept rural assignments. However, the problem has broader implications. The current rural (and to some extent even the urban) leisure situation is the product of modernisation, which has proceeded to a sufficient degree to undermine or destroy traditional forms of peasant recreation, yet not far enough to provide adequate substitutes. This has as its result a sense of cultural confusion and occasionally actual nostalgia for some of the old rural ways. Not infrequently the maintenance and enrichment of well organised non-religious, traditional holidays in the countryside is recommended. *Izvestia*, in an article entitled 'Holidays need talents', concluded that

> The time has come at last to enlist our best artists . . . masters in all the arts, in the creation of Soviet ceremonies, holidays and celebrations . . . Thrilling holidays and poetic ceremonies are legitimate spiritual requirements of the people (CDSP, 9 February 1966, p. 32).

The article also noted the appearance of a book entitled *New ceremonies and holidays* which was published 'to aid rural club workers'. In apparent contrast with such well-intentioned efforts, a debate on the

[8] Ibid. pp. 64, 78, 127, 129. Many of his findings, and especially those connected with the inadequate availability and/or utilisation of free time, were confirmed by recent articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* reporting the results of the newspaper's opinion poll institute. Cf. issues for 24, 25, 26 February 1966. Among the interesting findings of the latter was that, despite reduction of the workday, a high proportion of the respondents continue to work long hours at the expense of their free time.

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subject of 'folkways and artificial traditions' in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* elicited the following question:

> Introduce them? [i.e. folkways, traditions] How? Issue a decree? Require each person to sign a pledge, signatures to be collected by the apartment house superintendents? Establish control by the volunteer patrol detachments? . . . Only those customs, ceremonies and rituals that meet the spirit of the times, that arise naturally from the life of the people and are entirely separate from artificial contriving, become genuine popular traditions (CDSP, 13 January 1965, p. 17).

The other category which has yet to benefit significantly from whatever leisure revolution has taken place is women, in almost all strata of the population. While devoting an amount of time equal to that of men to work, women continue to carry their traditionally unequal share of domestic labour, which must, naturally, be done in non-working time.

> Women in Novosibirsk wash, mend, darn, and iron in the evenings and on Sundays . . . many women also spend their free time in papering walls, whitewashing and painting . . . How much time does a woman in Novosibirsk work each day after she has put in a normal working day on the job? Two hours are spent standing in lines, two more hours in preparing supper, breakfast, and dinner (in order to be on time for work in the morning, breakfast and dinner are cooked the evening before), an hour in cleaning the apartment and another hour in washing, ironing, and other work. Almost a whole 'overtime' work day! Is this normal? . . . It is necessary to spend an hour and a half to two hours in the stores after work every day just to purchase groceries for the next day . . . In order to dine at any dining room in Novosibirsk, it is necessary to stand in line for two hours (CDSP, 2 June 1965, p. 30).

Even *Pravda* turned its attention to the matter, noting that

> Sociologists, who are now honoured in our country, have conducted a spot investigation and calculated that many of us spend 70% of our non-working time on everyday concerns—on shopping, doing laundry, cooking, getting clothes repaired, paying bills, waiting for buses and the like. That means that . . . only 30% is left for books, the theatre, sports and rearing of children. Isn't that too little? (CDSP, 16 February 1966, p. 29).

But the problem does not lie only in inadequate services and facilities. The handicaps of women in the realm of leisure are also closely related to the persistence of yet another feature of traditional peasant societies, namely the masculine disdain for household work. *Izvestia* in a recent article criticised this state of affairs and called its urgent solution 'a political task'.

Besides revealing the inequities in the distribution of free time, the sociological studies illustrate the ways in which popular preferences regarding the use of free time continue to outweigh the official ones. It

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is particularly interesting to compare the amount of time spent on social work (i.e. communal, public, quasi-political activities), 3·5 hours a month, with that which is spent on entertainment, namely 33·5 hours a month! A limited preference for the diversions offered by the mass media is reflected by the relatively short time devoted to radio and television—6 hours a month—against frequenting places of entertainment: 9·9 hours a month, and visiting friends and relatives: 8 hours a month. (A study conducted in Leningrad among young people similarly showed that 'the majority of those polled preferred to spend their free time at home or visiting relatives'.)[9] Another interesting finding of the same study was that only two hours a month were occupied by sports. In the category of self-education a significant discrepancy appeared between the reliance on reading as a means to this goal, 14 hours a month, and attendance at lectures, seminars, and study circles, totalling 2 hours. An article in *Kommunist* noted the contrast between substantial participation in civic-communal activities at the place of work and the small amount of the same at the place of residence.[10] (Such a discrepancy indicates the superior strength of organised pressures at the place of work against the relatively unorganised character of the residential units in the framework of which people feel freer to withdraw from public-communal activities.) But the lack of adequate participation in collectivised leisure time even at the place of work is also apparent:

> Particularly unsatisfactorily organised in some enterprises is mass cultural work—collective attendance at theatres, cinemas, museums, evenings of rest, touring trips, country excursions and picnics, meetings with well-known people, and so on: public organisations are little interested in the life and daily existence of the workers, and do not exert enough influence on the use of non-working time. As a rule, therefore, workers at these enterprises use their non-working and especially their free time less rationally. The raising of the general level of work of party, komsomol, and trade union organisations is an essential reserve of the further rationalisation of the use of non-working time of the workers.[11]

If the use of free time by industrial workers is so different from the prescriptions, the discrepancy is bound to be more marked on collective farms. As a recent investigator reports with regret, 'the kolkhozniki prefer in their free time to sit at home in their warm apartment, in a circle of friends or acquaintances over a cup of tea, or for that matter, over a glass of vodka'. Sitting at home *per se* is not of course regarded as irrational, but is deplored in the light of the further finding that 'because of the insufficient penetration among rural workers of such games as chess and checkers, crosswords and rebuses, table tennis and

[9] *CDSP*, 8 December 1965, p. 14.
[10] *Kommunist*, August 1965, p. 55.
[11] Petrosian, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

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billiards, particular success is enjoyed by lotto, dominoes, and cards, which give nothing to the mind or heart'.[12]

BOTH Soviet commentators and western travellers agree upon the extraordinary importance of reading, one of the most favoured uses of leisure. Several explanations may be advanced. One is undoubtedly the policy of the regime. Rates of literacy are high, reading matter is available in abundance, and reading is a highly respectable activity. We may also suspect that it provides an irreproachably legitimate escape from the unpleasant realities of life and that it can be highly apolitical. The popularity of technical, scientific, classical, and foreign literature supports this. The Russian classics are especially loved among the older generations of collective farm peasants, while the current vogue of detective, science fiction, and adventure stories reported by the press underlines the escapist quality of some Soviet reading habits.[13]

Housing difficulties may account for yet another typical and highly popular Soviet pastime, going to municipal parks and parks of culture. This, along with the high rates of cinema and theatre attendance, is among the major public, though not necessarily collectivised, forms of recreation to which Soviet people are predisposed. Undoubtedly this is one result of the lack of facilities for small-scale private leisure which has to be based on the uncrowded, comfortable apartment (or house) or the family car or boat.

The contents of Soviet leisure are determined by the limitations on time and facilities, official policies and popular predilections. However, some of the problems associated with leisure are not peculiar to Soviet society but are also manifest, often in a more pronounced way, in other modern, secular societies. The privileged (or leisured) classes of the past always had leisure problems of their own, but these did not become major concerns for society at large, because the number of people so afflicted was very small and they usually managed to devise elaborate, if not truly satisfactory ways to chase boredom away.

To the extent that in every modern society the young, and adolescents in particular, have more free time than the adults, it is to be expected that Soviet leisure problems are also primarily those of the young. The predominance in Soviet writings on the leisure of youth attests to this.[14] The proper upbringing of the future builders of

[12] V. G. Baikova, A C. Duchal, and A. A. Zemstov, *Svobodnoe Vremya i Vsestoronee Razvitie Lichnosti* (Moscow, 1965), p. 267.

[13] Ibid. pp. 257. Similar reading preferences were found among industrial workers in a survey by L. N. Kogan in *Esteticheskie Potrebnosti Sovetskogo Rabochego* (Moscow, 1963), p. 190. The popularity of detective stories prompted *Komsomolskaya Pravda* to recommend their use for constructive purposes: 'adventure literature should become a powerful means of propagandizing the Soviet way of life' (*CDSP*, 22 July 1964).

[14] Cf. F. G. Durham: *The use of free time by young people in Soviet society*, M.I.T Center for International Studies Monograph, Cambridge, Mass. 1966.

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communism is a part of the general concern with the upbringing of the new generations.[15] The words of the first secretary of the Komsomol merit our attention in this context:

> It would be a big mistake to think that the very fact of living in the land of the Soviets, in the conditions of socialist reality, presupposes a communist world outlook in a young person . . . It would also be a mistake to think that the growth of political awareness and conviction in the young person is always directly proportionate to the growth of his general educational and cultural level (CDSP, 26 January 1966, p. 10).

The remedy is conceived of largely as one of facilities and proper guidance. However, even when the facilities are available they are often not used to capacity. Recreational programmes are frequently poorly organised, those in charge are inadequately trained (in 1964 of 89,000 club leaders, 35,000 did not have a high school education), and as to other forms of organised entertainment, time and again a recurring theme of Soviet discussions on the various media is dullness. The producers of Soviet films, plays, TV, radio and club programmes are haunted by the revolt against tedium. In the Aesopian language of the officials,

> Young people expect from writers, artists and composers from the theatre and the screen, works which show our heroic times and will create an image of the contemporary world worthy of emulation.[16]

It is one of the new developments of the post-Stalin period that this question of dullness has been officially discovered and analysed. The problem for the authorities is to find a balance between providing the population with stimulating leisure-time activities and at the same time preserve (and possibly increase) their didactic functions.

The use of leisure becomes a problem not only among collective farm workers but also among young people of such metropolitan areas as Leningrad:

> Pastimes that are not connected with spiritual interests and that are accompanied by drinking lead to no good. Last year more than 2,000 intoxicated young men were arrested in one Leningrad borough alone. Out of ten violators of public order nine are drunk . . . Study of the causes of divorce in Leningrad has shown that approximately half of the divorces result from the husband's drinking . . . On Mondays and the days after holidays labour productivity usually falls off markedly . . . These difficulties arise in large part because we have too few recreational facilities that are genuinely cultural and are capable of attracting young people . . . The correct organisation of leisure for city youth is unthinkable without Clubs and Palaces of Culture . . . According to data

[15] Cf. Merle Fainsod, 'Soviet youth and the problem of generations', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 108, no. 5. October 1964.
[16] *CDSP*, 22 September 1965, p. 15.

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> from the poll, fewer than 25% of the young workers and only 2% of the intelligentsia visited the clubs last year and they came mainly for films and dances. The conclusion is not very comforting: The majority of boys and girls spend a large part of their free time in the courtyards and streets (CDSP, 8 December 1965, p. 14).

Drunkenness is certainly not a novel phenomenon in Russian society. Its spread to the younger age groups, however, is more of a novelty and reflects both their greater purchasing power and their desire for escape from boredom.

Another study conducted among 1,000 secondary school students in Smolensk presents other aspects of the leisure problem, similar to the leisure problems of youth in other societies.

> The teenagers' weekdays and Sundays were taken up mainly by passive activities: reading, watching television, listening to the radio, etc. Activities requiring intellectual output . . . were in the 10th to 20th place (CDSP, 25 August 1965).

Only three per cent of those polled expressed a desire to engage in public activities. The article discussing the study reached the melancholy conclusion that there is a strong relationship between free time and juvenile delinquency.

Not surprisingly, Soviet spokesmen discern a relationship between domestic leisure problems and the penetration of western models of leisure. The trend towards the westernisation of leisure poses many dilemmas for the guardians of the ideological purity of Soviet citizens. What is the nature of the appeal of western models of leisure? How 'subversive' are they and to whom do they appeal?

As far as the Soviet public and the young in particular are concerned, interest in western forms of leisure is part of the ambivalent yet voracious interest in things western in general. Western forms and accessories of leisure are associated not only with material abundance and comforts. They are also seen by many as more exciting and 'modern'. Such propensities in the population are obviously unwelcome to Soviet ideologues. Borrowing from the West in the realm of leisure is undesirable because it amounts to borrowing styles of life which are tained by apolitical and escapist values; western leisure is fundamentally escapist, lacking in serious purpose. To be sure, escapism in the western sense is not yet an issue. The escapist tendencies in Soviet leisure are of a more primitive kind: they originate in the desire to forget the drabness of life rather than in the anxiety generated by questions which arise *after* material and environmental harshness is conquered. The spiritual maladies—ennui, spleen, and general world weariness—which, according to Aldous Huxley, have always afflicted the leisured classes, are not yet afflicting the Soviet masses. There are, however, some indications that the Soviet social system does not confer invulnerability on them. Huxley's ironic comments on the optimists of his day who believed that 'the leisured masses of the future . . . will

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do all the things which the leisured classes of the present so conspicuously fail to do', invite application to similarly unrealistic Soviet expectations.

The further westernisation of Soviet leisure is most likely, except in the improbable event of radically retrogressive political changes. It is not surprising that the more affluent and consumption-oriented societies will continue to be the models in this realm. After all, in these societies people have the most leisure and the most varied means for its use. Thus in the final analysis Soviet spokesmen are not far off the mark when they utter warnings about the 'pernicious microbes' transmitted by the western mass media, and, by implication, by many western forms of entertainment.[17] These are the 'microbes' against which the Soviet leadership wants to immunise the population. However, immunisation cannot take place without exposure, 'the man of the future cannot be raised in a bell-jar'. Yet exposure in this context means a more permissive attitude towards the infiltration of western ideas and models of leisure. As is often the case, Soviet ideologues face a problem analogous to the squaring of the circle.

(*My research was facilitated by the support of the Harvard Russian Research Center and a grant from the Ford Foundation.*)

[17] For example, the detective story is seen as 'a weapon that has been used long and successfully by our ideological enemies'. *CDSP* 22 July 1964, p. 16.

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SOVIET FAMILIES

Peter Juviler

INFORMED Western opinion about Soviet family policy runs the gamut from the view that 'Soviet parents are bringing up their children pretty much as the regime wants them to',[1] to the forecast that the communists consider the family an intolerable obstacle to the formation of the new, collectivist Soviet man, and are out to destroy it. Nothing before the fall of Khrushchev seemed to indicate to the pessimists any deviation of the Soviet march via a post-stalinist 'revolution from above' towards a collectivised affluence that destroys the family as a unit of parents and children, and nothing after the fall of Khrushchev discouraged the conclusion that 'the socialisation of the family and the public rearing of children are feasible and in earnest'.[2]

At first glance, the evidence supports the view that the family is 'withering away'. The regime is in fact far from satisfied with family upbringing of the younger generation, and prophets of the Soviet family's demise have no difficulty in establishing a communist motive for its elimination. They can point, moreover, to the anti-familial strain in the communist heritage, from Plato's Republic to the social revolution under Lenin which disintegrated, disorganised, and attacked the traditional religious basis of family ties. Stalin's conservative 'revolution from above', with its call for 'strong families' and glorification of motherhood, could be looked upon as no more than a necessary interlude before the onslaught was renewed, and a third revolution from above inaugurated as part of the party's programme for the 'full-scale building of a communist society', as confirmed by the congresses in 1959 and 1961. They usually cite an article 'Workers Life and Communism', written by the venerable economist, Academician S. G. Strumilin, and published in 1960 during the discussion of the 1961 programme of the Communist Party.[3]

Children, said Strumilin, should be raised apart from the parents, from birth, in special wings of the 'working and residential communes' where all Soviet people would be living in a few decades. Society, he wrote, could raise children much better than their parents could. Parental doting in the relatively isolated family environment made children selfish and individualistic, two traits unworthy of the men and women of the future communist society. Parents might visit their children periodically to bring them needed 'vitamins of love'. Their family life would be reduced, therefore, to the companionship of a loving couple (as in Engels' image of the future monogamous family).

[1] Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge, 1961), p. 230.
[2] Albert L. Weeks, 'The Boarding School', *Survey*, No. 56, p. 84.
[3] S. Strumilin, 'Rabochii byt i kommunizm', *Novy mir*, No. 7, 1960, pp. 203–220.

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They would have no household chores and no problems of child-rearing to worry about.

This article, however, has been over-rated as a sign of Soviet intentions, as even a cursory glance at the reaction to it will show. Strumilin's proposals for socialised child-rearing outside the family were attacked as 'a caricature of communism' while heated and sentimental articles extolled the joys of filial and parental love. Khrushchev openly repudiated Strumilin's scheme at the 22nd congress: 'Those who maintain that the family will become less important in the transition to communism and that with time it will disappear are entirely wrong'. Paraphrasing his remarks, the 1961 programme, a conservative document, in its only sentence bearing directly on family relations, asserts that they 'will be freed once and for all from material considerations and will be based solely on mutual love and friendship'. A. G. Kharchev, head of the Philosophy Department of the Leningrad branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has devoted part of the first post-Stalin Soviet sociological treatise on the family to rejecting Strumilin's communes. Under communism, he tells his readers, 'the sole family function which will wither away, not develop . . . is housekeeping'. After Khrushchev's fall, Kharchev published a chapter entitled 'Means of Further Strengthening the Family of the USSR', in which he tied the need for family stability to the 'important role of the family in Soviet society, especially in rearing the younger generation'.[4]

Moving from theory towards current Soviet practice, one can note that architects who, Strumilin said, were drawing up plans for the communes, must have filed them away. From talks at the Moscow Experimental Architectural Institute (MITEP) in 1964, I gathered that prevailing opinion there had never favoured the communes. An exhibit of new housing projects at the House of Architects in 1964 showed models of the most advanced, 'micro-district', pilot housing project, now being built in southwest Moscow, one of the projects which are to set the pattern for years to come. It does not include plans for boarding students in its school complex, which is designed to accommodate all the children living in the project. Families will occupy separate apartments with bedroom space for the children. In planning apartment sizes, MITEP's architects have been guided not by social blueprints for socialising upbringing, but by the results of demographic surveys of the size of families which are on the waiting lists for apartments in Moscow. In short, improved housing should bring families more, not less, physical privacy, unless the party makes a sudden turn in policy at present nowhere in evidence.

The truth appears to lie somewhere in between the finding that all is well with the Soviet family and that it is slated for deliberate extinction. Trends in boarding schools, family law, and family life seem to

[4] A. G. Kharchev, *Brak i semya v SSSR: opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya* (Moscow, 1964), pp. 231, 318.

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indicate that the regime is dissatisfied but that it seeks to eliminate eventually only most of the economic functions of the family and to leave with the families a small but vital share in child-rearing.

MORE than any other Soviet institution, boarding schools raise the spectre of Soviet intent to break up the family unit. 'At the present rate of expansion, the bulk of the peasant and industrial class may by the 1980s be living and matriculating in these institutions',[5] is one Western reaction. The 1961 party programme called for 'mass provision of an extensive network of boarding schools with free maintenance of children'.

Yet if we follow the actual growth of boarding schools, a very different picture emerges, one of rapid growth, retrenchment, and an uncertain future. After Khrushchev's call for boarding schools at the twentieth congress in February 1956, enrolment shot up to 540,000 in 1960–61, 920,000 (about 2·4 per cent of all primary and secondary school pupils) in 1962–63, and probably over a million in 1963–64. The following year, however, enrolment not only did not move anywhere near the 1965 goal of 2·5 million pupils; it actually fell.[6]

Embarrassed reticence marked the end of this dream of Khrushchev's even while he still held his leading post. So quietly as to escape Western notice, confining themselves to publishing a decree in the Russian Republic *Collection of Decrees* (normally not available in the West), and to a single paragraph in the magazine *Shkola internat*, the Soviet regime abolished all high school grades (9–11) for the 1964–65 school year, leaving only 8-year elementary schools as the regular boarding type. Pupils in grades 9–11 had to find places where they could in children's homes, day schools, or at work. The only exceptions to this sweeping order were the special schools for science, maths, languages, and the arts.[7]

Thus, where the boarding schools are the top-flight elite institutions that Khrushchev demanded in 1956, they are not mass schools; and to the limited extent that the 8-year boarding schools can be called mass schools, they often fulfil anything but the function of training the special elite. The main function now of the 8-year boarding school seems to be to provide care for children whose parents cannot, will not, or should

[5] Weeks, 'The Boarding School', *loc. cit.*, p. 85.

[6] Enrolment statistics are pieced together from Helene B. Rede (ed.), *Soviet Educators on Education* (New York, 1964), p. 199; A. M. Rumyantsev (ed.), *Rol zhenshchiny v sovremennom obshchestve* (Prague, 1963), p. 152; *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu*, p. 552.

[7] Decree of the RSFSR Council of Ministers of 20 December 1963 in *Sobranie postanovlenii pravitelstva RSFSR*, No. 22, 1963, item 151; 'Shkoly-internaty v novom uchebnom godu', *Shkola internat*, No. 4, 1964, p. 4. The decree specifically excludes from the abolition order 'secondary boarding schools specialising in physics and mathematics or chemistry and biology' attached to Moscow, Leningrad, and Novosibirsk universities. But other types of specialised high (secondary) schools in the USSR survived too, as noted.

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not have them constantly at home.[8] Kharchev's description (p. 273) of Leningrad's serves well to convey the social role of the boarding schools.

> A considerable part of the enrolment of a boarding school today consists, typically, of children from incomplete or 'defective' families —incidentally, these two traits frequently go together. In Leningrad boarding school No. 36, which has 422 pupils, 325 have only a mother, 15 only a father, 16 are orphans and only 66 have both parents, many of whom lead abnormal lives. In boarding school No. 9, the parents of approximately 100 children out of 330 are registered with psychiatric dispensaries . . .

Only now can we begin to appreciate the chaos involved in organising the boarding schools. An 'honoured teacher of the Russian Republic' recalls the rush of the first years:

> Decisions were made with unforgivable haste to organise boarding schools on a mass scale. They began to open them hastily, without careful selection of teachers, often in unsuitable premises, with enrolments of up to a thousand. . . . I remember how we fought with the architects, telling them that games and club rooms were needed, that the location of sleeping quarters . . . and the layout of school grounds call for careful planning. It was all in vain. The boarding schools kept growing like mushrooms. Quantity, fulfilment of enrolment plan—this became the decisive factor. . . . Imagine this fairly typical scene: a boarding school is being organised. For some two or three months they have been collecting teachers. Most of them have not the slightest idea of the special problems of their work. Yet they have 600 children from 100 different schools! Neither director, nor senior teacher, nor supervisors have any experience. And the new school becomes a living hell.[9]

Boarding school enrolments were cut, it seems, because the schools presented almost insuperable obstacles of staffing, housing, medical care, supply, and financing.[10] A high rate of turnover in staff indicates that good teachers and supervisors (guardians outside the classrooms) often leave because of bad living conditions, while those that remain cannot cope with the high concentration of difficult children, have many repeaters in their classes, and must be transferred to ordinary schools.

The Balei Boarding School is representative. In three and a half years it had three directors (occasional accounts of directors' immorality and drunkenness crop up in the press), and three senior teachers. 'The

[8] 'Priority of admission into boarding schools is given to children of unwed mothers, persons invalided or at work, orphans, and children whose families do not provide the necessary conditions for their upbringing'. (From the statute on boarding schools of 13 April 1957 in *Kodeks zakonov o brake, semie i opeke RSFSR* (Moscow, 1961), p. 58.)

[9] B. Shirvint, 'A budushchee u nikh est', *Izvestia*, 13 January 1966.

[10] Decree of 27 April 1963 lists difficulties in *Sobranie postanovlenii pravitelstva RSFSR*, No. 8, 1963, item 51.

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teacher and supervisor for the third grade had to be replaced three times between December 1963 and March 1964'.[11]

It costs the state 900 rubles a year to keep a child in a boarding school. For approximately a million children in 1963/64 graduated fees from parents averaged only a fifth of the cost of maintaining the schools. The state thus paid about 700 million rubles. This figure is conservative because of the huge arrears in payments from parents. Negligent local educational departments in some areas fail to produce full quotas of students. School buildings get turned over to other uses.[12]

Enthusiasts for the boarding schools point to the special educational possibilities of boarding schools for instilling 'love of labour' and unselfish 'collectivism', and for turning out 'convinced passionate fighters for communism, ardent patriots'; but indoctrination, too, falls far short of the ideal in all types of schools, boarding schools included. Labour training? A sampling has shown that only 40–50 per cent of boarding school pupils have assigned chores, and many of these are meaningless formalities. No amount of effort so far has rooted out 'scepticism, nihilism, and even apoliticalness and apathy' among some students, said to be small in number, but enough to prompt a special national meeting on the subject of extra-curricular activities and indoctrination work, and to produce an editorial on the subject in *Shkola-internat*.[13]

Boarding schools face an uncertain future. Some educators, it is clear, urge that they be abolished because they are no substitute for the family. Their champions defend them vigorously. Think of all the children, they say, with or without families, who would never have finished school and would have fallen on evil ways if it were not for boarding schools. Besides, they say, the boarding schools are not meant to replace families. Moreover they are especially suitable for instilling the moral qualities of the builder of communism in spite of all the shortcomings in school indoctrination.[14]

Because of their special services for the underprivileged and orphaned, for the rural pupils who live in widely scattered villages, for the children of busy parents, for the scientifically, linguistically, artistically talented, or for the 11–14-year-old delinquents who now have access to special closed boarding schools,[15] boarding schools will have a future in the USSR, if only one of modest growth.

THE future for mass schools in the Soviet Union seems to belong, rather, to the extended-day schools and groups, enrolment for which went up in the Russian Republic from 94,900 in 1959–60 to

[11] 'Shkoly-internaty v novom uchebnom godu', *loc. cit.*
[12] 'Vo imia cheloveka', *Shkola-internat*, No. 5, 1964, p. 1; Kharchev, p. 275; 'K novym uspekham v obuchenii i vospitanii', *Shkola-internat*, No. 4, 1965, p. 3.
[13] L. K. Petrova, 'Edinstvo uchebnoi i vneurochnoi raboty . . .', *Shkola-internat*, No. 5, 1965, pp. 3–4; *Izvestia*, *loc. cit.*; *Shkola-internat*, No. 2, 1963, p. 51.
[14] *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1965, p. 3; *Izvestia*, *loc. cit.*; N. Federov, 'Poleznyi razgovor o shkolakh internatakh', *Shkola-internat*, No. 5, 1963, p. 75.
[15] *Ibid.*, No. 5, 1965, pp. 30–33.

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581,700 in 1962–63 and to over a million in 1965–66. A twenty per cent expansion is planned for 1966, even while enrolment in boarding schools has been dropping—in the Russian Republic from 477,357 in 1962–63 to 450,000 in 1964–65.[16] Extended-day schools keep children off the streets under proper supervision, while their parents or other guardians are working, much more cheaply than boarding schools could (regular schools operate on only a half-day schedule). An *Izvestia* editorial of 22 January 1966 enumerates the advantages and problems of extended-day schools (about 10 per cent of the enrolment in the Russian Republic) and extended-day groups in ordinary schools (90 per cent of the enrolment in the Russian Republic). 'Parents may work with peace of mind, knowing that their children are eating, getting fresh air, doing their homework'. One difficulty is that schools are supposed to do much more than merely supervise the children and see that they do their homework. 'Extended-day groups must not become simply groups for rehearsing school work and extended-day schools merely schools of the *study* day', though this still seems to be the main accomplishment because of shortages of funds and teachers in many of the schools.

The draft directives of the twenty-third CPSU congress on the 1966–70 five-year plan, approved by the central committee on 19 February 1966, called for doubling the number of pupils in 'extended-day groups and schools', but said nothing about boarding schools (*Pravda*, 20 February 1966). This does not mean that boarding schools will not be retained or even modestly expanded. But it does seem to indicate a dampening of the ardour for the idea embodied in the 1961 programme of boarding schools on a mass scale.

State nurseries and kindergartens continue to expand at the most rapid pace of all educational institutions, which is good news to hard-pressed mothers, with no special indication of any sinister indoctrination beyond elementary lessons in collectivism which we might call group-mindedness and participation, and love of Lenin and motherland. Nurseries and kindergartens have been caring for about half a million children more every year, now about seven million in all, about one-fifth of all Soviet children of pre-school age, at modest graduated fees of up to 12 rubles a month. The 1966 plan calls for an increase of 835,000 places, which on official estimates should mean that by the end of the year nearly one-half of all city children will be able to attend these pre-school institutions.[17]

THE Bolsheviks attempted to undermine the patriarchs and 'emancipate' women by enforcing paternal obligations whether incurred in or out of wedlock, allowing non-medical abortions, recognising

[16] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo RSFSR v 1962 godu* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 486–487; *Izvestia*, 25 January 1966; *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1965, p. 6; *Shkola-internat*, 1964, No. 4, p. 1.
[17] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1963 godu* (Moscow, 1964), pp. 564, 632; *Pravda*, 30 January 1965; *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1965, p. 6; calculating from Soviet population figures that about 34 million children were born and survived in 1958–64.

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unregistered marriages, permitting automatic divorce. Stalin advanced one step towards depriving the family of its economic functions and bonds by collectivising the private peasants and nationalising most small-scale private enterprise. Otherwise he retreated for the sake of the birthrate and family stability by forbidding therapeutic abortions (1936) and, in the edict of 8 July 1944, dissolving all paternal obligations incurred out of registered wedlock, recognising only registered marriages, establishing state aid for unwed mothers instead of paternal support, making divorce complicated and expensive.

A regime which was out to break up the family would logically return to or even surpass the radicalism of the 1920s. This did not happen after Stalin. His heirs have inched back only part way towards 'Leninist principles of freedom of marriage and divorce, equality of all children whether born in or out of wedlock'. Would-be reformers—lawyers, judges, scientists and intellectuals, the publications *Semia i shkola* and *Literaturnaya gazeta*—demanded this for many years in heated debate, but the long-awaited new family law which would eliminate illegitimacy and substantially liberalise divorce procedures did not appear in 1964 as many, women especially, had hoped. The Party decision not to repeal the 1944 edict affected some eight million extra-marital offspring of all ages, the five million mothers who had given birth to them out of wedlock, and some 300,000 couples divorcing annually. [18]

Only piecemeal reforms have filtered through the sieve of bureaucratic and professional caution. Divorce practice was liberalised in 1955. This meant fewer refusals thereafter, but a continuation of the obstacles inherent in the complicated and lengthy procedure and the high fees. Still, many couples simply established *de facto* marriages rather than go through official divorce complications. Hence divorce obstacles served to harm the interests of women and weaken rather than strengthen family ties, since many new families had no legal protection.[19] Finally, at the end of 1965, a compromise divorce law

[18] Arkadii Vaksberg, 'Vosvrashchayas k staroi teme', *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 30 July 1964. Only 1·97 million unwed mothers are listed in *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1963 godu*, p. 512, as receiving state grants for their children. Yet 'over five million' unwed mothers is most probably on the low side. To the above-mentioned 1·97 million must be added the millions of mothers no longer listed because their illegitimate children are over twelve and no longer qualify for grants (the number of unwed mothers receiving grants reached a peak in 1957), or the mothers disqualified because (1) they live with the fathers of their children out of registered wedlock, (2) they have not reported their children, (3) the natural fathers have adopted the children to give them their names and material rights of children born in wedlock, (4) they are receiving support by court order from men who had once undertaken permanent support of their children and then reneged, (5) they have opted to place their children in state homes. A leading Soviet expert on the family told me in 1964 that there were about five million unwed mothers; their number has of course risen since then, even though the number of illegitimate children under 12 or 18 has fallen.

[19] *Sorok let sovetskogo prava 1917–1957*, vol. II (Leningrad, 1957), p. 281. One or both parties to 20 per cent of a sample of divorce cases in Leningrad had extra-marital children in new families at the time of divorce, largely because of delays

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provision appeared rather than the comprehensive new All-Union Basic Family Law which the reformists had been awaiting. Under the decree of 10 December 1965 divorces are a little simpler and less expensive. It retained the petition and 10 ruble filing fee; abolished publication of newspaper notice (often published after a long wait and usually costing 40 rubles); retained the first reconciliation hearing in the People's Court (usually ineffective), and moved the second, final hearing from the city or provincial court to the same People's Court; retained divorce registration fees of 50-100 rubles. [20]

Taken together, the other concessions of the regime to the family since Stalin do not amount to a campaign against it. Under Malenkov judges were allowed to use a loophole in the law to enforce support suits against fathers of extra-marital children not because they were the fathers but on the ground that they had at one time undertaken to support them. [21] Khrushchev's regime repealed a 1936 ban on non-therapeutic abortions 'in order to let a mother decide for herself whether or not to have her child, and in order to prevent the harm to women caused by abortions outside hospitals'. [22] Abortions are free for working women, Soviet health officials told me. Housewives and students pay city clinics only 5 rubles and rural clinics $2\frac{1}{2}$ rubles for each abortion. Moscow University's clinic offers this service to the women students. I attended a lecture on the use of contraceptives and the harm of abortions given at Moscow University in 1964 to a mixed audience as part of the campaign to encourage the use of contraceptives in a country so unfamiliar with them still that some college students expressed the belief that if men used them they would become impotent. The woman university physician wanted to clear the men out of the lecture hall. 'Men have no place here', she said. But the visiting specialist demurred. 'No, you stay. I am glad to see you men here . . . You have plenty to do with your wives' abortions'. Other concessions by the regime included the repeal of a 1934 decree establishing the blood guilt of the relatives of a defecting serviceman, freeing persons with only one or two children (i.e., most Soviet parents) as of 1 January 1958 from paying a 'birth stimulation' tax imposed in 1944; raising paid maternity leave from 77 to 112 days for urban working women (1956); extending maternity leave and pension benefits to peasant women (1964); and removing most priorities in college admissions which persons with two years' work experience had enjoyed since 1958, thus redressing the balance more in favour of the graduates straight out of secondary schools (1965).

In the context of these limited concessions, the inroads on family

in obtaining divorces. A. G. Kharchev, 'Brak i semia v SSSR: Opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovania' (doctoral dissertation, Leningrad Department of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1963), pp. 288–289.

20 *Vedomosti verkhovnogo soveta SSSR*, No. 49, 1965, item 275.

21 Peter Juviler, 'Marriage and Divorce', *Survey*, No. 48.

22 *Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 1938-1958* (Moscow, 1959), p. 550.

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functions made by Khrushchev — the surviving boarding schools, the stepped up grass roots social controls, confiscatory legislation to discourage speculation — hardly add up to a social revolution.

'Today there is no more conservative society than Soviet society', wrote Mihajolo Mihajlov in *Moscow Summer 1964*. 'The slightest change, even a new kind of tie, song, or trouser leg width, provokes great resistance'. Conservatism has been the word in family policy too, even though present divorce grounds and abortion laws would be considered radical in many parts of the world.

BEFORE Stalin, Bolshevik radicals like Alexandra Kollontai urged young people on to 'free love'. In some localities enthusiasts 'nationalised' women. Lenin disapproved of such extremism. Today, in Soviet Russia as in the West, the sexual revolution comes from below, not above. Official conservatism came in with Stalin and his 1929 model charter for a youth commune which banned a 'licentious sex life'. 'The sexual question', read the charter, 'can be correctly decided in one way only; steadfast and lasting marriage founded on love'. [23]

There is a direct link between the moral tone and traditionalist morality manifested in this youth commune statute and Kharchev's authoritative book, *Marriage and Family in the USSR*. Kharchev's views on sex would gladden the hearts of many parents, college administrators, and clerics. No pre-marital sexual relations or trial marriages for him, though he favours betrothals, an institution swept away along with church controls in 1917. Yet it is quite clear from Kharchev's book that the Western sex revolution, or what he calls 'the Western pattern of sexual "freedom" or more precisely, sexual anarchy', prevails as well under the 'socialist way of life'. Leningrad, with the lowest reported birth rate, seems to have the highest legal abortion rate, three abortions for every live birth. Twenty per cent of the many abortions are had by women under 24; the majority of these are unmarried. This gives direct testimony of the 'spread of pre-marital promiscuity among women'. Among the causes of the high urban incidence of pre-marital relations, Kharchev lists cramped housing, alcoholism due to boredom, and 'the ideology and psychology of the bourgeois world'. He mentions too the 'growing independence of students and working youth, especially in the cities, from the control of family and neighbours'.

Soviet family and sexual relations are coming to resemble their western counterparts in other ways too. As in the west, a slowly increasing part of socialisation takes place outside the family — in schools, youth activities, peer groups. Over the long haul, families have lost some of their economic-productive functions too, though in the USSR mostly through direct state intervention rather than spontaneous economic growth.

[23] Klaus Mehnert, *Youth in Soviet Russia* (London, 1933), pp. 214–215.

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Although wide family ties are cherished, the residual family unit has been shrinking in the Soviet Union as in the West from the extended family of at least three generations to the so-called nuclear family of two generations.

Resignedly accepting the new times, a Russian grandmother faces the problem of being also a mother-in-law and concedes that 'It is better to live on one's own if possible. Suppose that I'm staying with my son. He comes home from work late and his wife is already asleep. I wait up for him, making tea, sit down with him. He tells me everything about his work and his household affairs. He shared all his confidences with me when he was a boy. In the morning his wife asks: "What has made you so talkative? You never tell me anything, but you are always gabbing with your mother".' Such a *babushka* remains the proverbially indispensable baby-sitter and stander-in-line and a stubborn link with the church. But her changing life personifies the impact of industrialisation on a majority of Soviet families, whatever their ethnic backgrounds: the decline in economic interdependency, the consequent shift towards stronger emotional ties and greater mobility. This has brought about a steady disintegration of the matriarchal family. Only one family in four packs more than two generations under one roof. [24]

AS in other modernising countries, Soviet family relations are becoming less authoritarian, but also, with the loosening of economic and religious ties, more widely subject to breakup and divorce. Official statistics show a divorce rate in the USSR of 1·3 per thousand population per year compared with 2·2 in the United States. But in Moscow the divorce rate is 3·6, the highest reported in the USSR. Families are smaller, especially in European Russia outside the Caucasus. [25] 'The conflict of generations' and youthful rebelliousness are leading themes in literature and press discussions, as they are in the West. Doting white-collar parents show concern that their children get into college and marry well. The regime has tried to introduce romance into marriage with its new secular wedding ceremonials. Political crises could bring periods of set-back, but the basic trends in family life over the long run are towards companionate marriage, greater physical

[24] Kharchev, *op. cit.*, pp. 231–233.

[25] Divorce rates are lower and the birth rate higher, in the country than in the city, and above all in areas inhabited predominantly by non-Russian indigenous nationalities south and east of Moscow (*e.g.* in the Caucasus and Central Asia). Moscow and Leningrad have the highest divorce rate (annual registered divorces per thousand population) of 3·6 with a 10·8 marriage rate in Moscow, and 3·4 with a 11·1 marriage rate in Leningrad. They have the lowest recorded birth rates (annual births per thousand population) of 12 in Leningrad and 13 in Moscow. Divorce rates in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus are only 0·4 and 0·5 respectively, birth rates 35·9 and 32, with a national high of 40·6 in Azerbaidjan. The national divorce rate is 1·3, birth rate 21·2, and marriage rate 9·1. For the more urbanised USA the divorce rate is 2·2, birth rate 21·6, and marriage rate 8·8. All figures are for 1963. For most complete Soviet figures to date, see *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 1. 1965, pp. 86–96. The divorce rate rose in 1964 to 1·5. *Narodnoe Khoziastvo SSSR v 1964 g.* (Moscow, 1965), p. 120.

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privacy, and continuing high or even higher national divorce rates. If anything withers away in the USSR within this century, it will not be the conjugal, two-generation family. It will be certain special reflections of the austere, directed, terrorised, war-torn family in a period of total social mobilisation from which the Soviet Union seems to be just emerging.

I have in mind such symptoms as the prudery in matters of sex education and manuals of marital relations; the sparse rituals of courtship; the casual, honeymoonless adjustment to marriage; the contrast between the warm affection of grownups for children when time permits and the way-station aspect of the home when it does not; the massive, sometimes brutal impact of state restrictions on religion; the modesty of family possessions; the austerity of budgeting in all except well-to-do families; the specially heavy load carried by working women; the housing still so cramped that, for example, more than half the marrying couples polled at Leningrad's Wedding Palace expected to have to begin their married life with parents or in dormitories; and the still vital role of family entrepreneurship in feeding Soviet people.

Perhaps social revolution was brewing for Soviet families in the heyday of Khrushchev's power. Even if this were so, it had run aground by the mid-sixties on practical difficulties, bureaucratic opposition, and professional objection.

Stalin's 'revolution from above' won the devoted support of his 'promoted ones'. They benefited by it. Now the Soviet power elite, they have in effect vetoed even the pale reflection of the old social upheaval that brought them to the top.

For years the Soviet regime will continue to face the same problem with the family that it did before Khrushchev's fall. It seeks to strengthen the Soviet family for the sake of the children's healthy emotional development and the avoidance of social disorganisation. Yet particularisms of outlook and interest in the 'strong' family stand in the way of the ideal of collectivism and unity around the common task of building communism. Despite all this, the family remains both socially irreplaceable and morally desirable in the official Soviet view. Coexistence of family and state is likely to be permanent if not always peaceful.

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RELIGION AND SOVIET SOCIETY

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

FROM the very inception of the Soviet regime, its attempts to cope with the problem of religion in the USSR have been hampered by its dogmatic assumptions concerning the nature, roots, and social functions of religion. Derived from Marx and Engels in a rather simplified Leninist version, the Bolshevik notion of religion reduced it to a socially harmful 'illusion' born out of men's ignorance and their fear of the natural and social forces controlling their existence. Equated with a 'spiritual *sivukha*, in which the slaves of capitalism drown their human image', religion was viewed as a psychological tool used by the exploiters to keep the oppressed classes docile, apathetic, incapable of overthrowing the seemingly providential status quo. In their service the ruling classes employed the greedy clergy who perpetrated 'frauds' upon the credulous masses, justifying and sweetening their unhappy lot with the promise of an imaginary happiness in the next world. Not answering any universal human need, not rooted in any eternal religious sentiment, religion was destined to share the fate of the class system, private property, and exploitation. Through a combination of systematic scientific-atheist education and the operation of social-economic forces liberated by the proletarian revolution, the toiling masses were to liberate themselves fully from 'religious prejudices'.[1]

The nearly fifty years of anti-religious struggle and social engineering which were expected to eliminate the 'social roots' of religion in the USSR, failed to emancipate the masses from 'religious illusion.' Since the launching of the first five-year plan, this moment of deliverance has seemed to be just over the horizon, as the Soviet Union evolved through economic and social upheavals, the purges and the war into an increasingly complex industrial and literate society under an apparently all-powerful dictatorship. To be sure, by the end of the thirties *organised* religion had been almost completely suppressed throughout the country, but for all its massive efforts in atheist indoctrination the regime could not destroy religious *beliefs* in a large section of the population. Pragmatist as he was, Stalin drew a lesson from the failure of the anti-religious campaign when the German attack on the USSR made it imperative to mobilise all human and material resources for the country's war effort. Limited concessions were granted to the Russian Orthodox Church and to other religious groups which could be utilised for the purposes of the Kremlin's domestic and foreign policies. Under the new precarious *modus vivendi* between the atheist regime and the

[1] See a collection of Lenin's principal writings on the problem, V. I. Lenin, *O religii* (Moscow, 1955).

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'patriotic' religious groups, organised religion has experienced a significant, though partial, revival, and has indeed been recapturing some of the ground it had lost among the younger generation.

In seeking to explain the tenacity of 'religious survivals' in the post-war USSR, Soviet theoreticians have not only been constrained by the narrow Leninist frame of reference but were also compelled to maintain the fiction that with the construction of socialism such sources of 'religious illusion' as fear, insecurity, dependence, exploitation and alienation, had been eliminated in Soviet society. Consequently, they have found it necessary to fall back on such rationalisations as 'ideological lag', 'external capitalist influence', 'the war', and, above all, the 'neglect' or 'inadequacy of anti-religious propaganda' and the persistent 'activities of churchmen and sectarians'.[2] However, as the post-Stalin thaw slightly relaxed the dogmatic framework of Soviet philosophy, cautious voices began to appear in scholarly exchanges, criticising the limitations of the official view of religious phenomena in Soviet society.

The most serious challenge appeared in an article by P. P. Cherkashin published by *Voprosy filosofii* in June 1958, in which the author asserted the continued existence in the USSR of certain epistemological and social roots of religion. The epistemological base of religion, he suggested, will remain under communism as well, as it derives from the inescapable contradictions 'between the attained relative truth and absolute knowledge, between the objective content and the subjective form, between direct, emotional contemplation and the abstract logical work of the mind'. The vitality of religious survivals in the USSR, wrote Cherkashin, must also be explained by certain shortcomings in socialist society—its inequality in rewards, its marginal injustice and coercion.

> Real contradictions and difficulties of our society may painfully affect the fate of an individual person, especially one not firmly tied to the collective . . . In our circumstances, there may be 'failures' and 'fortunates' not only in family life. Personal plans may be drastically changed or shattered by unforeseen circumstances, unexpected events in the life of the country, some shift or other in economics or politics, not to mention the war . . .

Moreover, Cherkashin pointed out, religious survivals feed on 'certain features of our life' which 'simply contradict' socialist principles. Among such features he listed 'errors in the direction of agriculture, which were absolutely unnecessary in the history of our society', a seemingly all-powerful bureaucratism with its 'isolation from the masses, disregard of their needs and interests', and, in the past, the excesses of Stalinism with its 'most crude violations of socialist legality'. Finally, Cherkashin notes that Soviet society, especially the rural population,

[2] N. I. Gubanov, 'O prichinakh sushchestvovaniia religioznykh perezhitkov v SSSR', *Nauka i religiia* (Moscow, 1957), 50–67; *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1957, 57; I. P. Tsamerian (ed.), *Osnovy nauchnogo ateizma* (Moscow, 1961), 421–431.

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'has not yet fully overcome the dependence of man's activities on the play of elemental natural forces', which also contributes to the survival and revival of religious sentiments among the people.

This attempt to reduce the dogmatic element in the official notion of religion, while carefully confined to the Marxist frame of analysis (criticism of religion is a criticism of society begetting religion), concealed broader implications for Soviet religious policy. As the latter soon took a sharp leftward turn, his article came under attack from the party central committee in July 1959 for its 'incorrect conclusion that the very same reasons which nourish religious prejudices in capitalist countries operate also in a socialist society'.[3] Shortly afterwards, a *Pravda* editorial (21 August 1959) restated in familiar terms the official interpretation of the reasons for the continued existence of religious survivals, stressing in particular such 'subjective' factors as the weakening of anti-religious propaganda, machinations, and violations of Soviet law by the 'servants of religion', and the 'laxity of organisations called upon to supervise the strict observance of Soviet legislation on religious cults'.

THE increasingly violent anti-religious campaign extending from 1959 to 1964 and aimed at the 'final and complete uprooting of religious prejudices' in Soviet society, represented a major test of the regime's thinking on religion. On the surface, it produced results which could hardly fail to impress the party's ideological high priests. The number of registered religious congregations in the USSR had been reduced by at least one half of the 1954 total; some denominations, in particular Judaism, lost most of their legal facilities for worship. Of the eight Orthodox theological seminaries reopened since the war, only three survived by 1965 with a greatly reduced enrolment. At least two-thirds of the Orthodox monastic institutions had been closed. Under new laws and regulations severely curtailing the scope of ecclesiastical activities and discouraging laymen from openly performing religious rites, the number of church baptisms, marriages, and funerals had been drastically reduced, especially in large cities.[4] 'New Soviet rites' were said to have displaced church feasts and rituals for all but the most 'backward' elements of the toilers. In time-honoured fashion these fruits of administrative repression were now advertised as the 'inevitable' effect of 'objective' forces at work in Soviet society.

Since Khrushchev's fall the self-congratulatory mood characteristic of the early 1960s has slowly been displaced by a critical reappraisal of the situation on the 'anti-religious front'. Apart from the harm it had done to the Soviet image abroad, the 'assault on heaven' was found to have hardly reduced the number of believers in the country. Deprived

[3] *Voprosy ideologicheskoi raboty* (Moscow, 1961), 280–281.

[4] Among the consequences of these measures has been the spread of rites performed *in absentia* or by proxy in a manner reminiscent of the late thirties.

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of legal facilities for worship, the embittered faithful have been increasingly resorting to underground religious practices or replenishing the prohibited religious groups. For the authorities, this has magnified the problem of policing religious activities, reviving the spectre of a religious underground evolving into a centre of active political opposition to the regime. Religious persecution served to intensify eschatological tendencies among the believers, alienating the more fundamentalist, more aggressive, and, significantly, the younger elements from their submissive leaders suspected of 'selling-out' to the Godless authorities.[5] As for the much publicised *oktiabriny*, 'Komsomol weddings', 'civil funerals', 'consecrations into workers', etc., these synthetic new rites admittedly failed to match the popular appeal, the emotional and aesthetic qualities of the religious ceremonies they were supposed to replace; and the few and far between 'Palaces of Happiness' seem to show little improvement upon the bureaucratic routine of the *Zags* offices.

Symptomatic of the new self-critical mood in official circles has been a post-mortem on the Khrushchevite anti-religious campaign conducted in the pages of the chief atheist journal *Nauka i religiia*, and in *Komsomolskaia pravda*. Correspondence in the former publication admitted the self-defeating nature of vulgar misrepresentations of religion, concentration on priestly 'frauds' and 'immorality', insults to believers, and the widespread reliance on intimidation and coercion in closing churches and dissolving religious congregations. 'There can be no doubt', admitted a Minsk lecturer, V. Ivanov, 'that the violations of the legislation on cults [by the atheists] and the offending of religious sentiments of the believers contribute to the existence of religious survivals'. 'We must all firmly assimilate one truth', declared a journalist, M. Morozov, that 'in their great majority the believers in our country are honest Soviet men, toilers just as we atheists are, and one should treat them with respect'.[6] By far the most significant contribution to this discussion had come from a Lvov atheist, G. Kelt. Writing in *Komsomolskaia pravda* (15 August 1965), she reminded her fellow *antireligiozniki* that religion 'cannot be abolished in one day', as it is not 'an idle invention' but represents 'a historical phenomenon which has existed over thousands of years'.

> And today we are again lulling ourselves: 'many believers in our country had left the church and religion'. This is self-deception. One thing is true, that in the greater part of the territory of the

[5] The most significant split on this issue occurred among the Evangelical Christian-Baptists in 1960–61, when in a number of localities the younger elements of the sect (known since as the 'Pure' or 'Living' Baptists), repudiated their Moscow leadership. See *Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma* (hereafter *VIRA*), XI (Moscow, 1963), 102–111; and *Ezhegodnik Muzeia istorii religii i ateizma* (hereafter *Ezhegodnik*), VII (Moscow–Leningrad). 1964, 117–121. Similar tendencies evidently exist within the Orthodox Church as well. According to a recent memorandum circulated by two priests in Russia in the Summer of 1965, eight Orthodox bishops protested to the Patriarch against his appeasement of the authorities.

[6] *Nauka i religiia*, No. 10, 1965, 3–8, 11; No. 11, 1965, 7–9; No. 12, 1965, 5–6, 30–34.

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> Soviet Union there are no churches and no servants of religion. But there are believers. If not Orthodox, then sectarians of all possible shades.... The closing of a parish does not make atheists out of the believers. On the contrary, it intensifies the people's attraction towards religion and, in addition, embitters their hearts.

The writer concluded that 'a naked, purely negative, bookish-oratorical atheism' would not succeed unless it countered religion at the aesthetic and emotional levels as well. What is needed, she suggested, is a substitute for the church, 'a ritual centre', a 'shrine dedicated to the apotheosis of the genius of Man' combined with a 'new ritual that would replace church liturgy'.[7]

After a realistic diagnosis of the shortcomings of the campaign, the proposed cure with its Feuerbachian flavour and echoes of *Bogostroitelstvo* appears to have a distinct air of unreality about it. Apart from missing the importance of religious transcendentalism, it seems to misjudge the nature of Soviet society which, despite the party's repeated reindoctrination drives, had been growing increasingly secular, at least in the ideological sense. The combined effect of the contradictions between the official theory and practice, of the bureaucratisation of the system and the *Verbürgerlichung* of the Soviet elite, of the rising level of education and sophistication, has been the progressive erosion of the political myth, its substitution by a routinised public ritual and holiday rhetorics. Not the least important reason for the failure of the recent atheist campaign was its inability to overcome the indifference among the party and Komsomol rank-and-file to the cause of anti-religious struggle. The prevailing view appears to be that religious survivals are common only among the older generation or the less enlightened stratum of the population, that they do not pose any real threat to the regime and society, and that they would eventually fade away in the process of social and economic change, while a militant anti-religious campaign would rather arrest if not actually reverse this process. Significantly, a poll conducted in 1961 by *Komsomolskaia pravda's* Institute of Public Opinion revealed that the majority of the Soviet youth consider adherence to religion among the least of 'social evils'.[8] Many industrial workers tend to agree with the believers' argument that their religious convictions are a private matter which must not be held against them in the allocation of jobs and benefits.[9] Indeed, among the Soviet intelligentsia—a social stratum least represented among the overt believers—professional *antireligiozniki* have recruited remarkably few collaborators, while gaining the reputation of 'a sort of an atheist sect', which had 'assimilated from its opponent the worst features of intolerance and fanaticism'.[10]

[7] For discussion preceeding and following the publication of Kelt's article, see *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 29 May and 24 September 1965.

[8] See B. Grushin and V. Chikin, *Ispoved pokoleniia* (Moscow, 1962), 148–150.

[9] Akademiia Obshchestvennykh Nauk pri TsK KPSS, *Voprosy formirovaniia nauchno-ateisticheskikh vzgliadov* (Moscow, 1964), 43; *Nauka i religiia*, No. 2, 1966, 2, 7.

[10] G. Kelt in *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 15 August 1965; cf. *Nauka i religiia*, No. 5, 1962, 12.

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THE decline in militant atheism within the politically vocal strata of the Soviet population cannot be dissociated from changes in the overt attitudes of religious organisations towards the regime. Since the 1920s, after the period of open conflict and unsuccessful attempts to secure an equitable compromise with the regime, the Russian Orthodox Church and most other religious groups not only had to pledge their loyalty to the new system but also to accept far-reaching governmental control over their activities and give unconditional support to Soviet policies. Though it was not until the crisis of the last war that the Kremlin saw fit to acknowledge the ' patriotic attitude ' of religious groups, ever since the late twenties they have been conspicuously loyal, to the extent indeed of endorsing the regime's manifestly false claim that it had never persecuted religion or clergy but only ' criminals hiding behind the cloak of religion '. In nearly every religious group there were some who found the political and moral price of legality too high, and rather than compromise chose to withdraw into the religious underground; some simply discontinued church attendance and participation in religious rites performed by ' legal ' clergy.

Changes in the sphere of organised religion in the USSR are not confined to the realm of church-state relations. The institutional power of religion and the scope of religious activities drastically declined under the combined impact of a hostile political environment and social change. The most dramatic change in fortunes was that of the Russian Orthodox Church. The range of ecclesiastic activities was reduced to little more than worship and the administration of rites within the walls of the church.

The Church's revival since the war has been strictly controlled and restricted in line with considerations of political expediency. Neither the total number of open Orthodox churches (which declined from some 15,000 in 1948 to 11,000 in 1961, and may now be fewer than 8,000),[11] nor their geographical distribution are indicative of the actual strength or local density of Orthodox believers. An examination of the ' geography ' of the Orthodox Church in the USSR shows that the ratio of active churches to the population decreases sharply as one moves from west to east. The most ' churchly ' areas are those annexed to the USSR since the last war, followed by the territories which experienced a resurgence of religious life under enemy occupation, and the provinces which were threatened by the Germans (and where the Soviet authorities were prepared to grant some concessions to believers); the least ' churchly ' areas lie beyond the Urals. It is worth noting in this connection that in 1961 the *majority* of all active Orthodox churches and monasteries were located in the Ukrainian SSR (containing only 20 per cent of the total population) and that the Republic's three formerly Uniate *oblasti* (Lvov, Ternopol, Ivano-Frankivsk—2 per cent

[11] *Ibid.*, No. 11, 1962, 60; V. K. Tancher, *Osnovy ateizmu* (Kiev, 1961), 181.

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of the total population), accounted then for some 20 per cent of all Orthodox churches operating in the USSR. [12]

Some light on the changes in the denominational structure and social base of organised religion has been shed by field research conducted during 1959-62 by Academy of Sciences teams in four, predominantly agrarian, Central Russian *oblasti*—Voronezh, Lipetsk, Riazan, and Tambov—which largely escaped German occupation, with its stimulating effect on organised religion. Some information has also been published on the adjoining Penza oblast. [13]

The Russian Orthodox Church has remained by far the largest (and, *politically*, best adapted) religious group in the country, but much of its present institutional strength derives from the annexation of the Orthodox churches in the new Soviet territories in the west, as well as from the forcible conversion of the Uniates in the Western Ukraine. On the other hand, the Moscow Patriarchate has lost some of the faithful to the underground 'Truly Orthodox Christians' and its flock has been persistently raided by the Baptists and other 'Western' sects. The Old Believers and such old native sects as the Dukhobors, Molokane, Subbotniki, Malevantsy, Izrailitiane (Old and New), Khlysty and Skoptsy—have been rapidly declining in strength. In contrast, the newer sects of western origin—the Evangelical Christian-Baptists, the Adventists, as well as the banned Pentecostal and Jehovah's Witnesses, have been enlarging their following. [14] While the locus of Orthodoxy's organised strength shifted to the countryside, the 'Western' sects have developed a strong urban base, invading some newly industrialised areas only weakly covered by the Orthodox organisation. Among the sects, the Baptists appear to be the strongest and most dynamic group; it has the advantage of a less institutionalised structure (which made it less vulnerable to Soviet restrictions and pressures), and has successfully combined an intense missionary zeal with considerable ingenuity in adapting its message and style of operation to the changing social environment. The old sects of Russian origin were on the whole unable to adapt themselves to the new conditions; their withdrawal from the world into closed, self-sufficient communes had become impossible in the thirties with the collectivisation of agriculture and the increasingly totalitarian nature of the regime.

AFTER almost half a century of exclusion from public life and school, of the banning of religious instruction of young people under eighteen, and of administrative discrimination against known

[12] Tancher, *op. cit.*, 181. Similarly, of some 2,000 sectarian congregations officially registered in the USSR in 1957, the majority were located in the Ukraine (*Nauka i religiia* [Moscow, 1957], 396); *Pravoslavnyi visnyk*, No. 7, 1957, 215; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 7 February 1962; *Krokodil*, No. 5, 1963, 3.

[13] Accounts of these investigations appear in *VIRA*, IX (1961); X (1962); XI (1963). Some data on sectarians in the Voronezh oblast appear in *Ezhegodnik*, V (1961), 58–75.

[14] See *VIRA*, IX, 9–94, 161–188; X, 170–171; XI, 69–71; and *Ezhegodnik*, V, 63–67.

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believers in all walks of Soviet life, all religious groups have been facing for years the spectre of their gradual ' withering away ' in the absence of a large influx of young believers. Indeed, according to a 1963 official estimate, approximately 70 per cent of overt believers were then over forty years of age. [15] The average age of members of religious congregations in the USSR varies considerably, however, in different regions (in the newer Soviet territories the age structure of believers comes closer to that of the general population) and among the different denominations. While the published Soviet data are largely incomparable and restricted to sectarian groups only, they suggest that the Old Believers and the native Russian sects have been on the whole far less successful in rejuvenating their ranks than the Western sects. Thus, for example, among new members joining the Evangelical Christian-Baptists in a series of urban centres, nearly one-third were young people. Surprisingly, the youngest membership recorded for any religious congregation belonged to an illegal congregation of the ' Truly Orthodox Christians ' in the early fifties. Little information is available on the age composition of the Orthodox believers. Observations conducted in the Penza oblast in 1963 revealed that over three-fourths of the regular church-goers consisted of the over-forty age group, though at the 1963 Easter service in Penza approximately one-third of the congregation were identified as children and youth. [16]

Undoubtedly the females (who accounted in 1959 for 55 per cent of the total population) constitute a large majority of overt believers. A 1961 estimate placed the proportion of women in religious congregations at about 70 per cent. In Orthodox churches some of the auxiliary functions once reserved only for men have now been opened to women. In terms of their educational and occupational characteristics, members of religious groups seem to come primarily from the less educated strata of Soviet society. Apart, again, from the new western *oblasti*, such overlapping categories as housewives, peasants, unskilled workers, and those over working age represent the overwhelming majority of the registered sect members and regular church-goers.[17]

The official interpretation of the composition of religious congregations has persistently stressed the causal relationship between ' religious superstitions ' and the low levels of education and skill, seclusion from the collective productive process, and limited access to the communication and artistic media. Inevitably, it is claimed, as the general level of education rises, as women are liberated from drudgery and alienation and drawn into the productive collective, as the uses of leisure become more organised and cultured—religion will gradually lose its

[15] L. F. Ilichev in *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1964, 30.

[16] *Ezhegodnik*, VII, 115. Of the 83 ' activists ' in the Michurinsk congregation (Tambov oblast) of *Istinno Pravoslavnye Khristiiane*, 44 were under thirty and only 12 were born before the Bolshevik revolution (*Ezhegodnik*, VIII, 96).

[17] V. Iu. Kelembatova in *Narodnia tvorchist ta etnohrafiia*, No. 4, 1961, 27–33; G. T. Utkin in *Kratkii nauchno-ateisticheskii slovar* (Moscow, 1964), 451–452; Tancher, *op. cit.*, 317–330; *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1964, 39.

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hold on the less politically mature strata of the population.[18] Apart from some success attained by individual religious groups in recruiting younger (and usually better educated) members, the influx into the ranks of religious congregations of pensioners tends to upset such a simple correlation. Including people of professional and white-collar worker backgrounds, pensioners have come to play an increasingly important role in the administration of local congregations. Thus in the Penza oblast, of 681 members of Orthodox groups in 1962, 225 were pensioners of whom 144 had previously been decorated with orders and medals.[19] Idleness and age alone do not seem a sufficient explanation for this. One must also take into account the relative invulnerability of individuals once they have retired from posts which are as a rule closed to known believers; hence the temptation to reactivate one's beliefs at this stage.

This brings us to the question of the actual spread and intensity of religious beliefs in Soviet society. No one knows for sure how many believers there are in the USSR. Apart from the alleged findings of the abortive 1937 census,[20] no relevant statistical data have been collected and the occasional local polls conducted by Soviet institutions suffer from the understandable reluctance of the unknown proportion of believers to identify themselves as such. One, however imperfect, index of the extent of religious sentiments in society has been the degree to which births, marriages, and deaths have been accompanied by the corresponding religious rites. The published data for the Riazan and Penza *oblasti*, while restricted to the Orthodox rite, suggest that a much greater proportion of the population resorts to these rites than has usually been asserted by Soviet spokesmen. That large numbers of young people are clearly involved in these practices—in spite of the shortage of churches and clergy and the virtual impossibility of escaping official detection—also tends to show that the common association of religion with old age may not correctly reflect the real situation. Thus in the Riazan oblast, where of the pre-revolutionary total of 991 churches only 61 were operating in 1960 (i.e. one church for 24,000 inhabitants), 60 per cent of all children born in 1960 were baptised in church; in the same year, 15 per cent of all marriages and 30 per cent of all funerals were performed according to the Orthodox rite. In the Penza oblast, in which only 34 churches (against 924 before 1917) remained open in 1962 (one church for 44,000 inhabitants), the corresponding figures for church baptisms, marriages, and funerals were 48·5, 6·4, and 20·9 per cent respectively.[21]

[18] See I. A. Kryvelev, 'Preodolenie religiozno-bytovykh perezhitkov u narodov SSSR', *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, No. 4, 1961, 30–44.

[19] *Voprosy formirovaniia nauchno-ateisticheskikh vzgliadov*, 13–15.

[20] Cf. N. S. Timasheff, 'Urbanization, Operation Antirelgion and the Decline of Religion in the USSR', *The American Slavic and East European Review*, April 1955, 232.

[21] *VIRA*, XI, 67, 73, 80–82. The performance of Orthodox rites by the population in the Riazan oblast had increased two- to three-fold during the 1950s. *Voprosy formirovaniia naucho-ateisticheskikh vzgliadov*, 11–13.

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While such widespread resort to religious ceremonies, along with the retention of icons in the majority of households investigated, was officially ascribed to pressure and even threats on the part of 'fanatical' grandparents, the important fact remains that rather than submit to powerful anti-religious pressures from outside and fight ideological battles at home, many young people place family loyalty above ideological principle. The survival of the family despite all attempts to transform it into another lever of control, has probably been the major factor in ensuring a considerable degree of continuity of religious beliefs and practices in Soviet society. Notwithstanding their exposure to heavy doses of anti-religious propaganda in school, youth organisations, and the army, many young adults in today's USSR are evidently willing not only to tolerate 'religious survivals' among the older generation but also to charge their believing grandparents with the care and upbringing of the youngest generation of Soviet citizens.

By all accounts, organised religion in contemporary Soviet society represents only the visible and politically least vulnerable part of a much larger body of actual believers. These appear in varying percentages in all social strata and age groups and range from those totally devoted and prepared to bear witness to their faith, to the 'utilitarian believers' careful to light the proverbial candles to both God and Devil. The majority of those born since the 1917 revolution (especially in urban areas) are probably indifferent to religion, but have by no means become converts to militant atheism. While greater urbanisation will probably bring a further decline in the number of believers in the USSR, it would seem that as Soviet society comes of age, as it begins to shed the straitjacket of totalitarian controls, it becomes more tolerant of religious sentiments in its midst. At the same time, however, the process of secularisation at work in Soviet society fosters the attrition of the political faith which has provided the regime with its claim to legitimacy, its raison d'être. In the long run this process may yet prove to be a greater danger to the survival of the dictatorship than religion itself.

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THE TWENTY-THIRD CONGRESS OF THE CPSU (1)

Leonard Schapiro

THE twenty-third congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met in Moscow between 29 March and 8 April. An interval of four and a half years had elapsed since the twenty-second congress, which met in October 1961. The delay of six months was indeed a very modest departure from the four-year interval laid down by the party Rules, considering that Soviet political life had suffered a serious traumatic shock in October 1964—the sudden removal from power of the First Secretary of the Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N. S. Khrushchev.

Soviet party congresses naturally reflect the style and character of the leader, or leaders, in power. The twenty-second congress, with its vituperation of China and its visionary pie-in-the-sky new Programme for the party, reflected the style of Khrushchev. In contrast, the recent congress, which provided few surprises, and much disappointment for those who expected any kind of sensations, reflected the more business-like and practical Brezhnev and Kosygin. There was a good deal less heat—but the cynics could also claim with some justice that there was also a good deal less light thrown on Soviet politics.

Although the congress threw no new light on the circumstances which led to the fall of Khrushchev, much of the indirect criticism which was levelled at the fallen leader (never actually named) served to confirm the view which a number of observers of the Soviet scene had formed. Three reasons, among many, which led to the abrupt dismissal of the ebullient First Secretary can now be listed with confidence in the light of the congress debates. First, the chaos and confusion caused by his idiosyncratic ideas and methods—the bulldozing through, in the teeth of opposition, of what were once described by the Central Committee as 'harebrained schemes'—drastic reorganisation of the party and government apparatus, the cult of maize and other crops with scant regard for climatic and other factors, and the like. The Central Committee at the time, and the congress recently, omitted to point out that the 'harebrained schemes' were all launched with ostensibly unanimous approval by the party. But it does look as if someone has at long last been posing the question whether the traditional one-man form of rule, which has characterised the Soviet political system for so many periods of its existence, is necessarily the best possible.

Second, there can now be no possible doubt that Khrushchev had deeply antagonised the party and police (KGB) apparatus. That his enemies in the party apparatus far outnumbered his friends had already been shown by the strikingly small number of changes in it which have

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been made since his fall: the *apparatchiki* were certainly not sorry to see him go. The same can be said for the KGB—without whose aid his departure could never have been managed so smoothly; and who received immediate reward in the promotion of the Chairman of the KGB, V. E. Semichastny, to full membership of the Central Committee in November 1964. It may seem, at first sight, surprising that Khrushchev should have generated such antagonism in the party apparatus. After all, it was he who had, in his ascent to sole power, relied on the support of the party, and had advanced many of his own protégés in the ranks of its apparatus. Moreover, Khrushchev did more than anyone to promote the extension of the influence of the party into every sphere of life, and was the architect of a number of party-state 'partnerships' in which the party usually played the leading role. After all, it was Khrushchev who was the author of the remarkable suggestion, incorporated in the Programme and in official comments upon it, that the state machinery would progressively wither away as full communism approached; but that the role of the party would increase during the approach to this happy millennium; and that the party would still continue in being for a long time after communism had been achieved. But it seems that all this was far outweighed in the eyes of the party apparatus by the fact that Khrushchev was a reformer: having once embarked, in 1956, on the road to 'destalinisation', he was not prepared to let any of the party conservatives stand in his way. He was determined to get his 'harebrained' ideas through: when they ran into difficulties, then, in traditional communist fashion, he looked for the fault in the executives and not in the plan. At the same time the coarse directness of his utterances, which rather endeared him even to his enemies abroad, shamed and embarrassed the more traditional *apparatchik*, who was used to hide beneath the decorum of hypocrisy, dissimulation, and 'double-speak'.

The third factor which loomed in the background at the congress, was the international communist movement, shattered by the impact of the Sino-Soviet rift. Of course, the rupture between the two powers would have come without any intervention on Khrushchev's part. But, as the situation appeared in October 1964, it could well be argued that the violence of Khrushchev's tactics was threatening to throw even those parties which sided with the Soviet Union into confusion—at all events, his enemies had a good argument ready to hand. Whatever the rights and wrongs of blaming Khrushchev on this issue, there is no doubt that his successors have done much to repair the outward appearance of the 'world communist movement'—if such a thing still exists. The recent congress showed how successful they were in this respect—a subject to which I will return.

SUCH were the main factors which brought Khrushchev's meteoric and colourful career to an abrupt close, which must have surprised him as much as it surprised most observers of the Soviet political scene.

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But his successors did not inherit an easy task—if governing Russia can ever be considered an easy task. Their assumption of the reins of office, even if thinly anointed with the oil of Central Committee endorsement, was, to say the least, precarious and easy to challenge for anyone who was ambitious enough to do so. Their power remained dependent on the goodwill of the party apparatus and of the KGB. Moreover, they had to work out a new *modus vivendi*, a method of dual control by Prime Minister and First Secretary governing as equal partners in joint harness—that is, assuming that Kosygin was aware of the great advantage in the power stakes enjoyed by the First Secretary, and was anxious to avoid the fate of his predecessors Malenkov and Bulganin. Above all, both leaders were faced with serious and threatening economic problems in industry, and even more in agriculture, which all Khrushchev's ingenuity in piling one form of reorganisation upon another had failed to resolve. Besides, to complicate matters, the commonsense view of the problems indicated beyond doubt that the alleviation, let alone solution, of these major economic problems, demanded measures which run counter to the dogmas so dear to that most reactionary of all politicians—the Soviet party *apparatchik*. It has also become evident in the past eighteen months that the ubiquitous party interference in industry and particularly in planning, which Khrushchev had done so much to encourage, was driving the planners and technical managers to distraction.

It is not therefore to be wondered at that the keynotes of the recent congress were reticence, compromise, sobriety of tone, caution, and avoidance of major decisions of importance. The reticence was indeed most striking—even for a communist party gathering which is seldom outspoken in its public debates. It was perhaps least surprising that there should have been no reference at all to the fall of Khrushchev—neither to the manner of his going, nor to the reasons for it. The subject is a sensitive one for his successors, whose claim to the offices which they have assumed may appear pretty slender to those who are long accustomed to the rigging of all party votes. Khrushchev at all events could claim descent from the Stalin whom he in due course was to topple: neither Kosygin nor Brezhnev can do even this. But if Khrushchev was not mentioned, his methods of rule were repeatedly cited as ones to be avoided in the future—or, in some more sycophantic speeches, as having already been successfully avoided by the new First Secretary: ' voluntarism ', ' subjectivism ', disregard for objective factors, disrespect for party cadres, and the like.

Again, in the sphere of international communism—another burning topic—no light whatever was thrown on the issues between the Soviet Union and China. One might imagine that this was because everything that can be said on this subject has already been said, but that is not the case. Only a few weeks before the congress a letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU was circulating among the communist

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parties of the world, and—such is now the lack of security, discretion, and loyalty among these parties—in the usual manner reached the pages of the 'bourgeois' press. This letter is probably the most devastating attack on China yet to emanate from the Soviet Union. It accuses the Chinese of a deliberately anti-Soviet policy, which has led them to such lengths in their blind hatred of the USSR as to obstruct deliveries of Soviet military supplies to North Vietnam; and to attempt to foment a nuclear conflict between the USSR and the USA. '... The Chinese leaders', says the CPSU letter, 'need a long drawn out war in Vietnam in order to keep the international tension in being, in order to portray China as a "besieged fortress". All grounds exist for asserting that one of the aims of the Chinese leadership in the matter of Vietnam is directed at provoking a military conflict between the USSR and the USA. As they say themselves, they need a conflict between the USSR and USA in order to "sit on the mountain top and watch the tigers fight".'[1]

Even more striking was the reticence on two burning domestic issues. In the economic sphere nothing can affect the destinies of the Soviet Union more than the success or failure of the attempts to decentralise planning decisions and to evolve a more rational economic system. Some strides in this direction have already been made, and the whole policy is one which Kosygin warmly supports. Yet the subject was hardly more than mentioned by him in his own speech, and was completely ignored in the subsequent debate. Obviously this was not due to lack of interest—suspicion of profit and incentives, so far as management is concerned, is as strong among many Soviet communist party members as it is among some of our trade unionists. Evidently, therefore, the organisers of the congress were completely successful in ensuring the election of such delegates alone as could be relied on to say what their leaders wanted them to say, and no more. Equally striking was the reticence on the other vital domestic issue. The Siniavsky trial, only just concluded when the congress opened, had already caused protests in left-wing circles, and in several communist parties, outside the Soviet Union. Inside the country, the trial and a whole series of other sinister utterances on the subject of intellectual activity and—if reports are correct—many arrests and certifications as lunatics for literary activity in the past twelve months, actually led to an appeal by twenty-five leading intellectuals to the Central Committee not to permit the return of the old repressive methods. This was on the eve of the congress. At the congress itself not one word of protest, criticism, or warning was voiced—either from a fraternal delegate from abroad, or from a representative of literature among the congress delegates. But then these 'representatives of literature' were a careful selection of venal agents, including the Nobel Prize winner Sholokhov. They spoke in the manner to be expected of them. On the other hand, the packing

[1] *Die Welt*, 21 March 1966, p. 6.

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of the congress was so successful that of the few more critical and responsible writers who were delegates to these congresses in the past, even A. Tvardovsky, a candidate member of the Central Committee (until the new Central Committee was elected towards the end of the congress proceedings), was excluded from the congress. Perhaps most of the information of interest at the congress must be drawn from its silences—as Sherlock Holmes once did from the silence of the dog in the night. Even so, some more positive information also emerged, briefly summarised in the following paragraphs.

THE success in presenting to the outside world a picture of massive unity behind the Soviet Union of the overwhelming majority of all communist parties was considerable (even if it should prove shortlived!). Apart from China and Albania, the only countries whose communist parties did not send fraternal delegations were Japan, New Zealand, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The presence of the fraternal delegate from North Vietnam, Le Duan, was a particular triumph for Soviet diplomacy. (The Soviet authorities, needless to say, made the most of Le Duan's presence to extract propaganda value from it.) Even more striking than the attendance roll was the exemplary moderation of the fraternal delegates. Le Duan contented himself with formal thanks to China, and stressed the debt of Vietnam to the USSR. The delegates of those parties which could have been expected to be most critical—the Italian, the Rumanian, the Cuban, even the British—were studiously moderate and correctly pro-Soviet in their speeches, even if there were some undercurrents of interest. The Rumanian fraternal delegate Ceausescu laid greater stress than most other speakers on the need for non-interference by one party in the affairs of other parties, and of the need to respect the rules of 'socialist internationalism'. The Cuban visitor stressed the need 'to develop revolution in all corners of the earth and in the most varied conditions' equally with unity. Still, the appearance of unity was there—a great change from the days of Khrushchev, when the brickbats were freely flying, and, but for his removal by his colleagues, an international gathering for drumming China out of the club was imminent. How much this appearance of unity is worth is another matter. Quite a heavy price—in men, in weapons, and in risk of escalation—has already been paid for it by the USSR in terms of its aid to Vietnam. If some of the wilder Latin American communists interpret the recent Havana conference as giving them the green light from the Soviet end to indulge in extreme revolutionary adventures, what price will the Soviet Union pay in loss of communist party influence in the American continent? What shopping list is Castro now preparing in return for his support? The Rumanian delegate, within a few weeks of returning from the congress, made a speech in which the references to past Soviet policy were far from fraternal. Some of his remarks looked like the preliminaries to a demand for the return of Bessarabia and North Bukovina.

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Kosygin and Brezhnev have perhaps not yet fully explored the depths of appeasement and blackmail in the international communist movement, and may live to regret that they did not let Khrushchev blow it sky high in his own inimitable way.

THE total number of party members and candidate members is now 12,471,000. This represents a continuing growth of around 500,000 a year. It is a young party: only 5·6 per cent of party members have been in the party for over thirty years, and nearly half of the members have been there for less than two years. But then more than half—53 per cent—of all party members are under forty. In social composition the party is said to be over half (54 per cent) proletarian and peasant by occupation. This is in substance the reiteration of a claim which has been made for some years. But, in the absence of more exact details of the nature of occupations which are classified as proletarian and peasant, it would not be wise to assume that the party members are, in their majority, no longer white-collar workers, or persons in positions of authority—as they have been since the earliest days.

The finances of the party were stated to be healthy. It has never been apparent that the party has lacked funds—but it would seem that it is now a matter for congratulation that it can finance itself from its own income—from publications, and from members' dues.

Of greater interest were the changes made in the party Rules, which in their present form date from 1961. First, four amendments relating to party membership. Those under 23 can now join only through the Komsomol, the party youth organisation. This is presumably intended to strengthen the Komsomol which, with a membership of 23,000,000, is considerably below the strength it should have if all those eligible were enrolled in it. Referees for new candidates must now be of five years' standing in the party, not three as hitherto. Provisions for expulsion have been tightened up by making the final decision rest with the *rayon* (district) or city party committee, and not, as hitherto, with the regional (*oblast*) committee. The right of appeal up to the Central Committee has been preserved. Finally, demotion to the status of candidate or probationary member as a disciplinary penalty has been abolished.

The second group of changes relates to party organs. The provision for the summoning of party conferences between congresses, which existed until 1961 in the Rules, has been restored. (The last conference was held in 1941.) In Khrushchev's time enlarged and much publicised plenary meetings of the Central Committee were much in use. Presumably the conference will provide for more orthodox gatherings of party members for the discussion of specific problems. This, like the changes described below, seems to be in line with the general policy of the present leaders to remove from the party organisation every trace of the innovations associated with Khrushchev. Thus, the title of

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General Secretary, conferred on Stalin with Lenin's approval (or at all events without his dissent) in 1922 was restored, in place of the title of First Secretary, assumed by Khrushchev in 1953. It is not evident that this implies any change of authority or duty. Similarly, the Presidium of the Central Committee becomes once again the Politburo—a name first adopted in 1917, and not changed until 1952. Again, there is no serious evidence that this implies any change of function. As hitherto, the Politburo will determine policy (theoretically in the name of the Central Committee) and the General Secretary will preside over it—as the First Secretary presided over the Presidium.

Two further innovations by Khrushchev have been set aside. The Rules, as amended, preserve the general principle that it is desirable that the membership of party organs should be periodically renewed. But the specific percentages for the turnover laid down by the Rules in 1961 have been repealed. It may be, as Brezhnev claimed, that this change will obviate excessive mobility, especially at the lower levels of party organisation, and this would certainly be popular with the older members of the apparatus. On the other hand, the control of the secretariat over party elections has always been sufficiently stringent for it to be able, with at most some isolated exceptions at the lower levels, to impose its own selection of members for all party organs, irrespective of the provisions in the Rules. Second, the Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR has been abolished. The party organisations within the RSFSR will now be directly controlled by the secretariat in Moscow, and the departments of the secretariat, which were for the most part divided into two—one for the RSFSR and one for the Union Republics—have apparently been reunited. This innovation by Khrushchev was certainly at one time exploited by him in order to circumvent opposition to his policies at the centre. Perhaps Brezhnev, whose control over this body appears to have been less firm than that of Khrushchev, may gain in authority from this change.

The abolition of the RSFSR Bureau completes the dismantling of Khrushchev's innovations in the party structure, most of which seem to have been unpopular with the apparatus. All the others had already been repealed during the eighteen months which elapsed between his fall and the congress. The divided regional committees (*obkoms*) were reunited in 1964, and the district committees (*raikoms*), which Khrushchev had drastically reduced in number and merged in the new agricultural administrative directorates which he had set up, were restored. Thousands of displaced, or distraught, *apparatchiki* must have welcomed this restoration of their authority and privileges. Various innovations in the central apparatus were all reversed in the course of 1965—the ideological and party organs commissions, the agricultural, industrial, Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian bureaux of the Central Committee, and a few others quietly ceased to exist. Finally, at the end

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of 1965, the last of the party-state hybrids came to an end. The Party-State Control Committee, headed by A. N. Shelepin, was abolished. Its party functions of supervision over the execution of party directives by party officials (though it is far from clear that the party apparatus ever allowed it to exercise them) reverted to the Committee of Party Control —which also acts as the disciplinary organ of the party. The new body for state control, reduced in status, is now clearly limited in its authority to exercising supervision over the discharge of their duties by officials in the government administrative machine—and may, indeed, be moribund or dormant.

Lastly, a tidying-up amendment: all union republican congresses are now to be held at intervals of two years, and not, as hitherto, at intervals of four years in the cases of Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan; and two years in the case of the others.

THERE are no startling changes in the membership of the newly elected top party organs. The full members of the Politburo number eleven, in place of twelve full members of the former Presidium. The retirement of Shvernik and Mikoyan has no political significance, having regard to their age and health. The new full member, A. Ya. Pelshe, an old party hack from Latvia, is to replace Shvernik as chairman of the Committee of Party Control—he is the sole link with the generation of the Revolution and the Civil War. In announcing the new members, Brezhnev departed from what has been customary since the death of Stalin, by naming them in what appears to be some order of seniority of groups. This would indicate that the four senior statesmen of the party now are Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and Suslov—though not necessarily in that order, since Brezhnev's non-alphabetical order preserved alphabetical order within each of the three groups into which he divided his list. (The press has not preserved this refinement, and has reverted to the normal practice.)

As for the candidate members, the departure of Efremov, who fell from grace after Khrushchev's removal and was rusticated to Stavropol, causes no surprise. Two new candidate members, D. A. Kunaev and P. M. Masherov, seem very much to symbolise a balancing act between the less and the more extreme elements in the party apparatus—with Brezhnev heading the former, and Shelepin the latter. At all events, Kunaev is plainly a protégé of Brezhnev, whom he rescued after the fall of Khrushchev from the disfavour into which Khrushchev had plunged him. Masherov is evidently an associate of Shelepin from Komsomol days. The contrast between the speeches of the two men at the congress fully bears out this hypothesis: Kunaev's full of respectful references to Brezhnev, and silent on the subject of bringing the writers and intellectuals to heel; Masherov's, with a perfunctory reference to Brezhnev, and a diatribe against the new stirrings of intellectual freedom which was among the most violent of all that were uttered at the congress.

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The central secretariat now includes ten secretaries apart from the General Secretary, Brezhnev. Podgorny, as was expected when he became President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and titular head of state, is gone from the secretariat. There can be little doubt that in terms of real power this is, in Soviet conditions, a serious decline. In Brezhnev's non-alphabetical listing of the secretaries, Suslov came next to himself, and can therefore be regarded as the most senior after him. Shelepin was listed third. Since Suslov almost certainly supervises such matters as foreign communist relations and ideology, the high listing of Shelepin suggests that he has overall responsibility for the next senior secretarial duty—party organs. The more junior Kapitonov (disgraced by Khrushchev and rehabilitated by Brezhnev) is also associated in this vital side of party work—which virtually controls all elections to party offices and committees, except the very highest, which the Politburo decides. In any case, Brezhnev remains in overall control. It is unknown who controls the other vital side of the work of the secretariat, the administrative organs side, which supervises the army, the KGB, and the procurators. Indeed, so far as can be discovered from scrutiny of the new Central Committee, there has been no appointment to the post of head of the administrative organs department of the secretariat, which has remained vacant since the death of General Mironov in an air accident at the end of 1964. The most plausible explanation is that there is as yet no agreement, and probably has been conflict, over this vital appointment. It may be that Brezhnev has kept the supervision of the administrative organs department in his own hands—but that would only have made him all the more anxious to appoint a head whom he could trust. His apparent failure to do so is one further example of marking time at this strange congress, in which all the vital issues were swept under the carpet.

The new Central Committee would require a separate article for detailed analysis. It would not, however, be a very illuminating article, since little has changed. It is slightly larger than its predecessor elected at the twenty-second congress in 1961—195 full members as against 175; and 165 candidate members, as against 155. The full members show remarkable stability: only some 40 have died or been expelled since 1961. Expressed in percentages, the renovation amounts to 20·6 per cent. (This compares with 50·4 per cent in 1961 and 37·6 per cent in 1956.) Evidently, the aftermath of Khrushchev's fall has had a much less traumatic effect on the party aristocracy than the death of Stalin and the struggle with Malenkov—reflected in 1956—and the struggle with the 'anti-party group'—reflected in 1961. In this sense the stability is a measure of Khrushchev's unpopularity with the senior *apparatchiki*, since his fall necessitated so few casualties among those who had ostensibly been his loyal supporters. Among the candidate members of the Central Committee the turnover was, of course, greater—26·1 per cent as compared with 52·4 in 1961 and 46·8 in 1956.

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Representation of the categories of which the Central Committee is usually composed again offers few surprises. The party apparatus's proportion among the full members is the same as in 1961—11 per cent, and slightly down—from 34·4 to 30—among the candidate members. The representation of the government machinery has somewhat increased: percentage calculations are impracticable here, but all the Ministers and all but two of the chairmen of state committees and directorates are either full or candidate members. The military representation shows no striking change—though it is a matter for surprise and speculation that neither the air force nor the air-defence force is represented at all. Three most abject figures, Sholokhov, Gribachev, and Markov—are the spokesmen for literature in this higher council of the party.

The question is sometimes raised as to the number of supporters that the General Secretary can 'rely on' in the Central Committee. The question is an idle one. In one sense he can rely on them all, so long as he is in power: since their jobs depend upon him, they will naturally give him their support. If, on the other hand, they are satisfied that he is on his way out, they will vote against him to a man—as they did presumably against Khrushchev in October 1964. It should also be recalled that many of those who turned against Khrushchev when they were satisfied that he was finished (he was probably by then under house arrest), were in fact men who owed their promotions and careers entirely to him. One should not look for gratitude in any form of political infighting—in the Soviet Union or elsewhere. This said, the actual patronage exercised by Brezhnev over the composition of the Central Committee is comparatively small. Some full and candidate members can be identified as his political associates, friends, or protégés through past service in the party under him, notably in Kazakhstan; or by the fact that they come from his birthplace where he began his party career —Dnepropetrovsk—and do not otherwise merit promotion by virtue of their office. But they do not total more than twenty-five.

OF course there has been no 'return to Stalin'—the absence of a new Stalin, happily for the Soviet people, would alone prevent that. On present evidence, the revival of the names 'Politburo' and 'General Secretary' looks very much more like an attempt to wipe out the memory of Khrushchev and stake a symbolic claim of continuity with the era of the Patron Saint and Founding Father—Lenin—than a tribute to the memory of Stalin. Nevertheless, it is also true that a clear indication has been given by the party leader of two things. First, that criticism of the era of the 'personality cult' will be severely restricted, both by administrative measures and by party intervention, so as to ensure that the dignity and authority of the *apparatchik* are safeguarded. And, second, that the writers, artists, and intellectuals will be increasingly dragooned to toe the party line, to bend their energies to the crude

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demands of concrete party aims, to abandon 'art for art's sake', and 'apoliticism'. How far the apparatus will succeed in its aim, in the turbulent state of the Soviet intellectuals, is another matter. But the outlook is far from reassuring. It is true that Brezhnev himself is no fanatic, and his own treatment of the topic of party control over intellectual life at the congress was relatively moderate. But the party abounds at all levels in enthusiasts of the Stalinist type—some of them, like Sholokhov and the ex-policeman who controls ideology in the armed forces, Epishev, made this abundantly clear at the congress. They may not speak Brezhnev's language: but it is clear that for reasons of policy, whatever they may be—conciliating the apparatus and the KGB, or restoring the authority of the party, or building up the authority of the party in face of the rising importance in industry and agriculture of the government machine, which in the present state of divided authority is dominated by Kosygin—he is prepared to let them have their head. All this is part of the exercise in balance of forces which is the one clear feature emerging from this congress. It would be in keeping with party traditions that the awakening intellectuals who have fought valorously for some semblance of honesty in thought during the past decade, should be regarded as expendable in the interests of preserving this balance. Even so, the question remains: will it work?

THE idea of equilibrium in a political system, indeed the idea of 'collective leadership' (in any sense other than the pure propaganda synonym for a period of power struggle), denotes a balance of power and responsibility between two autonomous institutions. Therefore any description of the present truce in the power struggle in the Soviet Union today must be used with caution. At most it implies a number of features which served to distinguish this congress from the previous one, and indeed from all CPSU congresses of the post-Stalin period. First was the fact that, as between the top leaders of the state and party machines, all dangerous questions were either ignored, or very much played down. (Actually, only four members of the old Presidium spoke, and one of them, Shelest, really spoke in his capacity as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee.) The omission of all reference to the party programme was also characteristic of this congress, which seemed above all to be anxious to mark time and to 'wait for better weather'. Second, the division of interests and functions which seems to be emerging as a pattern, and which is above all the consequence of the fact that the offices of First (now General) Secretary of the party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR are really divided, and neither office is, or seems to be, under the control of the holder of the other. Thus, in the main, the Prime Minister deals with the plan, with industry and agriculture, and with foreign policy; the General Secretary with party organisation, with propaganda, with the state of international communism and with

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intransigent intellectuals. True, Brezhnev's opening speech surveyed the plan and most of the speeches in the 'political' or 'party' half of the congress—the debate on Brezhnev's report—did contain some 'com-boasting', as Lenin would have called it, on the material progress of the Soviet Union (there was even occasional criticism!). But the main debate on the plan—however uncontroversial—was the discussion which followed Kosygin's dull speech.

Appointments also seem to be a reflection of compromise, of a truce to the usual infighting—the balancing of Kunaev by Masherov, the failure to agree on a new head for the administrative organs department, the modest patronage exercised by Brezhnev over the composition of the new Central Committee. On the side of this truce or balance should also be placed the dismantling of all the hybrid party-state institutions invented by Khrushchev—such as the Party-State Control Committee and the new type of agricultural party committee which replaced the old district committee.

This spirit of 'balance' or 'truce' is the one outstanding impression which the congress leaves on the mind—the anxiety of these insecure and uncertain leaders to reduce the heat, to ignore the more insistent problems, to please everyone, to leave all sleeping dogs well alone. It could, one supposes, be said to have brought minor successes in its train —Kosygin may well be congratulating himself on the fact that the party apparatus no longer interferes constantly and daily in technical planning, as it was encouraged to do by Khrushchev; or the Stalinists in the party apparatus, enjoying once again the respectful adulation of their subordinates, may well feel that some real influence is well lost at the price. The big question is: will the truce last?

It is always a precarious exercise to venture into prediction in the field of politics. The most one can do, or should do if one has any sense, is to list the factors which favour and those which are against a given probable development. There is only one factor in favour of the survival of the truce—common sense. It is more efficient as a method of government. It is less unpleasantly dangerous to the participants—if no one can hope for supreme power, each can at all events hope for a more secure and permanent enjoyment of his share.

On the other side of the scale there are three factors to note, any one of which could wreck the truce beyond redemption. One is the effect that could be produced on the political scene if the economic reforms to which Kosygin is committed run into serious difficulties, or even fail to produce tangible results. The nature of these reforms is traditionally and ideologically alien, even repugnant, to very many party stalwarts. A period of economic crisis could well shatter the truce, and bring the latent and suppressed political conflicts into the open. The second such factor is the possibility, which must always be reckoned with, that some party leader will be driven by personal ambition to break the truce. Brezhnev, it is true, shows every sign of being most

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anxious to preserve it. It is difficult to be quite so positive about other leading figures—Shelepin, for one, and there could be others. The traditional strength and influence of the party apparatus in the Soviet Union might well give such an ambitious figure—if he exists, or should arise—a considerable start in the power stakes.

Most serious of all is the third factor—the party tradition. The party apparatus—and the same can be said for the KGB—has a strong vested interest in illegality, in arbitrariness, in cutting across legal and constitutional limitations, and the like. After all, the party apparatus is by tradition, by ideology, by experience, and by national political mythology the natural centre of power. The only way in which the truce, or balance, or whatever one calls it, can become a reality is for the government machine under the independent Prime Minister who has evolved under the present dual system, to develop its own channels of control. For this—in contrast to the party—it will have to rely on order, constitutionality, certainty, regularity; already the main government spokesman, Podgorny, late of the party secretariat, has been raising his voice in support of all these in his new capacity. Will the party apparatus be content to sit by and see its main area of prerogative—the arbitrary and illegal—threatened by such a new tide? Perhaps. But, should they see their position seriously threatened, they have all the means of acting. This is where the volcano may lie smouldering under the picture of balance and harmony which the congress sought to convey.

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The Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU (2)

THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

Werner Klatt

RUSSIA has a five-year plan again. It runs from 1966 to 1970. Its directives were presented at the twenty-third congress of the CPSU and adopted unanimously by the five thousand participants. It will become known as Soviet Russia's eighth five-year plan. As if by a conjuror's trick, Khrushchev's seven-year plan (1959–1965) was lumped together with his prematurely abandoned sixth plan (1956–1958), so as to give the appearance of a continuity in Soviet planning that has in fact never existed at any time since planning was introduced in 1928. Once again history is being re-written, and in the process a man and his life's work are being eliminated from the records. The orderly minds of the present leaders seem to favour bureaucratic mediocrity in preference to Khrushchev's impulsive improvisations. In two weeks of political deliberations all reference to the deposed leader was avoided, as if the mere mention of his name might spread the disease.

There can hardly have been a duller document in the long history of economic boredom than the directives of the current plan. Gone is the salty humour of the man who knew from his days in the hamlet of Kalinovka that pigs are as incapable of seeing the sky as capitalists of understanding communism. The congress of the party, that removed from discussion such controversial political subjects as whether Stalin was really necessary or whether China's support for wars of liberation is expedient, could hardly be expected to dwell on the effects which the application of the profit motive and the free play of the market might have on an economy planned all too rigidly for all too long. The well-codified Soviet constitution, unlike its unwritten British counterpart, grants no dispensation to its executors to stray from the policies laid down by the leadership.

In presenting the directives of the five-year plan to the congress, Aleksey Nikolaevich Kosygin, Russia's head of government, stressed that they had been discussed in the press and examined at republican party congresses and by regional and local party and trade union branch meetings. The outcome of these processes of Soviet democracy in action was a foregone conclusion: 'The draft directives received unanimous approval everywhere',[1] though some of the proposals made in public debate may ultimately find their way into the ordinances by which the plan is put into effect.

Before the congress the columns of the Soviet press carried some

[1] *Pravda*, 7 April 1966.

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lively contributions to debates, as topical as in the days when they were first opened a hundred years ago—on for example the meaning of the labour law of value—and still as esoteric—or the nature of commodity relationships in communist society. Some were as down to earth as the statement by Moiseyev, corresponding member of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, that the injection of capital into agriculture does not yield commensurate results in farm production, capital assets having increased during the past seven years by almost 75 per cent and production by hardly 15 per cent (*Izvestia*, 12 March 1966).

On the eve of the congress Leontiev reasoned that the plan and the market were perfectly compatible with each other [2]; but at the congress itself Brezhnev and Kosygin preferred not to put this argument to the test. Little attention was paid to the role of profit as an indicator of economic success; nor was the importance of a rational price pattern mentioned. In the autumn of 1965 a State Committee was set up—with Vladimir Sitnin, a former Deputy Minister of Finance, as chairman—to look into the question of administering prices in the light of present requirements of resource allocation and personal consumption. The Commitee's report was due in January, and the congress would have provided the most appropriate platform for a statement on price policy. There was none. Government by administrative decision and adherence to the status quo seem to have been preferred to any steps involving possible risks. This attitude bodes ill for the prospects of risk-taking on the part of managers, workers, technocrats or bureaucrats. A period of bourgeois respectability rather than revolutionary zeal lies ahead. This may be all to the good, but it seems unlikely that the present stalemate will last to the end of the decade. Though no articulate alternative is yet in sight, the existence of an opposition and of a power struggle is hardly in doubt.

The present leadership seems to have agreed that the state of affairs at the congress was the most appropriate reflection of the balance of power precariously maintained by the collective leadership. At the plenary session of the central committee held in September 1965, Brezhnev criticised what appeared to be a deliberate attempt on the part of Government offices to delay or frustrate the implementation of the agricultural policy adopted on his recommendation at the previous central committee meeting held in March 1965. If there was any disagreement between Brezhnev and Kosygin on matters of economic priorities, none was allowed to mar the appearance of consolidated collective leadership at the twenty-third congress. Leonid Brezhnev stole the thunder of Kosygin, the country's economic master mind, when presenting at the opening of the congress some of the targets of the new plan. But there were no surprises. When Brezhnev spoke, it was an open secret that Khrushchev's promise to pay by 1965 a minimum wage of 50-60 rubles a month had to be deferred; his undertaking to abolish

[2] *Isvestia*, 21 March 1966.

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income tax by 1965 had to be shelved. The five-day working week, a familiar feature of western industrialised society these days, is to be introduced universally throughout the Soviet Union, but the 35-hour working week, which was to have come into effect by 1964, has been removed from the agenda of social benefits.

THE innovation for which Brezhnev and the eighth five-year plan may be remembered, was the proposal to introduce a guaranteed monthly pay for members of collective farms at a level corresponding, job for job, to that paid in State farms; in Brezhnev's words a mighty task, so far tackled at best by one-quarter of the collective farms. If he meant what he said, Brezhnev committed his exchequer to an annual outlay of 6,000 million rubles; if he assumed that this amount would accrue from increased farm output and collective incomes, he took for granted a great deal. As Brezhnev has made the country's agricultural policy his direct responsibility, he will have to watch his step if he wishes to escape the fate that eventually caught up with Nikita Khrushchev. A decision on the role of the private plots cultivated by members of collectives, State farm workers, and industrial labourers, was deferred for another nine months. Nothing was said by those on the platform about holding the congress of collectives which Brezhnev had promised at the plenary session of the central committee in March 1965; but when the Ukrainian kolkhoz chairman Buznitsky spoke in the debate, it emerged that the congress which is to bring the collectives a new model statute is to be held at the end of the current year.[3] Collective farmers are likely to postpone until then their judgment on the present leadership's attitude towards the countryside.

When Kosygin, in a speech lasting about four hours, submitted the directives of the new plan, he stuck all too painfully to his brief. His was the statement of an experienced technocrat who—having weathered many a political storm in his time—had decided to stay clear of any but strictly economic matters. This was no doubt a step forward from the days when Khrushchev all too often mixed his political and economic metaphors. Whether, however, any member of the collective leadership can hope to see his plans come to fruition by keeping aloof from political issues seems more than doubtful. No amount of economic or technical jargon can distract attention from the fact that the allocation of scarce resources, the introduction of rational prices and price ratios, and the assessment of success in financial rather than physical terms, are highly political issues. By common consent, party leaders and party members avoided all controversial issues. As a result, the economic session of the congress, like its political forerunner, fell flat. The proposals to change the name of the Presidium to Politburo of the Central Committee, to abolish the Bureau of the RSFSR and to revive the title of General Secretary in place of First Secretary, met with

[3] *Pravda*, 2 April 1966.

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thunderous applause and exclamations of approval; and Brezhnev was relieved of the need to deliver a lengthy concluding speech since all contributions to the debate were said to be in accord with his opening address. Kosygin's speech from the platform and the replies from the floor were similarly stage-managed. Everything about the plan went according to plan.

In almost forty years of planning the Soviet state apparatus has grown old; this does not necessarily mean that it has become mature. In spite of all the talk of the last few years about impending economic reforms, the difference between 1966 and 1958 in the presentation of plan targets was one of tone rather than of substance. Nothing was left to chance. Even the growth of the rate of profits was imbedded in the directives as presented by Kosygin and approved by the congress. Nobody seemed even to notice the irony of the profit of plant managers and trading organisations being tied securely to the Procrustean bed of Gosplan. Western observers who commented on the old issue of growth rates in Soviet Russia's heavy and light industries allowed themselves to be diverted from more important issues. Russia's planners and publicists succeeded in presenting as a major achievement the closeness of the two growth rates that used to be wide apart. Due to this deceptive operation, other more vital issues remained undetected: in particular, the sterility of the whole approach to planning a highly complex economy escaped notice.

To be sure, planning, in line with economic development, has become more complex; and some of the most blatant errors of the past have been avoided, whilst others have been identified. The drafters of the plan directives did not mince their words when dealing with the errors of the past: 'Deficiencies in the development of the national economy', says the report, 'have been caused to a considerable extent by a disparity between the scale of production and the methods of planning, economic management and material incentives. The initiative of enterprises was restricted, their rights were limited and their responsibility reduced'. Cost accounting between enterprises, the authors of the directives observe, had become a purely formal operation. In planning and directing the economy, the authorities had underestimated the role of objective economic laws. The economy had been detrimentally affected by manifestations of subjectivism, by arbitrary changes in the rates of proportional development in the main branches of industry, and by a general neglect of economic reasoning in reaching plan decisions. This is as close as the congress ever got to holding Khrushchev responsible for the failures of the past, but the euphemistic references were unmistakeable.

There were, of course, many setbacks, some of which deserve to be recalled. Whereas the output of producer goods surpassed the plan targets, industrial consumer goods fell badly behind, as did the supply of agricultural produce from indigenous resources. This can only be

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described as dismally poor, particularly when the large outlay in farm investment is taken into account. The housing programme also remained badly underfulfilled. Owing to these and other shortcomings, Russia's national income rose by 6·5 per cent per annum and not by over 7 per cent, as laid down in the seven-year plan; and her gross national product, as defined in the West, increased no faster than that of the United States. The days have gone when the Soviet leadership can take it for granted that Soviet 'socialism' will inevitably outpace American 'capitalism'.

In recording the shortfalls one must, however, avoid the error of underestimating Russia's achievements, even if these are restricted to a highly selected area of industrial endeavour. As the previous plan had failed in vital sectors, the new plan was bound to allow for a certain retreat from positions that had been unduly vulnerable. In the past the nation's resources had often been over-committed; now they are to be carefully husbanded. Khrushchev's targets for 1970, announced at the twenty-second congress in October 1961, have been scaled down. The new rate of industrial growth is lower than in Khrushchev's plans for 1965 and 1970. The consumer is to be given a better deal than in the past; the gap between the increase in output of producer and consumer goods has been narrowed. The agricultural targets have been postponed and scaled down once again, after having suffered a similar fate twice in the last seven years. The Soviet leaders do not expect agriculture to reach in 1970 a level of production as high as that forecast by their predecessor for 1960.

The divergent trends revealed in the widely different rates of development in science on the one side and agriculture on the other, are a reflection of the deep cleavage that runs through Soviet society. It is the result of almost five decades of one-sided preoccupation with industrial development in a predominantly agrarian country. In the outcome Russia has become the least developed of the most highly developed industrial nations in the world, whilst remaining at the same time the most developed of the backward areas. This peculiar dual position has advantages as well as disadvantages. When looking at Soviet-type societies, the developing countries in Asia and Africa are acutely aware of an affinity of approach and purpose that they often find lacking in the industrialised West.

IT would be tedious to give a detailed account of the new plan targets, industry by industry, let alone commodity by commodity. It suffices to say that it is one of the prime purposes of the new plan to correct existing internal imbalances, in particular to reduce the gaps that exist between industry and agriculture and between capital and consumer goods industries. In the official jargon this is described as an attempt to alter the ratios of proportional development. The need for it is all too obvious to any observer of the Soviet domestic scene. At the same

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time more attention than in the past is to be paid to foreign trade, which still absorbs no more than 3 per cent of Russia's total economic effort. For the first time in the history of Soviet planning, international division of labour is mentioned without a sneer; the plan directives seem to recognise it as a factor that might well operate to the advantage of the communist system. But as much of the foreign trade escapes the grip of long-term planning, it is not surprising that all quantitative commitments are avoided.

The economic reforms that have been debated in the Soviet Union for many years past and that are being introduced cautiously in various sectors of the economy are to provide the lubricants for the planning machine. To what extent the economic engine will succeed in reaching its final destination will therefore depend largely on the quantity and quality of the lubricants used in the course of the next five years. Success will depend to a substantial extent on the measure of achievement that the economic reforms can claim. The conflict between planners and reformers has not yet been resolved; nor has a decision been reached as to how far the computer controlled by the planner may be able to take the place of the market supplied by the entrepreneur. Meanwhile 90 per cent of all economic calculations in the Soviet Union are made with the aid of the abacus, and the forces of supply and demand operate without hindrance only on the individual stalls of the *kolkhoz* market. At the moment the non-conformists seem to be in retreat and the conservatives in entrenched positions. The problem of how to square economic reform with political cohesion will continue to be one of the preoccupations of the Soviet leadership during the lifetime of the new plan.

As it stands, it is a technical document, written in a matter-of-fact style, with none of the characteristics, so familiar in the past, of a political manifesto. The plan directives show no signs of Khrushchev's imagination; nor are they likely to cause any of the irritation that marked an era of Soviet development which now belongs to the past. They display less militancy and more technical competence than the Soviet public has come to expect of such documents; more of sober mediocrity and fewer flights of fancy. They have their weaknesses all the same. In particular, capital investment and farm production targets are ambitious and may not be achieved. The output of chemicals, though lower than envisaged in Khrushchev's original design, is still planned to increase twice as fast as industry as a whole. The non-ferrous, machine, and machine tool industries, on which capital investment and defence depend, continue to be given a place of high priority.

The only surprise of the congress was Marshal Malinovsky's disclosure in the defence debate of the creation of the 'blue belt' system outside Moscow and Leningrad; the completion of an underwater cruise-round-the-world of nuclear-powered submarines; and the improvement in the long-range striking power of the Soviet air force. A week after

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the congress had ended, Russia's advances in the exploration of space were revealed by Professor Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. These revelations show how much the secret and the only half-disclosed items of Russia's five-year plan are likely to determine its contents, its direction, and its effect.

In the meantime a generation is growing up which is longing for personal comfort rather than political conquest. Khrushchev, who undertook to meet these needs, only half succeeded. Much has yet to be done before the motor changes from a status symbol of the Party and Government official to a people's car. As Kosygin admitted in his speech at the congress, housing remains one of the cardinal social problems. Kazakhstan's resources continue to be overtaxed and its grain delivery targets are bound to remain unfulfilled. Agriculture, though less ambitiously planned than in the past, is likely to confound again the economists' forecasts. In any event, the problems which await an answer in the rural areas of Russia are political and sociological rather than economic and technological in nature. Although the new plan opens, wider than in the past, the way to economic developments that resemble those with which the western world is familiar, the political system shows few signs of being able to adapt itself to this situation. Conformity in congress is hardly conducive to reform, even if it is indirectly recommended. Before the end of the decade those whose voices were not heard at the twenty-third congress may become articulate. What they have to say may please neither their elders nor their contemporaries; it may offend both their compatriots and their foreign neighbours. There seems a strong probability, if not a certainty, that they will aim at altering the present precarious balance of power at home and indecision in foreign policy. Stalinism and Chinese communism are realities that cannot be ignored for ever. The years of the eighth five-year plan may thus be among the most decisive of the first half century since the creation of the Soviet Union.

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Annual Rates of Growth (per cent)

	1966-70 Five-Year Planned	1961-70 Ten-Year Planned	1961-65 Five Years Actual	1959-65 Seven-Year Plan Actual	1959-65 Seven-Year Plan Planned	1956-60 Five-Year Plan Actual	1956-60 Five-Year Plan Planned
Gross industrial production	8·2	10·2	8·6	9·1	8·6	10·4	10·5
Producer goods	8·5	10·6	9·9	10·2	9·3	11·3	11·3
Consumer goods	7·7	9·2	6·1	6·8	7·2	8·5	9·9
Gross agricultural production	4·6	9·6	2·0	1·8	7·8	5·7	5·7
National income	6·9	9·6	6·3	6·5	7·2	9·2	9·9
Capital investment	8·0	n.a.	8·0	8·0	8·8	13·2	10·8
Labour force (national economy)	3·5	n.a.	4·3	3·7	2·8	5·1	2·8
Productivity (industry)	6·0	7·7	4·6	5·2	5·7	6·5	8·5
Productivity (collectives)	7·0	9·6	3·7	3·5	10·4	6·2	14·9
Real income per capita	5·5	7·2	3·7	3·0	4·9	4·2	5·4
Agricultural income (collectives)	6·5	7·7	11·0	5·5	4·9	5·4	7·0
Retail trade (turnover)	7·0	9·6	5·8	6·9	6·9	9·3	8·5

Industrial Production (million units)

	1970 Five-Year Planned	1970 Ten-Year Planned	1966 Annual Planned	1965 Seven-Year Plan Actual	1965 Seven-Year Plan Planned	1958 Annual Actual	1953 Annual Actual
Producer Goods							
Coal (tons)	670·0	693·0	n.a.	578·0	606·0	496·1	320·4
Oil (tons)	350·0	390·0	264·0	243·0	235·0	113·2	52·8
Electricity (000 kWh.)	845·0	950·0	560·5	507·0	510·0	235·4	134·3
Gas (000 cubic m.)	232·5	317·5	n.a.	129·0	150·0	29·9	6·9
Crude steel (tons)	126·5	145·0	96·5	91·0	88·5	54·9	38·1
Rolled steel (tons)	97·5	n.a.	76·0	70·9	67·5	43·1	29·4
Cement (tons)	102·5	122·0	n.a.	72·4	78·0	33·3	16·0
Fertilizers (tons)	63·5	75·0	n.a.	31·3	35·0	12·4	7·0
Consumer Goods							
Textile fabrics (000 sq.m.)	9·6	13·6	n.a.	7·5	8·3	5·8	5·0
Leather shoes (000 pairs)	0·6	0·8	n.a.	0·5	0·5	0·4	0·2
Radio & TV sets	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8·9	9·0	4·9	1·8
Refrigerators	5·4	n.a.	n.a.	1·7	1·5	0·4	0·0
Washing machines	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3·4	2·5	0·5	0·0
Housing space (sq.m.)	96·0	n.a.	90·0	78·0	93·5	71·2	30·8
Milk (tons)	87·5	125·0	n.a.	72·5	102·5	58·7	36·5
Meat (tons)	12·5	22·5	n.a.	9·5	16·0	7·7	5·8

n.a. = not available

Based on official Soviet sources

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ANNA AKHMATOVA (1889-1966)

Victor S. Frank

I tainstvenny pesenny dar . . .
[And the mysterious gift of song]
(Akhmatova, 1915)

EARLY in 1933 the Leningrad Press Club arranged a reading by the poet Osip Mandelshtam. An eye-witness has told us that, although there had been no advance publicity, the large hall was packed.[1] Mandelshtam, whose poetic genius was at that time at its zenith, but who had already incurred the displeasure of the authorities, was warmly greeted by the public. But there was also, the account goes on, an odd restiveness in the audience—some individuals were scurrying to and fro, whispering, frowning, shrugging their shoulders. Finally, one of them sent a note up to the platform. Mandelshtam read it aloud: it was an obvious trap. He was being invited to express himself on the subject of contemporary Soviet poetry and on the function of the older surviving poets. In effect, he was being cross-examined in public as to his loyalty to the regime. Obviously he could not shirk an answer. In a state of great nervous tension Mandelshtam stepped forward, threw back his head in a characteristic gesture, and asked: 'What do you expect me to say? I am a friend of my friends'. And then, after a short pregnant pause he cried out in a high-pitched voice: 'I am Akhmatova's contemporary!' A tremendous burst of applause followed his words.

Why was his answer so apposite? Why was it received with such fervour?

'I am Akhmatova's contemporary', Mandelshtam said. The four great poets who entered Russian literature on the eve of Russia's half-century of travail, just before the first world war, and who became undisputed leaders after the Revolution (and after Alexander Blok's death in 1921), were contemporaries in the strict calendar sense of the term. They were born within three years of one another: Anna Akhmatova in 1889; Boris Pasternak in 1890; Marina Tsvetaeva in 1891; Osip Mandelshtam in 1892. They were in their late or middle twenties when the 1917 Revolution put an end to an epoch and, as some will say, to a culture. They were thus old enough to have been moulded for life by that epoch and that culture. It is a measure of the power of the magnetic field radiated by poetry in early twentieth-century Russia that these four very different people, coming as they did from very ill-assorted backgrounds,[2] ultimately found themselves forming a glorious quatrefoil in the very centre of that magnetic field.

[1] Osip Mandelshtam, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. I (Washington, 1964), pp. lx–lxi. See also Elena Tager, *Dve Zapiski, Vozdushnye puti* (New York, 1965), IV, pp. 51–52.

[2] Pasternak and Tsvetaeva shared an academic and artistic family background; Akhmatova was the daughter of a naval officer; Mandelshtam the son of a semi-literate Jewish trader from Riga.

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The cross-links between the four were incomplete. In effect, they formed two duos: a Petersburg group (Akhmatova and Mandelshtam) and a Moscow group (Pasternak and Tsvetaeva). The outward circumstances of Tsvetaeva's life—she spent seventeen years, from 1922 to 1939, in exile—set her apart from the other three. She was linked by bonds of personal friendship with Pasternak alone—and that only since the mid-thirties (although she was one of the first fellow-poets to acclaim Pasternak, as early as 1923, as a great new force).[3] Nor were Pasternak and Mandelshtam on close personal terms, although Mandelshtam, too, had recognised the great liberating power of Pasternak's verse in 1923.[4] But Akhmatova was linked to Mandelshtam by lifelong friendship[5] and—in the second half of her long life—was equally friendly with Pasternak. Over and above these personal relationships, however, there lived in the four of them a quiet certainty that they belonged to an exalted order entrusted with the guardianship of a unique treasure. They spoke of each other with tender reverence and concern. There is a poem by Akhmatova, *Nas chetvero* [There are four of us], dated 1961; it carries three epitaphs—lines from poems dedicated to Akhmatova by the other three.[6] By that time she was the only survivor of the group, and the short poem is an expression of her firm certainty that the unity of the four (she calls them *kroki*, the warp, threads woven across the general run) persists even unto death.

Of the four Akhmatova was generally acknowledged to be *prima inter pares*. Not that she was 'better' than the other three. Poets are not gradeable goods. But, to begin with, she was the first to establish a firm reputation as a remarkable poet in her own right. After 1914, when her second volume of poems, *Chetki* [Beads], came out, she was acclaimed by critics and the public alike. At that time the other three were known only in esoteric circles. And, second, her verse had always —even in her youth—been marked by a certain timeless, classical quality which placed her firmly and directly in the great tradition of Russian poetry.

In any case, by 1933, when Mandelshtam uttered his defiant chronological commonplace, Akhmatova was already viewed by the public in Russia as a living link with the past which, in its social and cultural connotations, appeared to have vanished without trace. This was not true to the same extent of her three peers. Tsvetaeva was abroad and, in the nature of things, hardly known in the Soviet Union. Pasternak's poetic vision and diction was, until the mid-1940s, an explosive and not a conservative force. Complex and contradictory as his image was, it was definitely 'post-revolutionary': while Akhmatova was accepted as

[3] Marina Tsvetaeva, 'Svetovoy liven', in *Epopeya*, 3 (Berlin, 1923); reprinted in Marina Tsvetaeva, *Proza* (New York, 1953).
[4] Osip Mandelshtam, *Zametki o poezii*, reprinted in Osip Mandelshtam, *Sobranie sochinenii* (New York, 1955), pp. 351–54.
[5] See her moving notes on Mandelshtam in *Vozdushnye puti*, IV, pp. 23–43.
[6] Anna Akhmatova, *Sochineniya* (1965), p. 325; *Beg vremeni*, p. 438.

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a poet in 1914, Pasternak effectively entered Russian poetry only in 1922 —eight years later—and what years those eight were! It was only towards the end of his life that he was able to fight his way through to a serenity and simplicity which Akhmatova had never forgone. Mandelshtam, who in many respects was closest to Akhmatova, had a much more idiosyncratic style and vocabulary and hence a more limited appeal.

As the Soviet period of Russian history wore on, Akhmatova—without losing anything of her creative power, in fact, with a steadily widening vision and a deepening poetic resonance—became to the Russian poetry-lover a well-nigh legendary survival of another age, a living proof of the spiritual wealth and subtlety of a culture seemingly destroyed by events. So Mandelshtam's defiant cry, 'I am Akhmatova's contemporary!', was more than an expression of his personal devotion it was a profession of belief in the continuity of a noble tradition carried on, in his view, predominantly by Akhmatova.

The tragic destinies of the four are part of Russian history. In 1938 Mandelshtam perished in a labour camp, a ravaged, insane scarecrow. In 1941 Tsvetaeva, who, driven by homesickness, had returned to Russia two years earlier, committed suicide in the God-forsaken provincial town of Yelabuga after losing her husband and her son. Akhmatova's son, and a close friend, fell victim to the Great Purge. She herself, with Zoshchenko, became the target of a vile campaign initiated by Zhdanov in 1946. Pasternak's purgatory is still fresh in our memory. After Pasternak's death in 1960, Akhmatova was left on her own. Some of her greatest poetic achievements fall into the last six years of her life, when she was already in her seventies.

WE are now fortunate enough to have Akhmatova's poetic works laid before us not in one, but in two fairly full editions, one originating in America, the other in the poet's homeland.[7] In addition, Parts I and II of her long epic poem, *Poema bez geroya* [Poem Without a Hero], the first part of which appears in the Soviet edition under the title *Devyatsot Trinadtsaty God* [The Year 1913], was published earlier abroad in a fuller edition.[8]

We have thus, for the first time, an opportunity of seeing Akhmatova's *oeuvre* as a coherent whole stretching over a span of more than half a century and bridging two seemingly incompatible worlds.

Each edition has its strong points and its defects. *Beg Vremeni* has the distinction of having been prepared by the author herself. Now, after Akhmatova's death, it has assumed the importance of the last authorised edition. But this literary last will and testament may be considered

[7] Anna Akhmatova, *Sochineniya*, vol. 1 (n. l. 1965), ed. by B. A. Filippov and G. P. Struve (quoted as F. S.), and Anna Akhmatova, *Beg Vremeni* (Moscow–Leningrad, 1965) (quoted as B.V.).

[8] In fact, in two different versions—in the successive issues of the New York almanach, *Vozdushnye Puti*, No. 1 (1960) and No. 2 (1962).

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fully valid only in its positive aspect: we now know that those poems which Akhmatova included in this, the most comprehensive selection of her poetry ever to appear in the Soviet Union, were fully approved by her. There is no such certainty on the negative side: we can only guess which of the discarded poems (and a comparison with the American edition shows just how many were discarded), were omitted for aesthetic reasons, and which out of political considerations. It is clear, in any case, that Akhmatova's last will was drawn up under duress.

Certain guesses are permissible. *Requiem,* for instance, the deeply moving cycle written at the time of the Great Purge, in which Akhmatova voiced not only her own grief and despair but the grief and despair of millions of nameless Russian women, was omitted because even now, thirty years after the event, certain aspects of the Purge are still taboo. The same applies to Part III of the *Poem Without a Hero.* During her visit to England in the summer of 1965, Mrs Akhmatova herself said that, as things stood then, it could not be published in the Soviet Union.[9]

But what of the dozens of shorter lyrical poems omitted from the Soviet edition? We have no way of knowing on what grounds they were found wanting. But it is noteworthy that the majority of them are of a religious nature or contain religious imagery. So, despite Mrs Akhmatova's direct participation in its preparation, *Beg Vremeni* is one-sided and ignores one of the most important aspects of her poetry. On the other hand, it contains a number of items inevitably missing from the American edition—poems published for the first time,[10] and some earlier poems which remained untraced by the Russian scholars in America. For this reason, *Beg Vremeni* will remain indispensable to a student of Akhmatova's poetry at least until the publication of Vol. II of *F.S.*

The *F.S.* edition aims at completeness, which the *B.V.* does not. It includes poems omitted from the *B.V.* and naturally lacks only those items which either could not be traced, or else were published in the Soviet Union after the *F.S.* edition had gone to press. It also contains *Requiem,*[11] but not the *Poem Without a Hero* which is reserved for the second volume.

The book has been prepared by its two editors with their accustomed thoroughness and scholarly integrity. But they were evidently in a dilemma: Were they to treat Akhmatova in the same way as they had treated Mandelshtam and Zabolotsky, or as Professor Struve had treated Gumilev, i.e., as an author no longer alive? Were they in effect working on a posthumous edition in which the author's wishes, predilections, and principles of selection were no longer binding on the editors? Or were

[9] In his poignant obituary of Akhmatova, Mr Nikita Struve quotes some 20 lines from the as yet unpublished third part of *Poem Without a Hero.* See *Russkaya mysl* (Paris), 26 March 1966.

[10] Among them the longish *Putem vseya zemli,* pp. 283–89.

[11] First published in Munich in 1963 by the *Tovarishchestvo Zarubezhnykh Pisateley.*

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they to try to communicate with Mrs Akhmatova? In the nature of things, effective editorial consultation was extremely difficult, but to my mind not impossible. As it happened, they chose the first course. A strict chronological order—in disregard of Mrs Akhmatova's own traditional grouping of her poems—certainly brings out the autobiographical substratum in Akhmatova's poetry far more clearly than does the *B.V.* On the other hand, it destroys the identity of Akhmatova's individual early volumes. In any case, there was an implied lack of courtesy in this cavalierly pedantic manner of presenting a living author's work.

Still, the Filippov-Struve edition, when complete, will remain for many years to come by far the fullest version of Akhmatova's poetic work. Once again, the two editors have earned the gratitude of all lovers of Russian poetry, even though some of them may object to their methods.

AS a poet Anna Akhmatova combines three qualities: classical austerity, lyrical intensity, and a marked gift for precise and concrete language. The combination of these three qualities is rare if not unique in modern Russian poetry.

Classicism is, as a rule, a cold and generalised affair, dealing in allegories and disdainful of the shapeless variety of life. Nor is lyricism necessarily concrete. Blok, for instance, can rarely be pinned down as to the time, location and sequence of events he describes. Again, realism rarely goes hand in hand with classical simplicity. In Akhmatova all three are effectively combined in one powerful, highly idiosyncratic poetic personality.

The epithet 'classical' has nothing self-consciously archaic in Akhmatova's case. The language she uses is the ennobled everyday speech of an educated Russian. So, of course, is Pasternak's poetic language. But there is a clear distinction between Akhmatova's speech and that of Pasternak and Tsvetaeva. These two poets reflect the earthy and folksy Moscow ambience. Akhmatova's restraint and reserve are in the Petersburg tradition. On her own testimony her three masters were Derzhavin, Pushkin, and Annensky—three Petersburg poets from three successive centuries. Primeval chaos is as firmly controlled in Akhmatova's poetry as the Neva is by her granite banks. Her diction is austere and distinct. There is a definite Latin sonority about her verse—surprising as this is in the case of a highly feminine poet. Yet this reserve co-exists with great lyrical passion. In fact it requires all Akhmatova's inborn sense of form and proportion to control the passions fighting their way into her lines.

In her early period the emotions she had to control were born out of erotic love. Love of that sort makes for egocentricity, and Akhmatova's early poems deal with *her* sufferings, *her* joys, *her* loneliness, *her* sense of

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injustice. But very early, at the beginning of the 1914 war, other, purer waters began to enter the stream of her poetic consciousness. And ultimately, the cataclysmic events of the years after 1914, while they did not destroy her femininity, turned the langorous self-centred young woman into a Sybil of old. In 1916 she wrote:

Iz pamyati, kak gruz otnyne lishnii,
Ischezli teni pesen i strastey.
Ey—opustevshey—prikazal Vsevyshnii
Stat' strashnoy knigoy grozovykh vestey.
(The shadows of songs and passions have gone
from the memory, like cargo unneeded.
And the Almighty ordered it, now vacant,
To become a terrible ledger of menacing news.)

Her *Requiem,* for instance, born in a mortally wounded mother's heart, is at the same time and by the same token an objectively valid statement on the condition of a nation on the verge of collective despair. The tension between the explosive emotional content and the granite banks into which these emotions are forced, is at times unbearably poignant.

There is a third element in Akhmatova's poetry which makes it distinctly her own: the concrete quality of her verse, particularly her sensitivity to time. Korney Chukovsky, the veteran literary critic, one of the few surviving contemporaries of Akhmatova's, was the first to draw attention to this feature of her verse.[12] He spoke of her as an 'historical artist' and pointed to her 'infatuation with numbers denoting the passage of time'.

> The 'Colombine of the second decade of our age' is the name she gives to one of her heroines, while another is called 'The beauty of 1913'. Her last poem is entitled, 'The Year Nineteen Thirteen', and the poem dedicated to Mayakovsky, 'Mayakovsky in 1913'. Very characteristic of her poetry are the lines: 'I look down from the year nineteen-forty, as from a tower...'

This inbuilt sense of time comes out in Akhmatova's poetry not only on the historical level. Even her love poetry at its most intimate is punctuated by these calendar-like or stopwatch-like statements. Consider such lines as these:

Ya prishla k poetu v gosti.
Rovno polden. Voskresene.
(I have come to visit the poet,
At twelve sharp on Sunday.)

Dvadtsat pervoe. Noch. Ponedelnik.
Ochertanya stolitsy vo mgle.
Sochinil zhe kakoy-to bezdelnik,
Chto byvaet lyubov na zemle.

[12] Korney Chukovsky, 'Chitaya Akhmatovu', in *Moskva,* No. 5, 1964.

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(The twenty first day of the month. Night. Monday.
The outline of the capital in the twilight.
Some good-for-nothing had a notion
That there is love in our world.)

Or, perhaps the most extraordinary two lines of all,:

Ya soshla s uma, o malchik stranny,
V sredu, v tri chasa.
(I lost my head, oh my strange boy,
On Wednesday, at three o'clock.)

Her lover does not leave her at some time or another. He says farewell to her 'at the new moon' and promises to be back 'by May'. 'Your words are a fine lullaby', she says mockingly, 'I haven't been sleeping because of them for the third month running.' The final break between the lovers occurs 'when the clock in the dining room strikes three.' And she calls love 'the fifth season of the year.'

Her awareness of space is equally precise. She appears to her lover as a ghost 'to the right of the desk.' Some of her landscapes read like stage instructions:

U kladbishcha napravo pylil pustyr,
A za nim golubela reka.
(To the right of the cemetery dust rises from an empty site,
And behind it there is the bluish streak of a river.)

She is as precise and as obsessed with numbers when dealing with events, however tragic:

Ne byvat tebe v zhivykh,
So snegu ne vstat:
Dvadtsat vosem shtykovykh,
Ognestrelnykh pyat.
(You won't come to life again,
You won't rise from the snow:
Twenty eight bayonet wounds,
Five bullet wounds.)

Na Malakhovom Kurgane
Ofitsera rasstrelyali.
Bez nedeli dvadtsat let
On glyadel na Bozhii svet.
(They shot an officer
By the Malakhov Mound.
He was short of twenty
By one week.)

This detached objective sense of time deepens in her later poems, as Chukovsky rightly points out, into a chronicler's concern with establishing the correct sequence of facts and a historian's concern with the meaning of events. *Poem Without a Hero* and *Requiem* are historical works in the truest sense of the word, one dealing with the world which

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preceded and made possible the horrors, the other with the horrors themselves.

Yet none of these three qualities—each remarkable in itself and still more remarkable when combined—neither the classical austerity, nor the intensity of emotional life, nor the intellectual precision—would have of themselves endowed Akhmatova with the standing she had been enjoying, were it not for the presence of that intangible something which makes true poetry the mystery it is. Something else speaks through a true poet's lips, and this something else is the voice of ultimate truth.

Truth is a rare commodity at all times and in all places. But in the make-believe world of the lie in which Akhmatova lived out her great and tragic life, and one which she refused to leave, this voice of truth must have sounded like a trumpet call. When shallow fraudulent optimism was the order of the day—whatever the tragedies that filled human lives—Akhmatova came out with lines like these:

Bylo gore, budet gore,
Goryu net kontsa.
(There was grief, there will be grief,
There is no end to grief.)

Ya druzyam moim skazala:
Gorya mnogo, schastya malo.
(I said to my friends:
There is grief a-plenty, there is little happiness.)

The basic facts of the human condition: bereavement, old age, separation, exile, poetic inspiration, death—these subjects form the marrow of Akhmatova's poetry, and on all of them she has something new to say—in her austere, passionate, and precise way.

On old age:

I ne s kem plakat,
Ne s kem vspominat.
(No one left to weep with
No one left to remember the past with.)

On exile:

Temna tvoya doroga, strannik,
Polynyu pakhnet khleb chuzhoy.
(Dark is your path, oh stranger;
Alien bread smells of weeds.)

On the loss of friends:

Kak khorosho, chto nekogo teryat
I mozhno plakat.
(How good that there is none left to part from,
And one may weep.)

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On the epoch:

Menya, kak reku,
Surovaya epokha povernula,
Mne podmenili zhizn.
V drugoe ruslo,
Mimo drugogo potekla ona.
(*The grim epoch diverted me*
As if I were a river.
I have been given a different life.
The river now flows in a new bed,
Past the old one.)

Muzh v mogile, syn v tyurme:
Pomolites obo mne.
(*Husband dead, son in prison,*
Pray for me.)

And ennobling all these states of the human soul, there is Akhmatova's awareness of an intimate communion with her Muse—a being that she knows as well as a close friend, but also as one of whose inexorable power she stands in awe. It was this obedience to the call of her Muse, this loyalty to her poetic vocation, which made Akhmatova, who was not a fighter by temperament and who disdained political action, the most disturbing voice in the Soviet world.

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MEET THE SOVIET ROBINSONS

Patrick Waddington

'NEXT year we can have a whole month in Leningrad if you'd like it, I'm just crazy to get started on the way to England.'

'I don't want to dampen your ardour, but I'm afraid you're going to be disappointed. Your idea of England is one big *Forsyte Saga*, but I can assure you it isn't. My father isn't a man of property, he's just a retired engine-driver.'

'Does he get a state pension?'

'Old age pension, I suppose you mean. He gets a retirement pension, in fact he's been getting it for several years now . . . '

This remarkably vivid and truthful passage occurs early in a recent Soviet paper-back called *Meet the Robinsons.* * The author, one George H. Hanna, claims in his Introduction that his book should be read both for profit and for pleasure. It is intended for very advanced students of English, for teachers of English 'who would like to acquire greater facility of speech', and for interpreters 'who would like their language to be more readily understood by visitors from abroad'.

Now this in itself is quite revealing. Language teaching in the Soviet Union, as in Britain and in most other countries, generally involves getting a student to a particular standard of reading and of question-and-answer, then plunging him straight into classical literature. Mr Hanna writes: 'By the time you have reached the stage at which you can read this book you will, of course, know that such questions and answers as: "What is this?", "It is a book", or "Where are you going?", "I am going to the cinema", are hardly likely to occur in real life'. And it is precisely his insistence on accurate *colloquial* English ('What's', 'it's', 'I'm', 'don't', 'shan't', etc.; omission of the verb in replies; expressions like 'dampen your ardour' and 'one big . . . ', with their attendant irony or contempt), that makes Mr Hanna's description of contemporary English life and politics so lively, and therefore so convincing, to students of his book. Herein lies its great value for political understanding; herein also lies a great potential for political distortion.

Fred Robinson is an English-born 'engineer' (what he does exactly is not specified) who has been living for several years in the Soviet Union, where he has met and married Tatiana Petrovna, an architect now engaged in important projects in Moscow. Their characters are attractively drawn, with just the right proportion of calmness and irritability, affection and coldness, good sense and stupidity. Of course, Fred is always in the right and always gets his way; but where he is right, his way is usually Tatiana's.

The story begins in their Moscow flat. Fred is shaving, and Tatiana,

* The higher school publishing house (Moscow, 1965).

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who has been up for ages, is simply dying to know what is in a letter that has just arrived. (The author makes a special point of introducing what he quite rightly judges to be fundamentally feminine emphases into Tatiana's speech: 'dying to know', 'crazy to get started', 'heaps of time'; while only Fred will use expressions like 'not bad, considering', 'today's D-day', 'one big . . .' and the ironical 'I'm listening with rapt attention'.) The letter contains in fact an invitation from Fred's parents: they would very much like to see him again after an absence of five years, and would be pleased to meet the wife they so far know only from photos and by repute. As for Fred and Tatiana, they like the idea very much, and decide to accept the invitation.

I pass over the half-credible reasons for their having the time (two months) and the money to go to England for a holiday, and the quite improbable circumstances in which they obtain passports, train tickets to Leningrad, and berths in a boat, all within a matter of hours; it is also curious that Tatiana takes 'a lot of lemons' with her for the trip, in view of their cost and Soviet policy on the import and export of fruit. Interesting as all this may be, I am more concerned to discuss the picture of *Britain* which is conveyed by Mr Hanna.

At all events, the Robinsons arrive in England. They live in a hotel, in lodgings, in a suburban house, and on a farm in Dorset. In London they see the sights by day and by night, go to a theatre, make shopping expeditions, and talk politics in a pub. They also go on a grand picnic in Epping Forest. The people they meet are normal decent Britons with healthy attitudes to life and to the powers that be. They are for the most part attractively described, introduced naturally into the story, and by no means dogmatic or consistent in their views.

THERE is no doubt that *Meet the Robinsons* is one of the fairest pictures of life in Britain that has ever been published in the Soviet Union. So much of it is true and just that we must conclude its author spent a good deal of his life in Britain; but just how long he was here, where exactly he lived, and—most important—when he left, is problematic. What I wish to discuss is whether the often rather peculiar pieces of misinformation he includes in his story are simply errors of knowledge or memory, or whether they are deliberate distortions in the worst tradition of Soviet textbooks. I shall consider first some of the oddities, and then turn to what I believe to be quite dangerous misinformation. To judge by some of the mistakes he makes, the author has spent some time in London, but is quite ignorant of present conditions there. His detailed description of Bloomsbury, the City, and the area around Charing Cross and Piccadilly, shows first-hand knowledge; but it has been affected by memory and, in some instances, by a false confidence.

The Robinsons are walking down the Strand. Fred points out Villiers Street, and talks of people who lived there. *Then* Tatiana says: 'What's

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that red Gothic sort of building?' Answer: the Law Courts! The rest of the walk, to St. Paul's and the Mansion House, is quite accurately described. Or again, after a morning spent looking at the Tower of London, Fred suggests they get a boat up to Kew. The boat they are supposed to board leaves at midday; and they propose to nip up to Kew for lunch! After about a quarter of an hour they are out in open country . . . There is also a curious feature in Fred's otherwise accurate guide-book description of Kew Gardens: the price of admission, he says, is half a crown; in fact, of course, it is threepence—I shall come back to the question of costs and prices later. There are many other inaccuracies of this sort in *Meet the Robinsons*: Mr Hanna makes English pubs close at 10, and on the 'English Sunday' there are 'No theatres, no movies, no shops, no nothing . . .' The use of the word 'movies', and of other expressions elsewhere, such as 'groucher' and 'not over much time' suggests that Mr Hanna may have lived in America; while his ideas about pubs and cinemas, together with his name, his emphasis on unemployment, and his frequent mention of things Irish, suggest that his original home is Ulster.

Whatever the origins of Mr Hanna may be, it is clear that he is quite out of touch with London. The time is early August 1964. The Labour Government has already been formed; *My Fair Lady* is still on at Drury Lane; *Beyond the Fringe* is still at the Fortune . . . But Mr Hanna isn't content with this inaccurate dating: he makes it appear that Moscow had *My Fair Lady* before London did! There is also the following uproarious conversation (Eileen is a new-found friend):

> *Tatiana:* I want to see at least one more show before we leave. What would you recommend, Eileen?
> *Eileen:* You haven't seen a revue, have you? A real English revue?
> *Tatiana:* No. Fred's been talking about it, but talking is as far as he got. I've a notion he'd like to go but is ashamed to take me because the girls dance with no clothes on.
> *Eileen:* Not exactly, they wear as much as many girls wear on the beach at the seaside . . . I love revue . . . If you want to see a really good show, get tickets for *Beyond the Fringe* at the Fortune. I'm sure you'll like it.

If Soviet readers can be told how unreliable Mr Hanna is as a guide to what's on in London, perhaps they will also think twice before they swallow some of the tasty morsels of propaganda with which he subtly tempts them; or can it really be that these, too, are simply errors? Here is one. Fred and Tatiana arrive at Drury Lane where (as we have seen) *My Fair Lady* has been put back on for their benefit. There then occurs this extraordinary scene, which is worth quoting in full:

> *Tatiana:* Where's the cloakroom?
> *Fred:* There isn't one. I'm not sure, but I don't think any London theatres have cloakrooms. What do you need it for, anyway, you haven't got a coat.

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Tatiana: What would I do with my coat on a cold night, then?
Fred: Throw it over the back of your seat, the same as everybody else does.
Tatiana: That's very awkward, isn't it? Especially when it's raining and your coat is wet. And in winter everybody must have a coat.
Fred: It's unhygienic to have wet coats in the theatre, of course, but only for poor people. Only about half the seats in a London theatre are bookable, and people who have enough money to book a seat come in their own cars or in cabs. It's only the poor people who have trouble with their wet coats. Class distinction is still very pronounced in the theatre, although it is the class distinction of the 'haves' and the 'have nots' rather than the older distinction of aristocracy and plebs—the modern upper class is the aristocracy of money.
Tatiana: I knew that when I was still going to school.
Fred: That was theory and this is practice, you are seeing it for yourself now. People who love the theatre but haven't got enough money to book a seat sometimes stand for hours outside in the rain and cold to get a ticket.

Now this calls for the good old cliché: a tissue of lies. Of course the Theatre Royal has cloakrooms, just like any other theatre; of course its tickets are all bookable; of course queues there, as at any other theatre, have nothing to do with money or class, but signify that the show is so popular that people who haven't been able to get tickets are prepared to wait for returns or for standing room—which, when allowed at all at Drury Lane, is but a tiny fraction of the total room in the theatre.

That a Soviet writer who talks of Britain's pensions and national health service should deal thus with one of Britain's leading theatres is unbelievable. Can it really be that he would introduce this silly propaganda simply for propaganda's sake? I think not. The truth must be that Mr Hanna's experience of life in Britain (such as he may have), and his desire to be fair and truthful, have been clouded by his political assumptions. Communists are fond of alleging that we in the West 'slavishly repeat' things about the Soviet Union which are patently untrue. May their sensitivity be due to their own half-conscious realisation that they make slavish repetitions about 'capitalism', 'colonialism', and 'class'? Mr Hanna can make his hero tell Tatiana that England is no longer the England of Galsworthy; yet he himself is in the grip of the Soviet sympathy—one might almost say obsession—with *Dickens.* The Robinsons take rooms in Doughty Street, near Dickens House (perhaps, indeed, this is all Mr Hanna really knows about Doughty Street); Eileen (who is supposed to be terribly poor, terribly working-class, terribly down-trodden) tells them all about the places associated with Dickens, for example the house in Buckingham Street where Miss Trotwood took chambers for David Copperfield; they talk of the London Pickwick Club. (Incidentally, Mr Hanna misreads his guide-book again when he makes Benjamin Franklin live in Villiers Street and not in

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Craven Street.) Like many other Soviet citizens, Mr Hanna has come to know so much about the London of Dickens that he finds it difficult to see England except through Dickens' eyes. The fact that his English is bang up to date makes his Dickens-eye-view of London the more powerfully subversive.

AS is perhaps only natural, Mr Hanna has most to say on the issues that are most frequently debated in the Soviet Union: economic problems; housing; health; and peaceful co-existence. Russians are quite rightly proud of communist theory on these matters, and in practice they have made very great progress in planning and centralising their economy and in constructing a sound basis for future material and spiritual well-being. This pride, however, combined with a traditional chauvinism, has blinded them to the parallel progress which has been made in many Western countries. It is still very commonly assumed in the Soviet Union that only they have free education and medical treatment, State pensions, stipends for university students, massive building programmes. It is even quite common for Russians to dismiss as Western propaganda any statement to the contrary; it therefore comes as a welcome surprise to know that Soviet readers of *Meet the Robinsons* will read about the British Welfare State. All the more reason, perhaps, to criticise Mr Hanna for the misleading impressions he gives his readers.

Fred uncovers the breakfast their maid has brought them. 'One hundred per cent English', says Tatiana. 'Of course', retorts her husband. 'Dutch eggs, Danish bacon, Australian tomatoes, bread from Canadian wheat and God alone knows what butter'. The humour of this scene is pleasant; the point is taken. But Tatiana refers to this as 'England's economic problems'. It is true that we could produce more at home; it is true we have a trade gap. It is also true, however, that the Soviet Union imports wheat, fruit, and cattle; and whereas in her case this is a (perhaps temporary) question of necessity, in ours it is also a matter of *choice*. Fred omits to inform his wife that in Britain one can choose butter according to one's taste, whether it be Dutch, New Zealand, French, Danish, Irish, or a dozen varieties of English. Nor does he point out that we can buy many varieties of fruit, say, all the year round, or that the lemon you can buy here for sixpence would cost three shillings in the Soviet Union—if, indeed, you could buy it at all.

Mr Hanna's way of dealing with prices, in fact, is extremely clever. The Robinsons do many things where British prices might be shown to be far lower than they are in the Soviet Union; but the only actual comparison which is made is with books. Fred shops in Charing Cross Road for books on architecture for his wife, and for technical books and novels for himself. He buys mainly paperbacks, including Penguins, for 'books are so terribly expensive in this country compared with Moscow'. Now it is of course true that Soviet books as a whole are

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nothing like so expensive as ours; but when we examine the kind of books they produce, it emerges that their cheapness is largely mythical. *Meet the Robinsons* costs 29 kopeks (slightly less than half a crown). For this, one gets 168 pages, very flimsily bound, with a soilable paper cover. It is admittedly quite attractively laid out, with a number of pleasant drawings, but the printing is poor and the paper shows the pulp. Also on my desk at present I have the Penguin *Soviet short stories*. It, too, is attractively laid out; but in addition it has a glossy, serviceable cover, is better bound and printed, and is made of better paper; it has 224 pages, and is printed in two languages and alphabets; it costs 3s. 6d. I know which book is the Better Buy. I also know that many Russians would pay ten times this price to possess it, and that they can be proud of their own publishing houses only when they start producing any decent books on architecture at all.

AS already mentioned, Mr Hanna wildly inflates the price of admission to Kew Gardens. He also makes his hero pay 12s. 6d. for the chocolates his wife unsociably munches at Drury Lane. Taken together, these details are significant. In the Soviet Union, culture is cheap and luxury is dear; a reader would expect this to be true also of other countries, and would be quite surprised to learn that entry to Kew Gardens costs 3d. and a bar of chocolate 6d. It is of course perfectly possible to pay 12s. 6d. for a box of chocolates in a London theatre, but the price is untypical; in the Soviet Union, however, it is typical. But Mr Hanna is obsessed by economics. Listen to him on telephones:

> *Tatiana:* Have you got a telephone?
> *Eileen* (laughing): Our name's O'Hara, not Rothschild. Don't tell me working people have telephones in Moscow.
> *Tatiana:* Nearly everybody has. A telephone's a necessity, not a luxury. We've got a few things we can boast about, you know, even if our standard of living isn't yet as high as yours is.

I'm sure many Russians will be greatly amused by this, and I'm glad of that Freudian slip in Tatiana's last remark. Who are these 'working people' that Mr Hanna is so bothered about? Between them, at factory and office, the O'Haras probably earn £40 a week and more; in the USSR they would earn half as much.

Naturally enough, Mr Hanna makes no mention of wages and salaries. He does, however, make a great issue of housing costs in Britain. He makes as much as he possibly can of the undeniable fact that rents in Britain are high, often astronomically high, when compared with those in the Soviet Union. Again, of course, there are compensatory factors, such as the equally undeniable fact that houses and flats in Britain are usually much better constructed than they are in the USSR; I will insist less on this, however, than on the actual statements

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made by Mr Hanna. The Robinsons are discussing the possibility of taking a flat for the duration of their stay in London.

> *Tatiana:* What's the rent?
> *Fred:* Fifteen pounds a week without service.
> *Tatiana:* Isn't that a lot of money?
> *Fred:* Yes, it's expensive, living in London. Furnished lodgings usually cost about three times as much as unfurnished. You know that English people, workers, clerks and the professional classes have to pay as much as a third of their income in rent. That's why everybody is so anxious to buy his own house, even if it takes twenty years on the hire-purchase system.
> *Tatiana:* Do many people do that?
> *Fred:* Lots of them. It's a good idea for a man who has an absolutely guaranteed job. But if he loses his job and can't keep up his instalments he loses the house and the money he's paid. All the instalments are regarded as rent.
> *Tatiana:* That's not fair. There ought to be some law about it.
> *Fred:* I believe there is some new legislation since the war but I don't know anything about it. All I know is that rents are far too high and keep going up.

I'll say there has been some 'new legislation'! I have quoted at some length here to show how Mr Hanna, whether fully conscious of what he is doing or not, blurs round the edges of his arguments. It is expensive living in London, so the Robinsons must live expensively. English people may pay a high proportion of their salaries in rent and rates, so let's not tell the Russians how much those salaries are. It may take a very long time to pay for a house, so let's bring in the question of unemployment. Fred has been away from London for some time, so let's give his views in full, then make a tiny suggestion that they may be totally out of date. Now there is no need to contest these views in detail, but I will make just one revealing comparison. Here in Belfast, the rent for my flat is less than one-tenth of my salary; here it is of normal size for one or two people, but in the Soviet Union would officially accommodate a family of eight. My salary, on the other hand, is twice as high as it would be there, and the cost of living perhaps only a half of that obtaining in the Soviet Union. Of course it is true that costs are higher in London, but where is it written that one has to live there? And why does Mr Hanna make no such real comparisons?

As for the difficulty of actually obtaining a house or a flat in London, no one will object to most of the things Mr Hanna has to say about wrong priorities in reconstruction programmes. His descriptions of soaring office blocks next to slums or vacant lots are over-dramatic, over-generalised, and refer better to 1954 than to 1964; but the basic truth of his criticism remains: families wait for flats while offices stand empty. On the whole he is pretty fair, so one should resist the temptation to dwell on Soviet jerry-building and overcrowding, or the

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depressing sameness of architecture all over the USSR. As a good example of Mr Hanna's simplist yet strangely cryptic and ambivalent attitudes to England and England's troubles, here are the Robinsons discussing reconstruction:

> *Fred:* The London County Council has been trying for the last fifteen years or so to make some important alterations to the general plan of London but there are so many private property interests involved that it is no easy matter.
> *Tatiana:* How much more easily we do things in Moscow. All you have to do when you want to pull down old houses is build new ones for the people to live in.
> *Fred:* If only it were as easy as that . . .

IT is Mr Hanna's choice of facts which makes the discussions in *Meet the Robinsons* at once so honest and so irritating. While Fred, a convinced communist but an Englishman for all that, can correct his wife's assumptions and enlighten his Soviet audience, the opinions of some of the people they meet in England are so untypical that they seem naïve and occasionally pernicious. Eileen, for instance, a normal decent young working wife, has this to say: 'Just after the war, when we were going to school, we thought everything was going to be fine. We had our Welfare State, and most people thought we were going forward to socialism'. Now what people who were at school just after the war would remember most about the Welfare State is rationing, shabbily dressed teachers, and rotten school dinners! The idea of 'going forward to socialism' would never have entered their heads. Similarly, a woman called Mrs Jenkins complains about the Tories' 'whittling down' of the Welfare State, so that the National Health Service 'is almost all that's left' of it, and even this is 'too skimpy' and doesn't cover the cost of all medicines. (The Labour Party had only just been returned to power when the action described in *Meet the Robinsons* is supposed to take place.) Now whatever one may think of Tory rule, these statements are misleading to a Soviet reader: it is, of course, already quite remarkable that he is told of our National Health Service; but what of our free primary and secondary education (including text-books and writing materials, which are not free in the Soviet Union), our generous grants to students (far higher than those awarded there), our sickness and unemployment benefits, our compulsory insurance, our compensation payments, our council housing? Incidentally, Mrs. Jenkins is made to say a very un-English thing: 'There are never enough beds in lying-in hospitals, quite a lot of children are born at home'.

The items I have just quoted are taken from a scene called 'Politics in a London pub'. The Robinsons are being regaled by an old friend of Fred's who runs what Mr Hanna would have us believe is a typical English pub. They meet half a dozen people, with whom they have quite a lively discussion whose generally intelligent tone is spoilt by the following pathetic dialogue:

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Mr Jenkins: All of us here call ourselves left-wingers . . .
Mrs Jenkins: That means we don't quite know what we want, Mrs Robinson. We belong to the Labour Party and don't like it at all, and we don't join the Communist Party because we still don't understand everything about its policy, either.
Tatiana: Have you seen the new Programme of our Soviet Communist Party?

'Don't understand', indeed! It is already quite sickening to see such an emphasis on things political in an otherwise well-devised text-book for students of English, but to give the impression that the few who are politically aware are as naïve as this is reprehensible. It is true that they are better than the ladies at the hairdresser's who crowd round Tatiana to ask if they have electricity in the Soviet Union, but the recurring impression is of disciples gathered to receive instruction in communist doctrine. 'It would be much easier if we could get the rest of the world to disarm', she says, and you can see their hungry faces lighting up. Even at the end, the mutual toasts for peace and friendship carry primarily that characteristically Soviet implication that Britain and the USSR are at present at war with one another.

It would be wrong to leave *The Robinsons* on this note, however, for there is much about it to admire. There is certainly a good deal of straight (and silly) propaganda, as when Tatiana says to her English engineer husband 'you remember that place in Krupskaya's memoirs . . .'—as if he would have had the time or inclination to read them; but there is also a good deal of debunking. The conversation in the pub turns to Aldermaston. 'I'd love the experience of such a march', exclaims Tatiana; to which Mrs Wright replies: 'There's nothing to love, my dear. We wish they weren't necessary'. Or again, they are walking through the City late at night. 'Look, Tanya', says Fred, 'London is having its nightly wash'. 'Just like Moscow!' she marvels, to which Eileen retorts: 'What's strange about that? All cities wash their streets down at night, don't they?'

There are also frequent examples of a plain and gentle humour, the ordinary give and take of friendly conversation. Fred's little niece Jill takes a bite from her caviare sandwich and says: 'Oo, mummy, I don't like this fish jam!' Her mother splutters over her vodka: 'What's this stuff got in it apart from sulphuric acid?' Or there is the charming cockney repartee of the bus conductor who refers to Fred as Tatiana's husband:

Tatiana: How do you know he's my husband?
Conductor: Maybe he ain't, but it's only polite to say so since you're wearing a wedding-ring.

Mr Hanna's account of what English people are like is, indeed, fundamentally both friendly and enlightened. Who can tell how much of the apparent unfriendliness which does quite frequently occur is simply faulty knowledge on his part? He clearly hasn't lived here for some

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long time. Or maybe his advisers or his censors are responsible for much of the cruder pro-Soviet propaganda. However this may be, it is a fact that he goes out of his way on occasions to give a favourable impression of Great Britain as a twentieth-century state. And sometimes his enthusiasm is premature, to say the least:

> It is planned to introduce a decimal system of coinage in Britain *in the near future. The proposed unit is ten shillings* and each shilling will contain ten pence. This will be the second step towards decimalising British life; the first was the introduction of the Centigrade *in place of* the antiquated Fahrenheit thermometer. It is to be hoped that decimal weights and measures will also be introduced at some future date.

The italics are mine; the manuscript was delivered to the printers in autumn 1964.

Readers of *Meet the Robinsons* will nevertheless learn an extraordinary amount about Britain that is both true and just; they will come to see that most English people are as normal and as human as themselves; and they will, I hope, read between the lines to see that political dogma is just as irrelevant to everyday life in Britain as it is in the Soviet Union. And this is progress indeed. Listen, finally, to this splendid little conversation on advertising. For a Russian reader, the final sentence would sound more like honest ignorance than critical irony; but the humour of such scenes as this is typical of the author's refreshing West/East ambivalence:

> *Fred:* If I want to buy Tanya a pair of stockings, say, I ask for Bri-Nylons.
> *Tatiana:* If you did anything as sweet as that I wouldn't even look at the trade mark. But why that brand?
> *Fred:* Because I see it so often it comes automatically to mind—it's almost a synonym for stockings in the mind of the buyer. The whole Western world . . . is plastered with Coco-cola (*sic*) ads. When you see something as often as that you feel you have to try it, once at least.
> *Tatiana:* Even if they're purely commercial, I like them, they look so gay and bright . . .
> *Eileen:* Do you have ads like this in Moscow?
> *Tatiana:* Oh, yes . . . not in such quantities as this, of course.
> *Eileen:* I didn't think you'd need anything as commercial as neon ads in a socialist country . . .

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GHOSTS BEHIND THE GHOST—STALIN UNDER REVISION

Kurt Marko

THE picture at first sight looks somewhat confusing. The political and ideological dispute between Moscow and Peking, as well as the infighting in the Soviet Union itself, seems to draw its inspiration from a sphere of human endeavour equally rejected by both contestants, namely, modern art in its extreme forms. The way dekhrushchevisation was carried out while the campaign for the reappraisal of Stalin gathered momentum in preparation for the twenty-third CPSU congress is pure Federico Fellini, and could almost have been lifted bodily from one of his more recent films. A cautionary tale about the unredeemed past, the whole macabre comedy has a moribund and pallidly pretentious air rather than the vigour and high colour expected from great drama dealing with the irrevocable and fateful march of history. The way in which the new Kremlin leadership tries to handle the divergent forces within the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc, and the world communist movement, is full of vacillations. The dilemmas are obvious.

As the stage props of history shift, the familiar landmarks are beginning to change place and to disappear. In their independent and disembodied existence 'historical personalities' are illuminated by a new and ambivalent light, their image seems to multiply, and each of the freshly emerging faces holds up a different mirror to the *Zeitgeist*. In the game of reappraisal the ghoulish mole outside the Kremlin wall can be used to further some interests and to frustrate others.

While the trend towards so-called restalinisation did not exactly arouse enthusiasm in the Soviet Union, the east European countries, and among western communists, the Chinese refused to attend the twenty-third congress and protested against the continuing destalinisation. In their letter to the Soviet central committee of 22 March 1966 they stated that the present split was caused by the dismantling of Stalin's heritage.

Stalin was manipulated by his immediate heirs, and is now being manipulated by those in the Kremlin who would exonerate him and, if possible, restore his image. To begin with the entire syndrome of totalitarian and patriotic education, the whole panoply of Soviet nationalism was taken over lock, stock, and barrel both by Khrushchev and his successors. Thus with the blessing of the top leadership one of the essential ingredients of Stalinism was not only retained without modification, but as official state ideology continues to receive every encouragement.

The truth is that Stalin, by fostering an imperial ethos, provided Soviet ideology with a viable political basis. It was he who actually

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started to demolish communism as an internationally-oriented mass creed even though his disciples and glorifiers regard him as one of its chief standard bearers. He was responsible for that coupling of communism to Soviet great-power chauvinism for which Khrushchev and his successors are now being blamed. If the Chinese revere Stalin as an eminent theoretician and dedicated champion of Marxism-Leninism, although he was neither, the Soviet Union failed to acknowledge his services which, from the point of view of her imperial status, were truly commendable. After Khrushchev's fall the masks of Stalin the statesman, the strategist, and the saviour of the fatherland began to merge into a somewhat diffuse image.

Hardly six months after Khrushchev's overthrow, the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory over Hitler's Germany furnished Stalin's marshals with an opportunity to beat muffled drums in honour of their supreme war lord. Khrushchev's successors hastened to join in this display of respect. However, it soon became evident that this first tentative attempt at a Stalin renaissance had touched many sectional interests to the quick. His partial rehabilitation by the ideologues was directed against the critical attitudes of the scholars, scientists, and experts, among whom the younger generation was strongly represented.

The military on their part pretended to concern themselves only with questions of security, and 'the great patriotic war' provided them with an unassailable platform from which to put their case. In doing so, the generals managed to puncture the somewhat inflated part attributed to Khrushchev in defending the country, an exercise which allowed them to deal his cronies a gratifying blow. Security and intelligence services took advantage of the opportunity to present themselves once again as indispensable and honourable institutions, whose men, vigilant in the proud tradition of the Cheka, had been able to submit to Stalin the unfortunately disregarded reports of Hitler's imminent attack.

The party's main anxiety, however, was about the younger generation and the way in which it had succeeded in using the Stalin issue in its relations with the authorities. The 'era of the personality cult' and the way it was 'overcome' gave to the sceptical young a welcome opportunity to pass judgment on 'the father' and obtain concessions extending the areas of freedom, individuality, self-expression and general independence. This development had to be stopped. But the end of destalinisation and the transition to a more carefully controlled rehabilitation sprang less from an honest wish to purge the past of deliberate misrepresentations, than from the desire of the regime to maintain its position and to keep control. Under pressure of the common interests of the established power groups, therefore, those responsible for the opinion-forming media and for education turned their attention to the abuses to which the campaign against the 'personality cult' had, it was maintained, given rise.

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IN view of the delicate balance of forces the preparations for the congress had to be made warily. They had to take into account how the outside world, the emancipated 'fraternal parties', and the comparatively independent members of the bloc would react to further attempts to rehabilitate Stalin, while at the same time gauging the effect on the political climate at home, particularly among the non-Russian nationalities. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the strength and influence of the opposing factions of reforming pragmatists and security-minded dogmatists varied greatly from country to country in the Eastern bloc. Moreover it was essential, from a foreign affairs point of view, that Stalin's rehabilitation should not appear to satisfy Peking's demands or to recognise Chinese claims to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. At home, too, a simple reversal of Khrushchev's policy by a straight rehabilitation of Stalin would tend to invalidate the officially propagated continuity of planned socialist advance.

At first, as for instance during the All-Union conference of Soviet philosophers early in April 1965, that is before the military had embarked upon their rehabilitation campaign, they were still satisfied with more or less vague generalities. P. N. Fedoseyev, member of the Central Committee and Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, delivering before this audience one of the two keynote lectures, pointedly praised *Lenin and his successors.* They were said to have discovered and analysed the law of transition from antagonistic to non-antagonistic contradictions and to have found in the latter a new and potent force for social progress. This formula partly vindicated Stalin's status as a Marxist-Leninist theoretician even before he was re-established as a statesman and soldier. Some of his books were, according to reports from the Soviet Union, to be reprinted and restored to the library shelves of party training colleges and military academies.

The rehabilitation of the dictator proceeded considerably faster than that of his enemies and victims within the party; those outside it being, in any case, unworthy of attention. As the title of Vasily Bykov's anti-Stalanist novel, published by *Novy Mir* just before the congress, puts it: *The Dead Don't Suffer.* Before the congress, and apart from the Sinyavsky and Daniel trial, the public noticed what was afoot only after *Pravda* had published incontrovertible evidence of the new thinking. It appeared on 30 January 1966 in an article under the signatures of E. M. Zhukov, V. G. Trukhanovsky, and V. J. Shunkov. In it the three top-ranking Soviet historians, while paying tribute to the valuable and significant contribution the 'party and people' had made in exposing the evils of the 'personality cult', nevertheless regretted that this achievement was marred by the injection of certain subjective influences alien to the Marxist spirit. The wide acceptance which the misleading and non-Marxist notion of a 'period of the personality cult' had gained was thought to exaggerate the importance of the individual in history, and

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in doing so to denigrate intentionally or otherwise the part played by the party and the people in the building of socialism, an omission said to have impoverished the range and scope of historical thinking.

However disappointing these new interpretations may have appeared, as putting an end to destalinisation measures, and to whatever dire forebodings the renewed public appreciation of Zhdanov, Stalin's cultural grand inquisitor, may have given rise in mid-February 1966, the new formula aimed, nevertheless, at a compromise. It accepted and sanctioned the de-mythologisation of the erstwhile communist god who had been presented as the incarnation of Soviet patriotism. However, it did not completely reject Stalin's rule or regard it as exclusively dominated by the ' cult of personality '. Officially it was held in any case to cover only part of his life, whereas among the historians there were some who would extend the years of aberration to the early thirties and even further back. Under the new dispensation, refurbished and safely buried in an allegedly redeemed and in any event fast receding past, Stalin with all his good and bad features, his achievements and mistakes, was now to be admitted to the communist pantheon. The one-time monster was to be recast as a positive, though not unblemished, symbol of that heroic age in which socialism—long since completed—was built, a link in the chain of socialist fighters against internal and external foes. The over-riding consideration here was to absorb the stalinist phase into the mainstream of history and to integrate it into an image of continuity in keeping with the postulates of Marxism-Leninism. These presuppose an inexorable progress, a perspective in which Stalin's abuse of power would be reduced to comparative insignificance. Khrushchevian historiography also tried to stress the ' positive continuity ' of Soviet history, but the denunciation of Stalin made this operation more than difficult.

The directives of 30 January 1966 were essentially defensive in character and aimed at a compromise. This official intention was reaffirmed when, shortly before the opening of the congress, F. N. Fedoseyev published on 16 March 1966 an important article in *Pravda* indicating the line to be taken. This ingenuous piece of circumlocution, verbally obliterating the entire ' era of the personality cult,' came on top of the stir already created in eastern Europe by the anathema implicitly pronounced on destalinisation. Moscow was soon buzzing with accounts of the protests, in which prominent members of the intelligentsia were said to have warned the central committee against continuing the rehabilitation of Stalin. The March issue of *Voprosy Filosofii* carried an article denouncing the abuse of power by persons in prominent positions. Since socialism, as V. Z. Kelle, the author of the article, observed, was in no way immune from such contagion, it was essential to organise the system of leadership in a manner designed to prevent the repetition of past mistakes.

The external difficulties caused by the Chinese refusal to attend the congress were thus aggravated by the internal explosiveness of the Stalin

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issue. One has only to recall the efforts Soviet historians had made after the twentieth congress, with the help of colleagues in other disciplines, to rid the social sciences of their stalinist legacy. Their All-Union conference of December 1962 bore indeed some resemblance to the proverbial bar of history, and its proceedings remain one of the most extraordinary *documents humains* of the post-Stalinist era. Even so, as the January 1964 protocol of the social sciences section of the presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences reveals, the limits within which destalinisation operated were exceedingly narrow. Although a number of the attending delegates brought up once more the tasks outlined in 1962 and stated that many of Stalin's mistakes had not yet been exposed, analysed and overcome, they, nevertheless, had to concede that 'the front against dogmatism had hardly broadened'. According to the minutes

> The few successes worthy of note were scored at the centre. The overwhelming majority of historians and social science teachers at the universities and Academies of Sciences in the various republics were exceedingly timorous and showed little enthusiasm for overcoming prejudices formed when dogmatism ruled supreme. Scholars in the outlying provinces who, whether established or just beginning to make a name for themselves, had tried in their work and teachings to dissociate themselves from bias, not only remained unsupported but were actually exposed to inadmissible pressure. [1]

Such complaints might have prepared the detached observer for the brutal onslaughts to which the twenty-third congress was to be treated by men like D. G. Sturua, the Georgian party secretary, his colleague, V. P. Mzhavanadze, and even the Moscow party secretary N. G. Egorychev. To quote the *leitmotif* from the 'Chronicle of Fools', that unforgettable Czech film satire, 'the wind had changed again'. Sturua belaboured all those who had too readily accepted the concept of the 'personality cult' and listed the many errors to which a wrong interpretation of the era had given rise. Although Georgian historians, writers, and artists had shown themselves immune to the blandishments of Trotskyism, bourgeois nationalism, and right-wing deviation, others were guilty of disseminating destructive criticism, nihilism, cosmopolitanism, apolitism, and liberalism. Nobel prize-winner Sholokhov and others used similar terms to castigate those who disagreed with the harsh sentences passed on Sinyavsky and Daniel. These exaggerations and threats, and the patriotic sermonising with its distinct undertones of blood-and-soil mysticism, seem to appeal invariably to the simple minded who, deeply suspicious of the complexities of a highly differentiated philosophy of history and life, are always ready to rush into witch hunts.

The more sophisticated Egorychev chose the positive approach. He pooh-poohed apprehensions. The old oppressive rule, he implied, had vanished, Stalinism was now a mere phantom, and nobody in his senses would dream of reviving that coercive system. Mzhavanadze was more

[1] *Istoriya i Sotsiologiya* (Moscow, 1964), pp. 189, 305.

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aggressive; his defence of Stalin took the form of an attack on the writers of memoirs, who hoped thereby to secure for themselves a little place in history, particularly I. M. Maisky, formerly ambassador in London, who dared to criticise Stalin's conduct of the opening phases of the war.

In the light of the congress, the nature of the compromise attempted by the directives of 30 January 1966 becomes even more transparent. It aimed at controlling genuine destalinisation and at checking the reactionary—or at least conservative—forces, anxious to exploit the Stalin question in order to blame all the regime's difficulties on the progressives. This approach of the new leadership has a strong bias in favour of the established order.

Given the uncomfortable perspectives opened up by too close a scrutiny of the preceding regimes, the present is a temporising attitude. How, one wonders, does all this affect the carefully-tended party image? Can the leadership shrug off questions relating to the Stalin and Khrushchev regimes as mere historical episodes, the passing of which would automatically correct any minor aberrations they might have caused? When attempts were made to incorporate a comparatively realistic account of the Stalin era into the general picture of Soviet history, it was pointed out that this period represented a departure from Marxism, a phenomenon alien to the spirit and practice of socialism. Could such a lapse during the early stage of socialist construction be followed by yet another misguided period of error on the path to communism?

Khrushchev only revealed part of the guilt when he exposed the shame of others. He was not prepared to make a clean breast of all his predecessors' crimes and of his own complicity, to accept his own responsibility as well as that of the 'party and the people'. The saving word of the 'Stalin within us' remained unspoken. Khrushchev was not destined to become the Orestes of communism. Hence the erring and misguided children of the revolution are still carrying the dead along with them. With his victims and his henchmen Stalin shares the fate of those restless ghosts who are unable to find peace so long as their crimes and sufferings remain unexpiated. Both continue to cast their obstructive shadow across the future.

The Stalin of the Chinese and the Albanians is not the Stalin of the Georgians; and the Stalin of the Moscow restorers is not the Stalin his surviving victims and opponents hate, despise, and pity. Stalin is not dead. The god that failed still remains a festering sore that refuses to heal. Stalin is more than a mere boomerang that recoils on those who denounce him. He is the archetypal incarnation of that internal communist contradiction which becomes apparent as soon as its demand for unquestioning subordination and its promise of absolute redemption come face to face with man and the realities of his world. No one can stop or pacify the furies of the revolution, no one can silence them or

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lay the ghost of Stalin unless and until the 'party and the people' are individually and collectively prepared to admit fallibility and guilt, or, to be more precise, are permitted to make such confessions. A right that, as the Sinyavsky and Daniel trial showed, is still denied even to poets.

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SOCIALISM, ALIENATION, AND POLITICAL POWER

Z. A. Jordan

ADAM SCHAFF, whose recent book *Marxism and the Individual* [1] has caused some stir in Poland and also abroad, is no stranger to the columns of western journals; but since there are some misconceptions about his position and record as a prominent theoretician of the Polish Communist Party (PZPR), it is perhaps advisable to give a brief review of his career.

Schaff was born in Lwow in 1913, in a wealthy middle-class family of Jewish origin. [2] He had all the advantages of a civilised background and good education. He speaks foreign languages, has wide interests, is well read, well mannered, and appreciative of art and literature. He joined the League of Young Communists when he was nineteen and later became a member of the Communist Party of Poland. This decision reflected his strong urge to action, which has never deserted him.

Schaff studied law in Lwow, economics in Paris, and philosophy at the Philosophical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, where he received his Ph.D. in 1944. After the war he became a lecturer at the Communist Party Political School in Lodz and also taught economic doctrines at the university there. In 1948 he was appointed to the first chair of Marxist-Leninist philosophy at Warsaw University. From that moment onwards he rose steadily in the party hierarchy and consolidated his position as a communist theoretician, an ideological policy-maker and academic administrator. He became a member of the Central Committee of the PZPR, commanded, as it was customary to say at that time, on the 'philosophical front' in Poland, laid down the ideological line in philosophy and the humanities at the recurrent moments of crisis within the party, and managed to weather every storm. His good luck held in the October period. Although he was out of step with and occasionally fought a rearguard action against the advanced forces responsible for the October upheaval, he emerged from it with his standing unimpaired. He regained the trust of Gomulka and helped him to re-establish party controls over the humanities and

[1] *Marksizm a jednostka ludzka*: Przyczynek do marksistowskiej filozofii czlowieka (Warsaw, 1965), 372 pp. A German translation is now available (*Marxismus und das menschliche Individuum* (Zürich, Europa Verlag).

[2] This is not without importance today, since Mr M. Moczar's 'partisans', known for their anti-semitism, hold many positions of power in the country. Professor J. Chalasinski, said, rightly or wrongly, to be one of their ideological advisers, published an article in *Tygodnik Kulturalny* (19 December 1965) in which he argued that the concept of cosmic homelessness adopted by Schaff from Martin Buber's essay *What is Man?* reflects the rootlessness of the Jews and their estrangement from national cultures. Chalasinski's hardly veiled racist attack was answered in the same weekly (30 January 1966) by Professor T. Kotarbinski, the doyen of Polish philosophers.

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the social sciences. He was always in favour of censorship and insisted that the party had the right and duty to restrict the freedom of thought and speech (in *Marxism and the Individual* he demands complete freedom for himself and his fellow Marxist-Leninists, but calls for censorship for everybody else—the social scientist, philosopher or writer—as 'justified and necessary'). 'Men who are governed by reason,' wrote Spinoza in *Ethics* (Part IV, Prop. xviii, Scholium), 'desire nothing for themselves which they do not desire for other men, and consequently are just, faithful, and honourable.' Schaff heartily disliked revisionism, as represented by *Po Prostu* in the political field and by Leszek Kolakowski in the field of ideology, and became the party's pillar in its anti-revisionist struggle. He remained, however, as much as the late Oskar Lange, an orthodox revisionist. He believed that the party had to change its outlook and modernise its methods of government, in order to gain genuine social support, to compete successfully with new ideas, and to win the day in the ideological struggle for the allegiance of men. He wanted the party to revise its ways of thinking and acting because these prejudiced the acceptance of socialism, and to take notice of important social and intellectual problems, because their neglect had unfavourable political consequences for the party. His pragmatic approach is well illustrated by the arguments he used to convince the party leadership of the advisability of clarifying its position on the rights and liberties of the individual:

> The trump card of anti-marxist and anti-communist propaganda has been the question of the rights of the individual under socialism, the question of democracy. Our opponents labour hard to prove that they have a democracy and we a dictatorship, that the rights of the individual are respected in their countries and not in ours. This is an argument that really does appeal to many people and can for a time effectively frighten them away from socialism.[3]

Schaff's revisionism can be called orthodox because he subordinated it to the supreme objective of keeping the party in power and of making its hold on the country more secure and effective.

As an orthodox revisionist, Schaff endorsed some of the views which he criticised in others, and also suggested a number of revisions of his own. He was successful so long as he dealt with theoretical or philosophical problems regarded by his more practically-minded comrades with condescending indifference. (For instance, the relation between formal logic and dialectics, the attitude to Hegel, the assessment of modern philosophical trends, the neglect of sociology, ethics, the philosophy of language, cybernetics or the 'philosophy of man' within Marxism-Leninism.) But when he crossed this line and took up matters directly affecting the reputation and policies of the party, as he did in *Marxism and the Individual*, the party turned against him with anger and fury. Clearly he had miscalculated his standing, authority, and

[3] *A Philosophy of Man* (New York, 1963), p. 102.

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influence, and his reputation as the party's foremost theoretician has suffered a drastic decline, at least temporarily, for the first time since he began his political career. Schaff is head of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, an office held by party appointment and not by the choice of his peers. Apart from his official and influential position he is deservedly recognised as the leading Marxist-Leninist philosopher in Poland. He has an easy and prolific pen, is a hard worker, and a versatile writer. His book, *Some Problems of the Marxist Theory of Truth*, first published in 1951, is his most outstanding achievement. It is the first exhaustive study of the concept of truth from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint ever written either in Polish or any other language.

But Schaff has remained outside the main stream of Polish philosophy, known abroad as the Warsaw school, which from the beginning of this century has been closely connected with formal logic and science and characterised by a deep-seated distrust of metaphysical speculations and speculative systems. In the Stalinist period Schaff fought this tradition by all means, fair and foul, and took advantage of his political power to prevent its representatives from teaching and publishing. His other opponents, for instance the sociologists and phenomenologists, fared even worse, because they could not defend themselves against criticism and had no right to open their mouths at all. Since 1956 he has done much to make good the damage inflicted in the past. He also recognised the merits of his former philosophical opponents and even tried to adopt some of their methods and ways of thinking. These efforts were indicative of the agility, vitality, and adaptability of his mind, characteristics which are also apparent in his latest venture, that is, in his interest in philosophical anthropology (which he prefers to call *the philosophy of man*) and socialist humanism.

MARXISM AND THE INDIVIDUAL is a political book. It is addressed, above all, to the communist leaders in Poland and elsewhere and also to all party members, irrespective of their rank, who feel concerned about the achievements, the direction, and the rate of progress in the construction of socialism and communism. It tries to impress upon the communist leadership the advisability of a complete reorientation in viewing the world which they themselves brought about, and in evaluating their policies, which have failed to produce the desired transformations in the social structure, the system of government, and the attitudes of men. Schaff suggests that all these failures are ultimately due to the ignorance of Marx's true teaching and to the disregard of the essential tenets of socialism.

> Let us start with the statement of a trivial truth: man and his affairs are the central issue of all socialism, both utopian and scientific. Furthermore, it is not the abstraction of man, not man in general, but concrete human individuals who are the supreme goal of socialism. Although it may appear a paradox, this

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> undoubtedly trivial truth is in certain circumstances important and stimulating. If we do not comprehend it, we are unable to understand the meaning of socialism, its theoretical assumptions and its practice. All socialist movements have arisen in protest against an inhuman world, in the revolt against oppression, the exploitation of man by man, and hatred in human relations . . . a protest inspired by the sufferings and hopes for a better future of one's fellow men. For this reason every kind of socialism is, in a certain sense, a theory of happiness, even though it is not always a theory of the struggle, the genuine struggle, for this happiness. But he who fails to see that man holds the central position in the socialist idea, disregards what is most important in it and does not understand it at all.

Humanism is the belief that men have an intrinsic value and hence should be treated not as means but as ends in themselves; that their well-being and happiness are the highest goal of all social endeavour; and that men can achieve these objectives by their own efforts. Humanism is the foundation of all socialism, and Marxian socialism is no exception.

Marx wrote in his youth that the emancipation of man is 'only possible in practice if one adopts the point of view of that theory according to which man is the highest being for man'. For this theory establishes the 'categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being'. It also implies that socialism cannot develop without a 'political revolution with a social soul'. Every revolution overthrows the existing regime and in this sense it is a political act. But as soon as it starts organising new social relationships, the true purpose of socialism comes to the fore. A social revolution is a protest against an inhuman world; therefore its aim is to secure for the individual a really human life. Communist society is the only one 'in which the original and free development of individuals ceases to be a phrase'.[4] How could it have happened that the humanistic sources of Marxian socialism were forgotten by its supporters?

Schaff's answer to this question is not new even in Poland, where some Marxian scholars discussed the ideas of the young Marx long before Schaff thought of them.[5] Schaff reminds us that the writings of the young Marx remained unknown until our own times. The full original texts of *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and of *The German Ideology* were not published until 1932.[6] Plekhanov and

[4] *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: introduction*, in T. B. Bottomore (ed.), Karl Marx: *Early Writings* (London, 1963), pp. 52, 59; 'Kritische Randglossen zu dem Artikel: "Der König von Preussen und die Sozialreform. Von einem Preussen"', Karl Marx-F. Engels, *Werke*, Band 1 (Berlin, 1964), pp. 408–09; *The German Ideology* (London, 1965), p. 483.

[5] L. Kolakowski, 'Karol Marks i klasyczna definicja prawdy', *Studia Filozoficzne*, 1959, 2/11; B. Baczko, 'Wokol problemow alienacji', ibid. 1959, 6/15.

[6] By D. Riazanov in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe* (usually referred to as MEGA), Abt. 1, Bände 3 and 5.

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Lenin, Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg were unaware of their existence, and the interpretation which they had given to the theories of the older Marx hindered the understanding of his youthful ideas. The Stalinist period did not favour studies of the young Marx. 'In the atmosphere of the nineteen thirties', Schaff wrote, 'there was no room in official Marxism for the problems of the individual, the philosophy of man and humanism'. Finally, the esoteric, ponderous, and involved Hegelian style of Marx's youthful writings constituted an additional obstacle to their understanding.

In these circumstances the discovery of the ideas of the young Marx was left to western scholars (S. Landshut, J. P. Mayer, Henri de Man, H. Marcuse, H. Popitz, E. Thier, J.-Y. Calvez) and, we should add, to the revisionists within the Soviet bloc, for instance, to Ernst Bloch in East Germany and to Leszek Kolakowski in Poland. The revisionists found in Marx's socialist humanism an alternative to institutional Marxism, the importance of which was enhanced by the disclosure of the crimes and cruelties of Stalinism.[7]

According to Schaff, both western scholars and the revisionists not only contrasted the youthful humanism of Marx with his mature doctrines (to be found in *Capital* and Engels' *Anti-Dühring*), but also tended to endorse the former and to discount the latter. On the other hand, the supporters of official Marxism, who also claimed that the young Marx and the old Marx had held incompatible views, ignored entirely the humanistic philosophy of Marx, because of its alleged immaturity, and regarded the views contained in his later writings as the genuine Marxism.[8] Schaff rejected both opinions; there are not two Marxian doctrines but only one. He claimed, in agreement with the widely accepted interpretation, that there is a continuity in the development of Marx's thought. Marx changed his language, conceptual framework, and method of thinking in the course of his life, but there is no evidence that he ever abandoned his philosophical ideas on man. On the contrary, the ideas developed in his early writings help us to understand his interest in political economy, his criticism of capitalism, his theory of social classes and socialism expounded in his later years.

Schaff's claim appears to be methodologically right and sound. The

[7] The revisionists illustrated, as it were, the relationship between philosophy and life described by the young Marx. Philosophers, Marx wrote, 'do not grow out of the soil like mushrooms, they are the products of their time and of their people, whose most subtle precious and invisible sap circulates in philosophical ideas. Because every true philosophy is the spiritual quintessence of its time, the time must come when philosophy, not only internally by its content but externally by its appearance, comes into contact and mutual reaction with the real contemporary world' (Der leitende Artikel in Nr. 179 der *Kölnischen Zeitung*, *Werke*, Band 1, pp. 97–98).

[8] Schaff himself defended the official position in the past. See *Nowe Drogi*, 1959, 13/127, p. 18.

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hypothesis of continuity and connection between Marx's views in different periods of his life provides us with a criterion of objectivity and protects us from involuntary distortions of Marx's thought.[9]

THE interpretation of the thought of Marx based on the close connection between his youthful ideas and mature doctrines has some important practical consequences for all who claim to be his rightful inheritors. It puts them under the obligation to recognise that 'man is the supreme being for man' and to work for his full emancipation from the dehumanised world. But this objective is far from being realised in the communist countries.

The failure to secure for man a life free from anxiety, insecurity, and the feeling of futility is partly due to the fact that the ultimate problems of human existence—the desire for happiness, the fear of death, the experience of solitude, the dread of life or the sense of its meaninglessness—remain unresolved as much under socialism as under capitalism.[10] But the main cause of the persisting disillusionment with and unsatisfactoriness of life is alienation, which socialism has not managed to overcome. Schaff understands by alienation the 'power which the products of man's activity have over him', the fact that these products 'acquire an existence independent of man, function autonomously and subordinate him to themselves'. 'Alienation', Schaff writes elsewhere, is the 'elemental force with which social development asserts itself'. It results from the blind operation of social laws which 'gain mastery over the individual, threaten his very existence, and thereby impose restrictions on his freedom'. The emancipation of man from alienation consists, therefore, in the struggle for man's genuine freedom or in the efforts to regain his lost control over the blind forces of social life.

Schaff claims that according to Marx the system of private property is the original source of all alienation. Consequently, if you abolish private property, all forms of alienation, and not only the economic, are bound to disappear and man to be set free. There is some evidence to this effect in Marx's early writings. 'The positive transcendence of private property as the appropriation of human life', he wrote, 'is the positive transcendence of all estrangement, that is to say, the return of man . . . to his human, i.e. social mode of existence'.[11] Schaff argues

[9] In *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, composed by Marx in 1857/58, we find a passage which combines the socialist humanism of the young Marx with the evolutionary sociological holism of later years and thus corroborates the hypothesis of continuity. See E. J. Hobsbaw (ed.), Karl Marx: *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (London, 1964), p. 84.

[10] This is one of Sartre's main theses in the opening chapter of *Critique de la raison dialectique*, first published as an article in the Polish monthly *Tworczosc* in April 1957. Soviet writers strongly objected to Sartre's assertion that 'existential alienation' is possible in any society, including socialist and communist societies. In the past Schaff seemed to side with the Soviet writers rather than with Sartre. See *A Philosophy of Man*, p. 74.

[11] *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (London, 1959), p. 103.

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that this idea smacks of utopianism, and on this it is impossible to disagree with him. He adds that the experience of the socialist countries leaves no doubt that Marx's prediction has not come true. If Marx really made this prophecy, Schaff is right in saying that it remains unfulfilled.

Schaff believes that there are all kinds of alienation in all socialist countries. Therefore alienation is not inherent in any particular system of property relations and does not disappear in the wake of the socialist revolution. 'To indulge in naive prattle to this effect' while facts provide an emphatic denial, leads nowhere.

> The experience of the socialist revolution, which we all know, indicates that the abolition of the various forms of alienation, even of economic alienation, does not result automatically from the abolition of the institution of private property.

Schaff's arguments in support of this contention constitute the most interesting part of his book.

ALIENATION does not disappear in socialist society because the state, with its coercive forces, does not wither away. Engels' expectation, expressed in *Anti-Dühring*, that the government of persons would ultimately be replaced by the administration of things, is unrealistic, because the management of the processes of production can never be separated from the government of persons.[12] The state is bound to remain an 'alienated force' and to repress the individual. Moreover, George Orwell was not entirely wrong in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. In all socialist countries the period of the personality cult provides an instance of 'terrible alienation'; people were no longer able to control the powers which they themselves had created with the 'noblest humanistic intentions' and which, like an alien destructive force, began crushing their personality and exterminating them. The misconceptions about and the misuse of the dictatorship of the proletariat also point in the same direction. When the rulers assume their infallibility and enforce blind obedience on the part of the ruled, the stage is set for a politically estranged man.

Alienation does not disappear in socialist society because, contrary to Marx's and Engels' belief, the existence of different classes of society does not become an anachronism under socialism. In his analysis of the class roots of alienation Schaff shows his good sense, political acumen, and a certain philosophical naiveté. It is embarrassing to read that 'by definition, a social class cannot exist in a society which has abolished private property in the means of production'.

12 Schaff's sober criticism of Engels' famous prophecy was highly praised at a discussion meeting organised by Warsaw philosophers, most of whom were members of the PZPR. See 'Marksizm a jednostka ludzka', *Studia Filozoficzne* 1966, 1/44. W. Lloyd Warner used this argument to establish the point that complex societies cannot be classless. See W. L. Warner, M. Meeker and K. Eels, *Social Class in America*, Ch. 1.

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Having thus annihilated class divisions, he proceeds to establish the contradictory proposition, namely, that social classes reappear under socialism in a different guise. So long as there are rulers and ruled, differences of social status, prestige, privilege, style of life and even living standards are bound to persist too. Schaff explicitly endorses Orwell's satirical observations that under socialism all are equal but some are more equal than others. While it is nonsense to speak of a new class or red bourgeoisie, there is a power elite sharply differentiated from the ruled by its social and economic privileges. The persistence of class distinctions and the discrepancy between ideals and reality, words and deeds, estrange the masses from the rulers. They realise that they are still powerless and still held in subjection.

Finally, the dehumanisation of the worker arising from the division of labour and the expanding application of technology, which makes of him an 'appendage of the machine', survives the socialist revolution. Nationalism and racism, anti-semitism in particular, continue to poison and degrade human relations. Schaff himself makes capitalism responsible for 'racial alienation' and in this respect he is both wrong and less than truthful. The attitudes towards Jews in the Polish People's Republic are as morally repulsive as the practices of the democratic republic of Geneva in Calvin's time, or the behaviour of the Massachusetts population towards heretics and witches in the seventeenth century. It is a public secret that in Poland anti-semitism has supporters and promoters at the highest level of the party hierarchy.

There is really nothing new in Schaff's arguments supporting the contention that men continue to be alienated from the 'world of their own creation' under socialism. The only striking thing about it is the fact that it was precisely Schaff who produced and managed to publish them in 30,000 copies. Although the book is not original, its author's independence of thought and courage of conviction deserve the respect of opponents and friends.

LET us now consider Schaff's concept of alienation, as distinct from the facts it is supposed to denote, and compare it with Marx's concept of alienation in his early writings. As Schaff himself discloses, he has been greatly influenced in his conception of alienation by Erich Fromm, who himself is intellectually related to existentialism. 'For Marx, as for Hegel', Fromm writes, 'the concept of alienation is based on the distinction between existence and essence, on the fact that man's existence is alienated from his essence, that in reality he is not what he potentially is, or, to put it differently, that he is not what he ought to be, and that he ought to be that which he could be.'[13] Fromm's idea of the emancipation from alienation seems to be modelled on the existentialist notion of *genuine* existence and *authentic* man. Consequently, unlike Marx, who looked for the causes of estrangement outside

[13] *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York, 1961), p. 47.

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man, in the social conditions which he brings about and is also determined by, Fromm finds the source of alienation within man, in his consciousness; his cosmic homelessness and social solitariness are inherent in his spiritual and not in his social nature.

'Alienation' or 'externalisation' (*Entäusserung*), 'estrangement' (*Entfremdung*), and 'objectification' (*Vergegenständlichung*) are part of Hegel's terminology, almost inseparable from his doctrine. Hegel regarded history and society as an outcome of man's spiritual activity. Although they are a creation of man, they can become too powerful for him, grow beyond the reach of his control, and confront him as an independent, objective force. This comes about because

> in history an additional result is commonly produced by human actions beyond that which they aim at and obtain—that which they immediately recognise and desire. They gratify their own interest; but something further is thereby accomplished, latent in the actions in question, though not present in their consciousness, and not included in their design.

But the History of the World does not begin with a conscious human aim of any kind; it begins with a general aim, profoundly hidden and implicit, and this aim is the realisation of the Idea of Spirit. Human individuals, their volitions, interests, and activities, are only means to an ulterior end. They 'constitute the instruments of the world Spirit (*Weltgeist*) for attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and realising it'. Since this process is mediated by the consciousness and will of individuals

> Spirit is at war with itself; it has to overcome itself as its most formidable obstacle. That development which in the sphere of Nature is a peaceful growth, is in that of Spirit, a severe, a mighty conflict with itself. What Spirit really strives for is the realisation of its ideal being; but in doing so, it hides that goal from its own vision, and is proud and well satisfied in this alienation from it.[14]

Thus for Hegel alienation is an inherent characteristic of all spiritual and intellectual creation—*The Phenomenology of Mind* is based on the idea of creative alienation which is essential to Hegel's whole way of thinking—and, as it stands, can be accepted only by those who are ready to make Hegel's speculative assumption their own.

In *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* Marx was acutely aware of this problem. While he tried to re-define Hegel's metaphysical concept to make it suitable for the analysis of social structures and social action he was not quite successful in this endeavour. In the unpublished manuscripts of 1844 (particularly in the chapter entitled 'Estranged Labour') Marx distinguished between alienation as the property of social structures (the products of labour as alien objects), and alienation as a condition of individuals rather than of their social

[14] *The Philosophy of History* (New York, 1956), pp. 27, 55.

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environment (alienation as related to the act of production). Labour or production should be here understood as a very comprehensive category—not as the concept of physical work—which embraces all kinds of human activity. As Marx emphasised, he wanted religion, the state, law, morality, science, art, etc., to be conceived as 'only particular modes of production and to fall under its general law'. Alienation as a property of social structures and cultural systems consists in the creation by man's own labour of a power independent of the producer.

> The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, assumes an external existence, but that it exists independently outside himself, and alien to him, and that it stands opposed to him as an autonomous power. The life which he has given to the object sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force.

On the other hand, the psychological conception of alienation implies

> that the work is external to the worker, that it is not part of his nature; and that, consequently, he does not fulfil himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than well-being, does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased.

The alienation of the worker culminates in self-alienation, that is, in his becoming only a physical subject.

> The more the worker produces the less he has to consume; the more value he creates the more worthless he becomes; the more refined his product the more crude and misshapen the worker; the more civilised the product the more barbarous the worker; the more powerful the work the more feeble the worker; the more the work manifests intelligence the more the worker declines in intelligence and becomes a slave of nature. [15]

As defined in the *Manuscripts of 1844*, the concept of alienation or estrangement—Marx seems to make hardly any distinction between them—is the old Hegelian concept, not so much revised as disguised in psychological and sociological terms. But Marx assessed alienation differently, for it was no longer a creative but a destructive process; it did not mark the stages of progress in the self-realisation of the Idea of Spirit, but the stages of self-destruction of man.

In addition to this metaphysical notion, there is in the young Marx another concept of alienation which is clearly sociological and empirically significant. The term alienation in this second sense refers to the social effects of the division of labour, which as a social process enslaves man instead of being controlled by him.

> As soon as the distribution of labour comes into being each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape . . . This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting

[15] *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp. 103, 122–24.

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> our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now. [16]

While the division of labour establishes the mutual inter-dependence of the individuals among whom the labour is divided and makes possible the development of the productive forces, it also produces a contradiction between the interest of the individual and the community and determines the division into social classes. The division of labour assigns to the worker a fixed place in society, cripples him and makes him one-sided, and transforms personal relationships necessarily and inevitably into class relationships. 'While the division of labour raises the productive power of labour and increases the wealth and refinement of society, it impoverishes the worker and reduces him to a machine' [17]

The division of labour determines the division of men into distinct social classes, of which one dominates all the others. This follows from the fact that all conflicts within the state, whether between monarchy and democracy or bourgeoisie and aristocracy, are merely the illusory forms of the struggles of the different classes among themselves. But the individuals involved in these conflicts are unaware of their causes and of the forces which determine their own lives.

> The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour, appears to these individuals—since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally—not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, and which they thus cannot control. [18]

IT has been observed that the assumptions on which the concept of alienation rests vary from one thinker to another and that the only thing they have in common is the belief in a paradise lost, in a unity and harmony transformed into disunity and disharmony. Schaff's concept of alienation is an instance in point. He fails to distinguish the two main senses of 'alienation' in Marx's use of the term; he refers to the Marxian concept of alienation but in fact leans heavily on the recondite speculations of Hegel; he wants it to denote such a large number of most various things that the term, though heavily loaded emotionally, has no cognitive meaning. Schaff does not hesitate to speak of alienation when we are victims of the market economy, the armaments race, the threat of atomic annihilation, racial hatred or religious intolerance; when we have to submit to any kind of social constraint; and when we are prevented by law from satisfying our desires. He does not offer any explicit and systematic guidance to the various signs of estrangement, to observable alienated behaviour, or to the observable properties of social structures. As Schaff uses it,

[16] *The German Ideology*, pp. 44/45.
[17] *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 28; *The German Ideology*, p. 481.
[18] *The German Ideology*, p. 46.

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'alienation' is an all-inclusive term which can refer to practically anything and, in particular, to any social or moral evil. This is extremely vague and ambiguous; the term is bound to be applied metaphorically and to become a suitable objective for a persuasive definition. Since a term of such indiscriminating and heterogeneous generality denotes practically everything and connotes nothing, it is utterly useless for any serious analytical or empirical purpose. People can and do take advantage of it in metaphysical disputes or journalistic polemics, but they can dispense with it in investigating actual social and political conditions. Marx must have realised this, because the term and the concept of alienation, in its metaphysical sense, disappear from his later writings. He remained aware of the 'enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour' and frequently deplored its 'disastrous effect'. He returned to this subject over and over again in *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847), *Wage-Labour and Capital* (1847), *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), *Wages, Price and Profit* (1865), *Capital* (1867), and *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1875). But there is no evidence for the assertion that in these writings the 'division of labour' becomes 'an almost obsessive theme' and that it is 'made out to be synonymous with slavery'.[19] Ever since Mandeville introduced the term in *The Fable of the Bees*, economists and social philosophers have pointed out the advantages and disadvantages of the division of labour. They spoke highly of it for the same economic reasons as those given by Adam Smith in the celebrated passage of *The Wealth of Nations*, and they condemned it for its psychological and social effects very much in the way Marx did. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Marx may have been made aware of the social effects of the division of labour by the study of Adam Ferguson's *History of Civil Society* (1767), and Thomas Hodgskin's *Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital* (1825), which he read and quoted in *The Poverty of Philosophy* and *Capital*. He may have benefited from *The Wealth of Nations*, which contains a condemnation of the division of labour in terms as strong as his own, and even from Proudhon's *Philosophie de la Misère*. Marx could tear to pieces Proudhon's theories but did not question his facts. He would have been delighted by Alexis de Tocqueville's strong words about the 'new axiom of the science of manufactures' which improves the workman and degrades the man, making him weak, narrow-minded, and dependent. After Marx, Emile Durkheim, the most thorough, learned, and systematic supporter of the principle under discussion, concedes in *The Division of Labour in Society* that in certain exceptional and abnormal circumstances, characterised by anomie or by an excessive use of external coercion, the division of labour exercises a disruptive or dissolving influence on society. And Durkheim expanded and developed the ideas of Comte whom Marx studied, even though he thought little of him. Marx's

[19] R. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Harvard, 1961), p. 189.

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views on the disadvantages of the division of labour appear to have been shared by many prominent thinkers and perceptive observers of social life both before and after him.

In the introduction to *The Division of Labour in Society* Durkheim pointed out that the development of man can be conceived in two entirely different ways. Some see the perfect man in the individual who appears to be 'interested in everything without attaching himself exclusively to anything'. This praiseworthy man of former times is a dilettante to us; since he assumes that each man is sufficient to himself and constitutes an independent world, there is 'something anti-social' about him. The other conception sees perfection in the man who has a restricted task, accomplishes his work, does his duty, and devotes himself to his specialised but also more intense life. It is not self-evident that human nature which develops superficially is superior to the one which develops profoundly. Durkheim sympathised with the latter, and not with the former, and on this account he considered the division of labour a civilising force. But apart from his preference for the organic type of perfection, he also argued convincingly that it is nonsense to believe that personality is more complete when the division of labour is less advanced. 'The progress of individual personality and that of the division of labour depend upon one and the same cause.'

It would be easy to produce a convincing argument to the effect that Marx's view of human perfection was that of a 'complete man'. But this would be only half the truth. For Marx also believed that not only does man produce society, but also society produces *man* as *man*, and social progress depends upon the progress of division of labour.[20]

Man is transformed from a pure creature of nature into a social being because he must work. Labour is the eternal natural condition of human existence, common to every stage of production. But production of the means of subsistence is always a collective, social activity. Men produce 'only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities'. The individual's capacities increase through the division of labour and the ensuing structural differentiation of society. The spiritual life of man, his social and cultural advance, grow out of his involvement in social life and result from the evolutionary laws of human society. Only in community with others can the individual extend the range of his mental and social activities and freely develop his personality.

After *The German Ideology* Marx never mentioned the possibility of abolishing the division of labour and the deliverance of the individual from its constraints. The relevant parts of *Capital*[21] show that he became aware of the extreme complexity of the phenomena arising from the division and organisation of social action. He tried to distinguish different types of the division of labour, using either technically or

[20] *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 103.
[21] Vol. 1, Ch. XIV and XV.

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socially significant criteria of classification. The extensive collection of historical data and the rich harvest of analytical distinctions accumulated in *Capital*, which Max Weber may have used in his own work on this subject in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, are incompatible with the naïve idea of Marx's youthful period to the effect that one can do without the division of labour altogether. In fact, no trace of it can be found in Marx's mature works. Contrary to what Engels said in an enthusiastic mood, man never leaves the kingdom of necessity behind. Given a 'rational division of labour', enough can be produced for all members of society, for abundant reserves, and for providing everybody with the opportunities of a civilised and fully human life. But without work social life would quickly disintegrate and man would return to the state of barbarism, where life was 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'. There is no escape from the necessity of work and from the estrangement inherent in every system of production.

> Just as the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his wants . . . so must civilised man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production . . . Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control . . . But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity . . . The realm of freedom can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. [22]

Marx cherished fewer illusions about life under socialism than some of his followers.

THE merits of *Marxism and the Individual* should not be sought in its theoretical content, but in its statements of fact, political implications, and ideological critique. Its reception in Poland seems to support this assessment. It is praised or condemned as a political tract and not as a sociological 'treatise on alienation'. As one reviewer emphasised, the controversy to which the book has given rise concerns the relationship between the humanistic values accepted by Marxism, and life. [23] It is praised for its courageous confrontation of socialist ideals with reality, for common sense and frankness in evaluating present conditions, and for its sober mood in the attempt to anticipate the future. Friendly reviewers agree that for these reasons the appearance of the book is a significant political and social event. Unfriendly reviewers, and they seem to be in the majority, are not concerned with this aspect of the book. They concentrate on the political irresponsibility and lack of wisdom of the author, who raised problems and made public facts likely to provide the 'enemy' with weapons against 'socialism'.

[22] *Capital*, Vol. III (Moscow, 1959), p. 799.

[23] B. Baczko, *Nowe Ksiazki*, 1965, No. 18. Similar views, openly approving and supporting Schaff, were published in the weekly *Polityka* and some quarterlies such as *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo* and *Studia Filozoficzne*, which, however, have a small circulation and are limited to a selected audience.

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The leadership of the party was shocked and angered. Its spokesmen took Schaff sharply to task in a number of polemical reviews in *Kultura* (Warsaw) and *Zycie Literackie* (Cracow). Fifteen speakers took part in the discussion of Schaff's book at a conference organised by the party last October and published in the December issue of the theoretical party monthly, *Nowe Drogi*. Five of these speakers defended Schaff and ten condemned him. It was clear beyond doubt that the attacking group, which included Zenon Kliszko, Gomulka's trusted friend and right-hand man, represented the authoritative opinion of the party, an opinion expressed in no uncertain terms. While some problems of substance, for instance Schaff's use of the term 'alienation' or the affinity of his views with existentialist philosophy, were raised, and some good points against them scored, the main objection was his 'long list of exaggerated and often groundless complaints against socialism'.

This line of attack can be best illustrated by summarising the main objections contained in Kliszko's contribution to the discussion. Schaff's 'rash, flippant, and unfounded' criticism, Kliszko announced, harmed the party and helped the imperialists who 'profit by every mistake we make'. Although his assumptions were intended to improve and carry forward 'social theory', they departed from the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism, and his over-simplified and wrong conclusions distorted reality. He made mistakes which would be charged to the party's account and in that he showed a deficient sense of responsibility, and a failure to keep in close political touch with the party. Concluding his speech, Kliszko said that

> Comrade Schaff has written rashly, superficially, and lightly about important theoretical and political matters. I think that Comrade Schaff, whose scholarly achievements, ability, and profound knowledge I greatly appreciate, would have avoided mistakes, simplifications, and errors in his last book had he in his discussion of purely political problems borne in mind the theoretical and practical achievements of our party. Our party's point of view is surely more important than what various, often anti-communist, western 'Marxologists' have to say about Marxism and socialism.[24]

The whole discussion must have been a painful and degrading experience for Schaff who, however, defended himself stubbornly and withdrew nothing.[25] As compared with the treatment meted out by the SED to Professor Robert Havemann, who lost his chair, his research institute, his membership in the Academy of Sciences, and his membership of the party, Schaff came off quite well. He may have suffered some injury to his pride, some disappointment in his heart, and was probably left with some more doubts about the party's wisdom. But should his customary luck fail him this time and should he be irretrievably defeated, he may still, if he wishes, win a victory entirely different from the success he used to strive for in the past.

[24] *Nowe Drogi*, December 1965, p. 185.
[25] He returned to the defence of his position in *Studia Filozoficzne*, 1966, No. 2.

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JUDGMENT ON PASTERNAK

The All-Moscow Meeting of Writers 31 October 1958

Stenographic Report

This account of a meeting of Moscow writers has appeared in a number of foreign periodicals, and appears here for the first time in English.

In the chair: S. S. Smirnov.

S. S. Smirnov: Comrades, I declare open the general meeting of Moscow writers which is called upon to discuss the resolution concerning the conduct of B. Pasternak passed at a joint session of the Presidium of the Board of the USSR Union of Writers, the Bureau of the RSFSR Union of Writers Organisational Committee, and the Presidium of the Moscow Branch of the RSFSR Union of Writers.

If there is no objection, it is proposed that the Presidium of today's meeting should be composed of members of the Presidium of the Board of the Moscow Branch of the Bureau of the Organisational Committee, and the Secretariat of the USSR Union of Writers. Is there any objection? (Carried.) Then I would ask the members of the Presidium to take their places.

I would like to touch briefly on the history of this question. The position is that a group of Moscow writers have drafted a letter for publication in a newspaper to express their shock at the conduct of B. Pasternak. This letter was then signed by a large number of Moscow writers. I shall read the names appended to the letter. (Reads the list.)

As you see, it contains not only Moscow writers but also writers who were in Moscow at the time. This letter was to be published in the press but we wondered why we should publish such a letter signed only by a group of Moscow writers when the Moscow organisation as a whole would surely like to express its opinion on what has gone on in our midst. It was therefore decided to call this meeting so that the voice of the whole assembly of Moscow writers could be heard. We, the Moscow organisation, can not pass over in silence the grave act of treachery which has taken place among us.

And now a few words on the substance of the matter. We all know B. Pasternak—some personally, others by report. It would be wrong of me to say that B. Pasternak is still the same poet that our Soviet people knew until now. No poet is more remote from the people than B. Pasternak; no poet plays the aesthete more than he does; no poet's work is so redolent of pure and unadulterated pre-revolutionary decadence. The whole of B. Pasternak's poetic work has lain outside the true traditions of Russian poetry which has always eagerly responded to every development in the life of our people.

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It has been the poet's fortune to have only a narrow circle of readers and to have about him only a small group of friends and admirers in our literature. That narrow circle of Pasternak's friends and admirers has been gradually building up a kind of halo for him and the myth about Pasternak has gained very wide currency in our country. It is the myth of an entirely apolitical poet, a child in politics, who understands nothing and is locked away in his castle of 'pure art' where he turns out his talented works. It has been said that we have here a man profoundly apolitical but completely loyal to the Soviet regime, who has even tried to show in his work something of his people's struggle, though such efforts have been a minute fraction of his work. Finally, people have said that he is a thoroughly decent man, an old-style intellectual with that exceptional decency peculiar to his kind.

From this coterie, this narrow circle surrounding Pasternak, we have heard 'oohs' and 'ahs' about his talent and his greatness in literature. Let us not hide the fact that there have been people among Pasternak's friends who have stated at meetings that when Pasternak's name is spoken, people should stand.

This myth received currency not only among the circle of Pasternak's friends. The myth has now been exposed and laid to rest by Pasternak's work and behaviour. I refer of course to the affair of the novel *Dr Zhivago*. This novel, on which Pasternak worked for so many years and which, as he himself states, is the main work of his life, was sent in manuscript to the editors of *Novy Mir*. I believe that the comrades who looked at the manuscript were astounded. This was no doubt because the apolitical Pasternak, this political infant, had created a pointedly political work with a central political motif. They were not surprised by the artistic side of the work, which was a piece of very mediocre prose; it was not at all significant artistically but the whole concept and philosophical framework of the thing deeply shocked our comrades from *Novy Mir* who had looked on Pasternak as a colleague of theirs, a Soviet writer and a Soviet citizen.

The book's philosophy and the characters' whole pattern of behaviour bear no relation to our Soviet way of thinking. I shall not paraphrase the letter from the *Novy Mir* editors, published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, which dealt with the shortcomings in the novel's whole construction and philosophy in what I can only call a very tame and extremely polite, even protective manner. I would like to add something on my own account. I have read the novel *Dr. Zhivago*, from cover to cover, and I would like to pass on to you my own emotional reaction to it.

The reader has little difficulty in discovering who is the author's favourite character and which are the characters through whom he expresses his inmost thoughts. It is especially difficult to deceive experienced readers like us. We instantly detect the characters that are acting as spokesmen for the author. I can state confidently that Pasternak has concentrated his own personal philosophy in the image of Doctor Zhivago. I would venture to suggest that Doctor Zhivago can be considered as synonymous with Pasternak. Zhivago's whole philosophy, his treatment and the way in which Pasternak lives and behaves in our country and in literature show this to be so.

How then did I interpret the novel and what is its philosophy?

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Many of you sitting here saw and took part in the Great October Socialist Revolution, the civil war, and the subsequent construction that has taken place in our country. There are people sitting here of my generation, comrades of mine from the Fatherland War, soldiers of the Fatherland War. We are all part of the forty-year history of our State, a sublime history of which we are justly proud, a history which back in 1917 had limited horizons; one might say that the basic cell of our future society was at that time encompassed within the walls of the Smolny. But we have seen how in forty years those horizons, those walls, have widened to east and to west. And we know that the whole of this history would have been impossible but for the Great October Revolution. You will understand the feeling of outrage and real anger I experienced when I finished reading that book and put it down! For in this book the author's favourite characters refer to the revolution, the civil war, and all the great events of their time as some of the world's petty upsets and try to prove that Marxism, with its ideas that guide our lives, is no science, and they contemptuously refer to collectivism—the fundamental principle of our life—as the herd instinct. In the author's view this herd instinct makes men mediocre and degrades them.

We have often heard our enemies refer to this philosophy and the bitterest of them keep on at us with this jibe of 'herd instinct'.

We are here dealing with a novel in which the whole array of characters is purposely chosen to show that everything even remotely fine or intellectually enlightened perishes and is crushed and trampled by the forces of the revolution, leaving behind only stupid, mean, grasping and brutal people. It is in order to show this that the characters in the novel are presented in the way that they are. The novel portrays the whole of our people's struggle in the years of the revolution and the civil war, waged in the name of the enlightened ideas of the October Revolution, as a series of brutalities, executions, and intrigues among the leaders. A series of unjust acts—that is what the whole thing is made out to be. Not only as a Soviet man but as a Russian I found it outrageous that Pasternak failed to portray in his novel a single admirable character from the Russian people. All his characters are frightful and cruel and the reader is left with a feeling of outraged national dignity.

Also as an intellectual and a man I found it outrageous that the novel's whole philosophy, behind its Christ-loving humanitarian mask, is utterly anti-humanitarian. According to Zhivago who, I repeat, I am deeply convinced propounds ideas that are to a very large extent if not entirely those of Pasternak, everything in the lives and historical destiny of our people is negligible as compared with the intellect of one single talented man. This intellect alone can create things of value; he alone gazes down on all this strife, not participating in it but withdrawing from it. Only he is capable of judging from his intellectual heights everything that occurs.

You will no doubt remember the passage that was quoted in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* where Zhivago says of his friends that they all had something precious if only because they had lived at the same time as himself and because they had known him.

And lastly, the novel insulted me as a soldier of the Fatherland War, as a man who wept over the graves of fallen comrades, a man whose

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present task it is to write about war heroes, the heroes of the Brest Fortress and other remarkable war heroes who demonstrated with such wonderful force the heroism of our people.

I found it outrageous that not only the novel's main characters but also the lesser ones openly and shamelessly preach the traitor's philosophy. The novel presents for all to see the idea that treachery is perfectly natural and that the talented lone-wolf intellectual may desert and join any camp. Probably all of us who were in the war and have lived through the whole Soviet period were scandalised by the scene where Dr Zhivago is with the partisans in circumstances which oblige him to open fire on the approaching Whites with whom his sympathies lie. It is a horrible scene and an offensive one.

But the novel's philosophy of treachery does not end with this one scene. For example, one of the main heroines in the novel says straight out that when the Whites came, the commander of the White forces took care of her. She adds that only ordinary people could be in the same camp as the Reds, only ordinary people can be on one side of the barricades, can commit themselves definitely to something.

It is therefore, comrades, my profound conviction that the novel *Doctor Zhivago* is an apologia for treachery.

I recall what was said about this in the Presidium. One comrade compared Doctor Zhivago with Klim Samgin. The comparison with Gorky sounds blasphemous. But if one is to make such a comparison, then it should be said that Gorky exposes Klim Samgin and exposes treachery, whilst in this case the traitor is elevated to the rank of hero and treachery is glorified and presented as human courage.

Naturally, since the novel is a betrayal of all our people and of everything fine that we have stood for during the past forty years, throughout which time Pasternak has lived in our country, it follows that the whole of Pasternak's behaviour during this period has been a series of betrayals.

Our comrades from the *Novy Mir* office, in their alarm over the novel, did not understand but wanted to think that Pasternak had just fallen prey to a monstrous delusion, that this was a sort of aberration, and so they spoke about the abyss which the novel opened up. At length, they sent him the letter which you read in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. And so, comrades, instead of paying heed to these insistent, serious, well-intentioned, and (as I came to realise after reading the novel) over-solicitous warnings, as I say, instead of that, Boris Pasternak sold his manuscript abroad. That action alone is enough to put Boris Pasternak outside our ranks, outside the ranks of Soviet writers. He sent the manuscript to the Italian publisher Feltrinelli, who is a renegade and a deserter from the progressive camp, and you know that there is no worse enemy than the renegade and that the renegade nurses an especially strong hatred for the thing that he has betrayed.

Perhaps you criticise us, the leaders of the Moscow section, and charge us to state why Pasternak was not expelled from our ranks immediately after he had sent the manuscript abroad and committed this anti-patriotic act which is unworthy of the honour and conscience of a Soviet writer. You would be right to ask, since we counted on a Soviet writer's honour and conscience, attributes which Pasternak should have

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possessed, and our hopes came to nothing. At the same time we cannot fail to see that this was perhaps indicative of our excessive protectiveness towards an erring comrade. We, too, have in some measure entertained the myth of Pasternak's decency, in the belief that he would have second thoughts, that he would eventually see everything he had written in the same light in which it appeared to the reader, that this would horrify him and he would draw the right conclusions, retract his manuscript and shelve his novel. Up to the last moment we thought that Pasternak would come to his senses. He was given too long and too much opportunity for second thoughts.

All this while, B. Pasternak was playing a dirty game devised by our enemies. He was waiting for the novel to be published overseas. At length it was published over there. You know what a godsend this was for foreign reactionaries, for our enemies. A frantic hullaballoo was kicked up about the novel. People began to hail Pasternak as a highly talented writer and poet although until this time his verse was virtually unknown. However, even bourgeois critics have now begun to speak of the novel's unmistakeable artistic weakness. Bourgeois critics have openly said that the novel is not a significant event in Russian prose writing and has many artistic weaknesses, and they have firmly stated that the whole great rumpus kicked up about the novel has a political basis because our enemies were at the time drawing their own conclusions. At first there was no mention of a Nobel Prize, at least not until some pressure had been exerted from abroad; only then was a Nobel Prize for Pasternak on the cards.

Pasternak, being made the way he is, was absolutely incapable of understanding the position in which he had landed. But the myth of Pasternak the poet remained among us and so we showed patience, thinking that at the last moment Pasternak would discover in himself some vestige of honour and conscience, as befits a writer and a Soviet citizen, which would make him behave correctly.

I would like to say a few words about the courage shown throughout this affair by the head of our writers organisation, its Chairman K. A. Fedin. He has the deep admiration of all of us sitting here in this hall, and he has done everything possible to save Pasternak and to explain to him the full danger of his position. When Pasternak was awarded the prize, K. A. Fedin went to him and had an amicable chat with him and said to him in a friendly spirit, ' Do you realise that this is not a question of literature, it is pure politics. You have become a pawn in the game that political intriguers are playing. You are now standing on the brink and if you overstep it you will sunder your connections with Russian literature and the Russian people.'

It was a long conversation. Pasternak began by arguing but finally said that he would think about it and talk it over, and if he thought of anything he would come and see him. He has not been to see Fedin. He was awarded the prize and later, as we learned from foreign sources, he sent the following telegram to the Nobel Committee: (To the Swedish Academy)

' Eternally grateful. Moved. Surprised. Staggered.
Pasternak.'

(Murmuring in the audience. Commotion. Someone shouts ' Shame! ')

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At the same time, Pasternak received Western correspondents and said that he was happy and that he would like to go to Stockholm to receive the prize.

By this act, this man who had always been an internal emigré once and for all revealed himself as an enemy of our people and literature. This action set the final seal on Pasternak's political and moral downfall. This action brought his traitorous activities to their sudden culmination.

One can not fail to note that, as distinct from other Nobel Prizes, the literature prizes are increasingly being awarded on political considerations which have nothing to do with literature. I would remind you that they contrived to pass over Tolstoy, Gorky, Mayakovsky and Sholokhov but took notice of Bunin. That was only after he had already become an emigré and for the simple reason that he had become an emigré and an enemy of the Soviet people.

A literature Prize has also been awarded to that enemy of the Soviet people, W. Churchill. A Nobel Prize went to the fascist-inclined French writer Camus, who is very little known in France and who is morally the kind of person that no decent writer would ever sit by. This Camus has sent a friendly telegram to B. Pasternak. Naturally, the people have assessed this fact at its proper value, for it has shown that all our hopes that Pasternak might have a shred of decency or conscience left were vain.

Naturally, the whole of the Soviet literary public has reacted to Pasternak's activities, for he grovelled in accepting a prize that was offered to him as a political enemy of our State. Articles have been published and numerous letters have come in from a Soviet public disturbed by Pasternak's behaviour. Students visited us on Saturday at the Writers Union and stuck posters on the gates.

Pasternak's actions have been discussed at a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Board of the Writers Union, the Organisational Committee, and the Moscow Branch.

With great unanimity, writers from various towns and republics have expressed their anger at Pasternak's behaviour.

Pasternak did not attend that joint meeting. He was invited to the meeting and a copy of the agenda was sent to him but he did not come; he sent instead a letter addressed to the meeting which I shall read out. (Reads the letter. Murmuring in the audience.)

Well, comrades, I think it is clear to us all that this letter shows that Boris Pasternak has understood nothing and has learned nothing. I would just like to comment on one or two points in the letter, comrades, since it was read out to you rather quickly.

It is perhaps a matter for Pasternak's conscience that he did not feel well and was therefore unable to come, though the state of his health easily allowed him to entertain foreign press correspondents and even benefited from the process!

He considers that it is possible to be a Soviet man and to write books like *Doctor Zhivago*! In defining this he wants to adopt a purely territorial criterion, but I think it is perfectly clear, comrades, that we do not call a writer Soviet on territorial grounds alone. You are

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aware that enemies sent from other States sometimes disguise themselves as Soviet citizens!

He writes, ' I do not expect truth to conquer and justice to be upheld '. Involuntarily I think of what he has written about the herd instinct, for of course he considers all of us the herd, incapable of rising to the level of his intellect.

As far as his expectations are concerned (and I shall not now go into the true state of affairs), he said that he was expecting a censored edition to be published which would serve as the basis for a foreign translation. But this was just a trick, comrades! He understood full well that the renegade Feltrinelli would never publish such a version but would take particular pleasure in publishing the anti-Soviet passages—a simple action that would enable people abroad to say that Pasternak had been forced to cut out those very passages! This was of course a deliberate provocation. And when he asked, as though butter would not melt in his mouth, why it had not been possible to omit the few unacceptable parts and publish the novel three years ago, well, of course, as you know, comrades, that was impossible because it would have taken a very great deal of work and a lot of time in view of the nature of the novel's construction. Let the matter of his self-conceit remain on his conscience. His telegram merely confirms the old Russian proverb that pride apes humility.

I should like to dwell for a while on page seven of his letter where he says that he might transfer the Nobel Prize money to the Committee for the Defence of Peace. I think, comrades, that you will all have noticed the terrible bargaining tone here. He tries to use money to bargain his way out of the nasty situation which threatens him. He does not see that only a traitor can put a cash price on treachery, whereas for decent people treachery can only be priced in terms of moral values. This man, who refused to sign the Stockholm Appeal (you should just ask Andronnikov how many hours he spent trying to persuade Pasternak to sign the Appeal), now proposes to transfer to the Committee for the Defence of Peace money earned by treachery. What cynicism! What an insult!

He then tries to hint that as we have already rehabilitated some people we should rehabilitate him too! I think no reply is needed here, that the precedent is completely invalid and that no one would countenance the kind of precedent that Pasternak puts forward!

In short, comrades, this letter has shown us yet again what sort of man Pasternak is and has helped us once and for all to see him for what he is.

The decision of the Presidium of the joint session was unanimous and, as you are aware, Pasternak has been deprived of the name of Soviet writer and expelled from the Writers Union.

I know the opinion of my many friends in the Moscow section, and have heard many heated conversations among people who have been deeply shocked by what Pasternak has done, so I feel that [this meeting] will probably reach a unanimous decision.

I think that while we are condemning this behaviour, this disgraceful action, there is another matter that should be mentioned. I believe that this grave lesson teaches us a great deal. First, it blows sky high any

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talk there might have been about the possibility of apolitical literature. At a time like the present, when the fates of the peoples of the world are being settled, when enormous political events are taking place, when the life of mankind is being weighed in the balance and people are faced with choosing the correct course to pursue, there can be no place for literature which is insulated from politics and there can be no talk of pure art. There are only two sides to the fence, as P. Nilin correctly remarked at our meeting. There can not be a third. And any attempt to sit between two stools inevitably entails the risk of siding with the enemy. The prefix 'a' in apolitical often changes into the prefix 'anti'.

Some of Pasternak's friends who to a greater or lesser extent defend the tenets of pure art should think about this.

Second, we should ourselves say straight out that we too have enabled people to pay homage to Pasternak and make an idol of him, and have allowed a situation to exist where at the mention of Pasternak's name people should stand. Just see where this has led! We must get clear in our minds just how harmful this sort of utterly unrestrained adulation is. These people who have paid homage to Pasternak have to an increasing extent turned his head. (*Voice from the audience*: 'Who has done homage? Why hide names here?')

We have mentioned this not so as to settle scores, nor to punish these people. We must draw important conclusions of principle here. What we need now is a frank and open talk, and people who have done homage should show courage and a sense of honour by coming up to this platform and stating that this will be a serious lesson to them. We must speak frankly in order to clear up this matter.

We must talk about this also because this lesson should bring us closer together. This evil in our ranks should show us how meaningless is the petty group strife that persists among us, this strife between the petty ambitions of literary vanity which does much to spoil the atmosphere as we face the important tasks confronting our literature. So this too is something we must discuss today.

I am not very concerned here about the fate of Pasternak himself in this business. On finishing the book, I could only agree with what comrade Semichastny said at the Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee. Perhaps he used rather crude words in speaking of swinish behaviour, but in substance what he said is correct. For forty years a man who was a secret enemy of ours, with hatred and malice in his heart, has been living and taking his daily bread among us. Just like Doctor Zhivago, he was afraid to desert openly to the enemy's side.

I particularly liked the second part of comrade Semichastny's speech at the Plenum, where he said that the internal emigré should be made a proper emigré. My view is, let him in actual fact go and stay in the anti-Soviet camp, and let him continue to receive prizes. We have had enough deserters, enough wind-bags braying at us, but as a certain eastern saying has it—The dog barks but the caravan goes on its way.

I recall how the Norwegian people punished the writer Knut Hamsun who deserted to the Germans during the German occupation, and how they hurled his books over the fence at his house! The people showed him that they did not want to touch his books. I feel that B. Pasternak deserves a similar public punishment and we should, I think, appeal to

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the Government to deprive him of Soviet citizenship! (Applause.) And we should throw open for him the gates that lead into the camp to which he long ago deserted! I should like to mention a certain rumour going about at the moment in literary circles here and in the foreign press. There are growing rumours that B. Pasternak has turned down the Nobel Prize. I must say that this statement does not originate from any Soviet source and officially we know nothing about it. I should add that the foreign press has not printed but only commented on a certain telegram allegedly sent by Pasternak to the Swedish Academy. Commentators write that this telegram was worded as follows: 'In connection with the reaction of Soviet society, I am forced to reject the honour offered to me. . . .'

Judge for yourselves! This is an even dirtier provocation that carries treachery still further. I think that no further comment is called for. You will see that each step along this path is a fresh act of betrayal by Pasternak, yet another vile act.

That ends what I wish to say in my report. Shall we proceed to the discussion of this question? I call on L. Oshanin to speak first.

L. Oshanin: Comrades! We must understand what has happened soberly and calmly. In the extremely bitter cold war now being universally waged against us this is a long-premeditated and subtly calculated *coup.*

Pasternak has been kept under continual surveillance by our foreign neighbours and has always been surrounded by vast numbers of foreigners. Whatever Pasternak has done and thought has been very well known overseas.

When we heard of this business, could we then have said that it was something unique, accidental, and uncharacteristic of his whole past way of life and that it was not like him?

Each of us probably has his own view; each of us has had conversations with Pasternak. I should like to tell you about one small incident which quite shook me. It was in 1945 when the medals 'For Valorous Labour in the Fatherland War' were first presented in the Writers Union. You all remember the atmosphere in the country at the time, an atmosphere of unusual unity; and you remember that festive feeling we experienced when the Victory Salute at last rang out.

Meeting Pasternak at that time in the club, I said to him 'Tomorrow they're presenting the medals, Boris Leonidovich, and I see your name is on the list, so you will need to be here in the club'. To this he replied, 'Maybe I'll send my son'.

What a slight this was not only to a Government award but to that feeling of great joy and that spirit of unity that filled the people!

I cannot forget how we sat here in the club waiting for Andronnikov who had gone to Peredelkino to add his signature to the Stockholm Appeal. We remember how he repeatedly urged Pasternak to sign too and we also remember his reaction to events in Hungary.

In a report which I made to the Moscow Plenum on poetry I remember that I made a detailed study of Pasternak's latest verse. I centred the report on an analysis of two poems—one by Tvardovsky, the other by Pasternak—on their attitude to art. Comrades who attended

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the plenum will remember that discussion. His poem left nothing unsaid; it showed his contempt for the people, his belief in himself as a superman. His feelings were those of an alien and I said so in my report at the time. In that report I said that we were dealing with an internal emigré and I was later asked why I had expressed myself so harshly. We have known for a long time that we have living side by side with us a man whom it is difficult to call truthfully a Soviet man. But because of his talent and the extraordinary way it was exaggerated, and because he has been placed on some unheard-of pedestal, we took trouble over him for an unpardonably long time.

When we were examining this question in the Presidium, we noted how people had been extraordinarily protective—excessively so, as it would now appear—in their desire to save this man and trust him.

You will remember that while working on various pieces of writing, Pasternak would suddenly produce several stanzas about Lenin, and good ones too. (*Voice from the audience:* 'And you would immediately relent. . .')

It seemed at the time that in writing in this way he was the one who was relenting, comrade. . . . He sometimes did produce poems that were Soviet in content. That was how he lived all the time, concealing with great cunning what he was really thinking, and this led to our always taking trouble with him. In so doing we were seriously at fault.

Now that we are talking about how to proceed in future, I think that Sergei Sergeyevich is right when he says that this should be a good lesson to us, that this should lead to the end that we are continually seeking, namely the great feeling of team spirit. But the petty ambition mentioned by S. Smirnov gets in the way of this and prevents us from solving our very great problems.

I would appeal to you all to work hard and harmoniously because the world is now looking to us as never before, and what we say now on this platform and write at our desks is of immediate and enormous significance in the struggle going on in the world. We have all wondered and there is no need to dodge the issue, what our comrades and friends overseas might say. We should think of them but we should not be timid; we must not be caught napping like we were over Pasternak. We must uphold our view of the truth, for this is our only possible course when such a thoroughly extraordinary insult is hurled at our people.

Pasternak really stands out as a glaring example of a cosmopolitan in our midst. We have said a great deal about this. He is a genuine and perfect example of the cosmopolitan. You, Sergei Sergeyevich, compared Samgin with Zhivago, but Gorky exposed Samgin whilst in this instance Samgin plays the part of the author of the novel. One could argue the truth of this, but Samginism of the kind that Gorky exposed is present in this case.

It seems to me that Pasternak, who has lived his whole life in effect as an internal emigré, has managed not to realise where he is living at a time when more and more of the world's best people are turning their interests, their hearts, and their gaze towards us; he has been able to write that letter he sent to us, in which every line proclaims him a veritable Jesuit and in which he says he forgives us: 'I know that you are constrained by pressure of circumstances to do this thing but I

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forgive you' (that is to say—you people are weak but I am strong). We, however, are only too familiar with other aspects of Pasternak. We know what he said about Mandelshtam. This man does not want to live with our people; he does not wish to work for communism; he does not understand that this is the only thing in the world capable of saving mankind from the course towards which imperialism is urging it; he has found time during recent years to go God-seeking; he is still holding the knife which he plunged into our back. So we have no need of such a man, no need of such a member in the Union of Soviet Writers, no need of such a citizen in the Soviet Union!

N. V. Chertova: The following have been proposed as members of the commission for drafting the meeting's resolution :

N. V. Lesyuchevsky, N. V. Chertova, M. S. Gus, K. L. Zelinsky, S. P. Letonov.

S. S. Smirnov: Is there any objection to these nominees?
Voices: None.
S. S. Smirnov: We do not need to vote, then?
Voices: No. No need.
S. S. Smirnov: The Commission is adopted as proposed. I now call on K. L. Zelinsky.

K. L. Zelinsky: Last year I had occasion to go through the novel *Doctor Zhivago* in detail, with a fine-tooth comb, as they say. I established no *rapport* with the author. It was impossible to do so. I was left with a feeling of great heaviness after reading it. I felt as though I had been literally spat upon. The whole of my life seemed to be defiled in the novel. Everything that I had put my energy into for 40 years, my creative energy and aspirations, my hopes, had all been defiled.

It is true that there can be no question here of any isolated corrections the author might make to the novel. For a man of my generation who still remembers Pasternak somewhere among Mayakovsky's followers, it has not been so easy to realise that he is an internal emigré, an enemy utterly hostile in ideology and on the personal level, an alien in every sense of the word.

Artistically, the novel is a prime example of decadent literature with its fragmentary form, digressions of all sorts, its long-windedness, superfluous dialogues, and its vast number of quotations from the scriptures and psalms (it quite puzzled me how he had made himself so erudite in the narrow field of clerical literature). The novel is chock full of banal, commonplace, philistine anecdotes on the pattern, Marxism is the science most remote from life, and such like. I have no wish to spell out all the evil-smelling nastiness which leaves such a bad taste. It was very strange for me to see Pasternak, the poet and artist, sink to such a level. But what we have subsequently learned has revealed in full the underlying truth, that terrible traitorous philosophy and that pervasive taint of treachery which Smirnov rightly mentioned earlier.

You ought to know, comrades, that Pasternak's name in the West, where I have just been, is now synonymous with war. Pasternak is a standard-bearer of the cold war. It is not mere chance that the most

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reactionary, monarchistic, rabid circles have battened upon his name. Newspapers are carrying pictures of Pasternak and of that other traitor Chiang Kai-shek on their front pages. I have brought with me from Rome a copy of *The Daily American*, an English-language newspaper which is published there. You see here on its front page a picture of Pasternak and comment on his being awarded the prize. It says here that the award of the Nobel Prize for the novel *Doctor Zhivago* is a literary atomic bomb aimed at the communist regime. It goes on to say that a certain critic has called the award a slap in the face for the Soviet Government. This is how our enemies have reacted to the award of the Nobel Prize to Pasternak. I repeat that Pasternak's name spells war. It heralds the cold war.

I want to expose and dispel the myth about Pasternak that whereas we in our Soviet country have failed to appreciate this great artist, the best intellectual circles in the West hold him in very high esteem. This is utterly untrue.

I was a member of the Soviet delegation which took part in the International Writers Congress in Naples. About four hundred delegates from various countries attended. The flags of twenty-two States fluttered over the building where the congress took place. There were Dutchmen, West Germans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Belgians, and representatives of a great variety of other countries present. The congress took as its theme the search for solidarity and friendship and the means of establishing unity. It is an interesting fact that the congress mentioned the names not only of outstanding Russian classics like Tolstoy, Gorky and Dostoyevsky but those of Mayakovsky and other writers throughout the world. All sorts of writers were present, some of them not at all well-disposed towards us (for example, the well-known writer and academic André Chamson was there), but not a single person at the congress mentioned the name of Pasternak.

Why, you might ask? Because it would have been tactless, as everyone knew that to do so was tantamount to making a rude noise in public; people who are seeking to establish contact with each other could not bring themselves to speak that name.

This is very telling. It shows how serious is the change of attitude in the world today.

I might also have mentioned our celebrated Tashkent congress, where again Pasternak's name simply did not come up.

It is a myth to say that we underestimate Pasternak whilst some people in the West—the best connoisseurs, refined aesthetes, and literary experts—hold him in high regard. I can quote you further examples to show that Pasternak's name stands for war and that all honest, decent people here and overseas understand this. So do those who do not wish to fan the cold war into flame, those who do not side with the warmongers. They try by every means within their power to make this plain.

On Saturday, October 25th, in Rome, the Italy-USSR Society put on a reception for our delegation so that we could meet the Roman intelligentsia. Comrade Shcheglovsky spoke and gave a most graphic account of our contacts and the international links between Soviet writers and foreign men of letters. He demonstrated convincingly how widely we acquaint our public with Italian literature. It was then that a certain

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critic called Paolo Milano (who specialises in busily spreading the word about Pasternak and his work) stood up in the hall and put the following question : 'Would all the members of the delegation (there were four of us) state their attitude towards Pasternak?' He hoped that we in the delegation, having received no instructions from 'Red' Moscow, might go somewhat off the rails. He also asked other provocative questions.

But we unanimously said 'No', and the audience, which then applauded us, also said 'No'.

Milano failed to drive a wedge between us and the intelligentsia of Rome. People congratulated us and shook our hands. A Russian priest who was present at the meeting approached me. Why? For what purpose? Because I had said that Pasternak allegedly embodies the ideas of Christian humanism, whereas in our country the church is not in opposition to the government. This shows that Pasternak is all on his own, a most miserable, reactionary renegade. It is American news-rags that support him. The man's impossible anachronism smells so strongly of moth-balls that he has been utterly rejected by the mass of intellectuals not only in our country but in the West too.

Our delegation was subjected to attacks by bourgeois newspapers in connection with this prize that has come like an atomic bomb. In face of this, writers, and not only progressive ones, have sent us expressions of their sympathy.

C. . . . , the man who organised the reception for our delegation, came round to our hotel and said emphatically, 'We are with you, friends, so don't think that we belong to the other camp'.

There is a certain Italian writer, whose name I shall not mention as I do not wish to make trouble for him, but he is the well-known Italian scholar and writer who has translated Pasternak's books into Italian. He said that during the days following the award of the Nobel Prize bourgeois journalists turned his flat into a besieged fortress. A sensational anti-Soviet scandal had been whipped up. But this man, who is not a communist, locked up his flat and came to us and said, 'I want nothing to do with it. Pasternak stands for war. I want no part of it.'

So we have had to realise that the Pasternak who seemed to us a man in an ivory tower, an aesthete, an unworldly creature, has turned out to be one of the most rabid, vicious champions of political strife. There is a very serious theoretical lesson here and we must learn to distinguish between the appearance and the reality of art.

I should like in conclusion to touch on the matter raised earlier by comrade Smirnov, namely Pasternak's following, and also on certain of us who are in some measure to blame that people have created special conditions for him, made a cult of his personality, worshipped him and sung his praises.

Like comrade Smirnov, I feel that those responsible for this should recognise the fact and admit it. For the lesson here is only too serious. I believe that we should even give some thought to the nature of our educational work, for that occasional human concern and friendliness we show runs away with our principles and tends to change into the kind of liberalism that leads us to support an enemy.

I remember that when I had read Pasternak's telegram, I myself believed that he would re-write the novel.

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It is not very easy for members of our older generation to realise that the man standing beside them is their enemy, a very dangerous and subtle one at that, who might shield himself behind the fact that he possesses aesthetic gifts and stab them in the back. He is the kind of man who carries a knife up his sleeve.

I must tell you of one instance of the way in which Pasternak's followers stooped to terrorising everyone who set out to criticise him.

I had published an article called 'The Poetry and Feelings of Today', and I was in the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences where I met V. B. Ivanov, the deputy editor of the journal *Questions of Philology*. He pointedly failed to shake hands with me because I had criticised a poem by Pasternak. He was thus giving me a political object-lesson. I hope he will come to hear of these words and will find the courage to publish a statement on his attitude to Pasternak.

Yes indeed, we need to have a heart-to-heart discussion and we must all realise the lengths to which we can be driven by our sympathy for aesthetic gifts if that sympathy and support involve sacrificing our Marxist approach. This pseudo-academic must be shown up.

Comrades, our country is approaching an occasion which will give us a powerful uplift. We are moving towards the twenty-first Party Congress when figures that Lenin dreamed about will be announced—figures telling how we will be catching up with the capitalist world.

People throughout the world, in every continent, in Europe, Asia, Africa, are turning their eyes toward us. And it is in such circumstances that we have to deal today with this loathsome, repulsive business that goes against the tide of events in the world and is getting us so agitated.

I completely agree that we should tell this man who has ceased to be a Soviet citizen, 'Be off with you, then, and collect your thirty pieces of silver! You are not wanted here now. We shall go on building the world to which we have dedicated our whole lives!' (Applause)

S. S. Smirnov: Dear comrades! I have no wish to rush speakers through the discussion of such a subject but I would ask comrades to bear in mind that we have a long list of people billed to speak and our meeting can not go on indefinitely. I call on Valeriya Gerasimova.

Valeriya Gerasimova: Comrades! This whole Pasternak affair happens to coincide with an occasion which is for me a most important moment in my life, namely, the fortieth anniversary of the Komsomol. So I would like to speak here from what I call my personal conviction.

You see, the *Novy Mir* editors' excellent letter (I don't know whether it appeared late or in good time) analysed Pasternak's book rather cleverly, perceptively, and in great detail. The passages on which it dilated gave one an extremely clear picture and a very good understanding of the infinite contrast between what Pasternak wrote about and what actually inspired the life of our generation, the generation that first embarked with extreme courage on the construction of our life, joined the Party and set out on the construction of our Soviet literature.

At the evening meetings held in honour of the fortieth anniversary of the Komsomol we have, in fact, been recalling the particular events which Pasternak's book distorts.

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I remember those pages in his *Doctor Zhivago* where the doctor, instead of firing at the advancing White Guards, hides and fires at a tree. Quite accidentally he hits someone—Serezha, a White Guard volunteer; but Serezha survives because the bullet hits the amulet that his mother had hung round his neck. I went back over all these events as I had experienced them and so I could not remain indifferent to all the adjectives Pasternak used to describe these people that I had known in my youth. I have a completely different memory of those 'expressive and attractive' faces of the White Guard youth. At the Komsomol meetings we spoke of and heard how these young people from privileged families used to shoot and flog to death youths and girls who tried to uphold the truth of our life, the truth of the cause of socialism and of communism.

Here is an interesting point. As I was leaving one of the meetings, I saw some people standing about reading *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. I can't tell who these people were. They may have been either workers or intellectuals, for in our country the different catagories of people from the various professions or the intelligentsia are all alike in appearance. It was then that I heard what I consider to be a very apt comment.

One comrade was reading the letter from the *Novy Mir* editors and said 'Good Lord' (or perhaps he used some other expression. I don't remember)—'and he still doubts that the October Revolution was necessary. Can you credit it?!' Someone replied, 'Yes, he has doubts on that score. And he seems to be revising the White Guard question too.' Then a third one said 'Of course, it has long since been Doctor Mertvago [Dead and Buried] not Doctor Zhivago [Everlasting].' (Laughter) This is very much to the point, comrades. I was overpowered by the incredibly archaic flavour (and I stress the word archaic) of the pages reproduced in the *Novy Mir* editors' letter.

And what about the masses, whom Pasternak portrays as a drudging, faceless force? Our Soviet writers treat them in an utterly different manner, with great affection. Isn't that the way the problems of personality and the masses are treated in Fadeyev's *Razgrom* [The Nineteen]? You remember that miserable louse, that wretched individualist Mechik and the way he is set against the background of faceless, wild people like Morozko and his comrades in the partisan brigade! These masses are great, even if they are grey and crushed by the legacy of the tsarist system. Their greatness was understood even by Blok in 'The Twelve', where he wrote allusively of his admiration for the sailors who fought and gave their lives for the cause of revolution! This subject has had gifted treatment in our Soviet literature, but to go back to an outdated approach, as Pasternak has tried to do, is disgraceful.

And what about our intelligentsia? There is nothing to be gained by falsifying history and stating that the whole of our intelligentsia accepted the events of October immediately. This was certainly not the case, for of course a certain proportion did go over to the side of the Doctor Zhivagos. Yes, this certainly did happen and some also became our outright enemies. But with the passage of time the intelligentsia became morally re-educated. A certain number broke away and joined our avowed enemies but the great ideas of communism had their effect. The intelligentsia became an organic part of the whole great working people.

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And when I read the lines where Pasternak sees Doctor Zhivago as the 'cream of the nation, the cream of our spiritual life and of the intelligentsia', the images that came to my mind were utterly different.

Remember *The Baltic Deputy* and Professor Polezhaev, who was modelled on the outstanding scientist Timiryazev? Do you remember, comrades, a certain man whom I shall never forget, and we can rightly be proud that he is one of us and that we have sat in the conference hall alongside him—I refer to the great teacher Anton Makarenko? That is what the intelligentsia was like, the real cream of the nation. That is the intelligentsia to which each one of us according to his abilities can rightly say he belongs.

One thing I must say is that it was good to hear K. Zelinsky, on returning from abroad, telling us that this provocation has failed. The people and intelligentsia of the whole world have smelled out this provocation. But we should leave dead things for the dead, as we are building something immortal in our Soviet literature for the benefit of our vital and strong socialist society. (Applause)

S. S. Smirnov: There will now be an interval. Afterwards, the first to speak will be V. Pertsov, followed by Alexander Bezymensky.

S. S. Smirnov, from the chair:

Shall we continue our work? I call on V. O. Pertsov.

V. O. Pertsov: Already something over a week has gone by since we learned of the facts which led us to call today's meeting. Articles have appeared in *Pravda* and *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* and that first immediate feeling of indignation should presumably have abated.

But when S. S. Smirnov read those documents which were new to some people—for example, it was the first time that I had heard that loathsome passage about Pasternak's work in the letter that was sent—I must say that my feeling of indignation could not die down. One point shocked me in the theses that were read out earlier. This was that the author of *Doctor Zhivago* considered it a mitigating factor that he had sent his novel to a foreign publisher at a time when Dudintsev's novel had already come out. But it seems to me that the two are utterly different. Despite all Dudintsev's serious ideological errors, these are still two completely different things. We should think this over.

One would like to form a picture of the sort of man this was that turned out to be a traitor. Speakers here, myself included, have come predominantly from the older generation. I used to belong to a literary group to which B. Pasternak was attached. I met him in Mayakovsky's company. It is not just a simple matter of asking any comrades who have been under the spell of Pasternak's work to come up to the rostrum—for there were certain grounds for such fascination.

B. Pasternak is a master of verse. People who have paid homage to him have been invited to come forward here. I can not myself be classed as an example of the kind of man who first thought one thing and later began to think another, for I did not pay homage; however, I never imagined such vileness as we have witnessed here was possible. In the extremely highly-charged emotional atmosphere in which we are

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discussing this character's behaviour, I must say that the notion of Pasternak's stature as a master of Soviet poetry has, of course, been exaggerated. In fact, as the resolution of our writers organisation said that the Writers Union had shown concern in trying to protect and help him, I must admit that we have always understood the tricky game Pasternak was playing and was carrying over into his written work.

Evidence has been given here to show that Pasternak is known by very few people in our country, in fact only by a small circle of literary admirers. Apart from some very hedonistic young people, few people know his poems and few understand them. The reason is that whilst his poems always contain a number of striking lines and unusual metaphors, they are as a whole diffuse. They lack the unity of form that is generated by an important idea. He has no such idea, no feeling to provide a basis on which to build a consistent artistic form.

Of course, comrades, we really must get to the bottom of this matter. Pasternak is an individualist. He is absorbed in working only on the little things that surround him. His poetry could be described as ' 80,000 *versts* around my own back-yard '. A poetic mission of this sort can not breed a great artist. So the formula used by the Swedish Academy to the effect that Pasternak continues the tradition of Russian poetry and prose is a purely ignorant one. It cannot be said that simply anything written in Russian is a continuation of Russian traditions. That a novel like Sologub's *Navvi Chary* continues the Russian tradition, though it is written in Russian and is not without aesthetic values. The same holds for Artsybashev's disgraceful novel *Sanin*. Nor can we recognise as part of the Russian tradition A. Bely's *I* . . . ., that frenzied paroxysm of individualism.

Therefore, comrades, we must reject this formula and understand, all of us, that this individualistic, anti-communist work has nothing to do with the development of Russian literary traditions.

Comrade Smirnov spoke earlier of Pasternak's decency. As a young man, and one who was not one of his followers and who did not pay homage, I published an article on Pasternak for which I later suffered, as my colleagues attacked me for writing it. The article was called ' An Idealised Character '. It dealt with Pasternak's significance as an artist and those ideas of his which I mentioned just now. At the time my colleagues Aseyev and Shklovsky attacked me. They believed then that it was still possible to make a man of Pasternak. I consider him not only an idealised and somewhat exaggerated figure but also a villainous one. It was not mentioned earlier, there being no need to do so, but *Literaturnaya Gazeta* printed only one sentence from Pasternak's so-called *Autobiography* which has now, I understand, been published in Paris. I have read this autobiography which he offered as an introduction to a collection of his *Selected Works* to be brought out by *Goslitizdat*. I have never read anything more malicious than what he says in it about Mayakovsky, though Mayakovsky played a big part in Pasternak's life. If Pasternak ever wrote anything human it was those pieces he wrote in 1925, reminiscing on the 1905 revolution; Pasternak himself said that Mayakovsky had been largely responsible for the fact that he had written them and had expressed real, if admittedly only

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transitory, feelings in them. What in fact did he write about Mayakovsky? In his theses he refers to a letter from comrade Stalin. Evidently he means the same letter referred to in the autobiography. When I heard the phrase he used (and remember that comrade Stalin called Mayakovsky the best and most talented writer of the Soviet period), I sent the author of that expression a letter thanking him for ridding me of the false notion I had that he, Pasternak, was the most talented writer of the Soviet period.

And he says that there is no self-conceit in him! He shows such a lack of understanding of his position in literature and in the world. This is the result of his total lack of contact with people and it is evident both in his poetry and in his behaviour.

And now he has offered his novel to the Swedish Academy rather than a letter to the head of our Government. His entry has been successful and they have recognised him.

I have read the novel. I must say that the letter from the *Novy Mir* editors which was published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* is very accurate. It leaves nothing out. Only its tone, which shows that the editors harbour a certain hope, a certain desire to do something to help this man, now gives possible grounds for objection. In substance it is quite correct but they should have added that the narration is rather tiresome and transparently shows the plot's ideological motivation. The novel portrays the murkiest and most reactionary facets of the shameful decade that Gorky described and the most paltry aspects of what is called Dostoyevskiana (without in any way doing justice to the greatness of that Russian writer). I shall read you a quotation from it:

'Let the whole world go hang so long as I can drink tea'. Here you have the philosophy that motivated the author's pen throughout this extremely inflated, long, and heavy novel. And this is the passage mentioned by S. S. Smirnov: 'The riddle of life, the riddle of death, the joy of discovery—that, yes, that we understood. As for such petty trifles as reshaping the world—these things, no thank you, they are not for us.' Sergei Sergeyevich is quite right in what he says when speaking as a reader. And believe me, if you set any store at all by the experience of our critics in analysing Soviet literature and literature in general, then I would say that as far as *Doctor Zhivago* is concerned, it is Pasternak who is saying, and is responsible for, what Doctor Zhivago says.

What should we do with the author, this 'superman' Mr Pasternak?

You know, Lenin used to say, 'One cannot live in society and be free from society'.

Pasternak behaves as though he were free from society, and from ours he really is free. He belongs to another society, where he will really be a slave and where he will find it easy to serve. In this case, we must draw the right conclusion and make his situation easier by letting him go and settle over there where writing will be easy for him and he will have no need to utter those meaningless phrases, hideous to our ears, with which he felt obliged to justify his conduct in his letter.

I think that comrade Semichastny is right. Pasternak being a neighbour of mine, I and many of my comrades and people who live in the writers' settlement find it rather hard to imagine that we could

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continue to have such a man for a neighbour. Let him go abroad; we should enable him to do so and we should request that his name should not appear on the next census register. (Applause)

We should not, of course, let our minds dwell on the experience of this whole repulsive Pasternak affair. There are good tasks ahead of us and I am sure that each one of you is at present working with particular enthusiasm in the desire to do your very best, but all the same we must learn some lessons from this business.

I shall mention only one such lesson (there may of course be more), one which we discussed during the interval. It is a thought which has crossed many minds. We were late in publishing the letter from the *Novy Mir* editors. When it became known that he had let a bourgeois editor have his manuscript, I think it was already something that our public should have been told about, and when the book was published there was even more need for us to have published that letter; we would then have entered the dialogue with the bourgeois world from a much more advantageous position. We must remember this omission. In trying to learn the numerous lessons which are to be found in this affair, let us work really hard, comrades.

S. S. Smirnov: I call on A. I. Bezymensky.

A. I. Bezymensky: I shall not need long to put forward my view on the question of today's agenda. The lengthy arguments which have gone on for so long today about Pasternak and his work should be rounded off in a few brief words. When the proletarian writers of the 'October' group in the 1920s and 1930s severely criticised the social and aesthetic content of Pasternak's work, we argued with them as though Pasternak were within literature. When, in 1934, at the First Writers Congress, a group of proletarian writers including Surkov, Pervomaisky, myself, and others, fiercely attacked Bukharin who had pointed to Pasternak as a writer whose works ought to be taken as a guide by all Soviet writers, we continued from the rostrum of the congress to voice our severe criticism of the social and aesthetic content of Pasternak's work. We were still talking to him as though he were within Soviet literature. But today, through his venal novel and the way he has behaved, Pasternak has put himself outside Soviet literature and Soviet society. (Applause.)

Dear comrades! Throughout the past month I have been speaking at Komsomol meetings marking the fortieth anniversary of the Komsomol. The day before yesterday, the meeting ended with a wonderful celebration in the Palace of Sport. There were 12,000 people there from the Komsomol, the Komsomol Central Committee, and representatives of today's 18-million-strong Komsomol, representatives of all generations of the Komsomol, of all the 67 million people, as the main speaker said, who have passed through the ranks of the Komsomol. Comrades, when comrade Semichastny spoke about Pasternak and was greeted by stormy applause, what we heard was the voice of today's multi-million Komsomol and all its past members. What did Semichastny say? I shall read it to you:

'Pasternak has made our enemies so happy that they have awarded him the Nobel Prize without bothering about the artistic merits of his

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rotten book. He has been living among us and has now gone and spat in the people's face. Pasternak is an internal emigré and it is to be hoped that he will become a real emigré and go off to his capitalist paradise. I am sure that neither the public nor the Government would put any obstacles in his way; on the contrary, they would feel that his exit from our midst would freshen the air.'

This was greeted by a real ovation by our young people, by our country, the mightiest and the best. I think we should draw up a resolution in this same spirit. The decision taken to expel him from the Union is correct but we should add to it. Our Russian people are right in saying, 'Good riddance to bad rubbish!' (Applause)

S. S. Smirnov: I call on A. V. Sofronov.

A. V. Sofronov: Comrades! We here are of one mind, and I would say that Soviet writers are of one mind not only with each other but with our many friends overseas, even with some in places where we least of all expect it.

In June this year I was with a group of journalists in Chile, a country which since 1947 has had no diplomatic relations with us. I happened to spend an evening and a night in conversation with a very interesting man—a Peruvian writer who had emigrated from Peru to Chile; he was a very well-known Peruvian writer who had spent ten years in jail and had then been exiled from his country. He was not a communist nor a socialist, but a waverer. As we drove around Valparaiso together and talked, he said that since the launching of our sputniks and in view of many things that had happened at the same time in the Soviet Union, he would be on our side if asked on which side of the fence he stood. We spoke a great deal, of course, about literature as well.

We often think that outside Moscow and outside the Soviet Union people take little interest in the details of our literature. It would appear that this is not so. Even there, in the little Chilean city of Valparaiso, this writer Delmag was very well informed about certain events in our literature. He said to me, 'You are acting oddly over Boris Pasternak. He is your enemy.' I had not read the book and have still not read it. I replied : 'You know, he is a very strange man who has lost his way with that false philosophy of his. We consider him something of a crackpot.' 'No! not at all!' he said. 'What do you mean, a crackpot! He's no crackpot. He has set out very clearly, in great detail, and in a manner very harmful to you his whole political programme, which amounts to rejecting the October Revolution. That book of his (which circulated for a year and a half, mainly in English but also in Russian, before the Nobel Prize was awarded) causes trouble here and spreads anti-Soviet propaganda.'

We realised this on several occasions both in Santiago and Buenos Aires when we were asked pointed questions on the subject at press conferences and the like. There is an important and serious lesson for us here—serious, furthermore, because we are somewhat late in dealing with this problem. Yesterday I spoke at the Air Force Academy and was surrounded after my speech by men who asked me—how is it that you writers dallied when all of this was known long ago? (Voices :—

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'A good question!') I agree, it's a good question. And if we had all shown sufficient principle in judging such matters, this particular matter included, we would have been able to make a correct appraisal of Pasternak in good time.

Comrade Smirnov was right in what he said about 'pure art'.

Each of us has his own experience in life—some people come from the factory, others from the lecture room and so on, and in cases of this sort one always automatically measures things against one's own experience. I remember how I came to understand Pasternak. I used to know Bezymensky, Zharov, Mayakovsky and other poets. One day in 1934, when I was attending courses for young poets (I was writing my own poems and had not read any Pasternak), someone brought along Pasternak. He was accompanied by the Secretary of the party organisation, presumably, we were told, so that if he said something out of place the Secretary of the party organisation could correct him. (Laughter in the audience.) However, he said nothing specific but just talked generally, made deprecatory remarks about certain writers and poets including Bedny, and behaved generally like a tomfool.

Later I attended the writers congress in 1934 as a representative of the *Rosselmash* factory literary group. And I did not understand what was happening, for this was not the first time that Pasternak's name had been the centre of discussion, and yet Bukharin and all of his friends spoke up in defence of Pasternak's work whilst we all sided with comrades like Surkov and others who spoke refuting Bukharin.

We ourselves, to tell the truth, sometimes fail to take sincere criticism and advice in the right spirit, and not because we are suspicious of each other. I remember a discussion about Pasternak's poems that took place in 1944-45. It was wartime. Conditions were dreadful and life was full of all kinds of difficulties and yet in the hall of the Writers Union people were coming out with praises in justification of Pasternak's odes. All this at the very time that war was raging and millions were giving their lives . . . and yet people could defend Pasternak's verse in this way.

Some speakers said, very mildly of course, Boris Leonidovich, you should have got to know life a bit better; you should be in closer touch with life. Afterwards he came to me and said that he agreed this was very interesting. Then he went away somewhere.

But the worship that has surrounded the name of Pasternak goes against the grain with us. I think that after all that has happened and now that the very aptly named Pasternak myth has reached its logical conclusion, we are faced with the need to take a decision affecting our principles and ideology.

We should be more principled and consequently should be more trusting towards each other. We must banish our petty differences. Comrades, we are Soviet writers who adopt the stance of our communist party and of Soviet authority; we have had 41 years now and in that time each of us has made his own contribution to the life of our people and State. We must put away childish things, as the saying goes. And this means we must value each other more.

We must pay greater attention to our young people. I was approached by two young men, one of them aged 20, the other 23. They said: Don't be afraid of us, for we are from Pasternak's salon. I told them

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I was not afraid. They gave me some poems. Twenty or thirty poems from each of them. Among these there was one by each of them about the Virgin Lands and the rest came straight from the Pasternak mould.

What sort of young men were they? One was from the factory, the other from a collective farm . . . . So where had they come across that logical individualism, that anti-Soviet attitude? What current had carried them in that direction?

I asked them had Pasternak influenced them? They said that he had not; he had simply said that a writer must serve poetry.

It was then that I understood where these unstable lads had acquired such an attitude. I was later told that they were revisionists. Just the same, I did publish one poem. They were, after all, our Soviet boys.

We must remember that Pasternak had acquaintances and friends and there is no doubt that he has influenced a certain section of our creative young writers. ('Hear, Hear!') All of us here and everyone in the Writers Union too should expose the myth of Pasternak and pure art and the widely-entertained myth that Pasternak is an outstanding poet.

We must dispel this myth.

I too was in the Sports Hall at Luzhniki to hear comrade Semichastny speaking about Pasternak. We cannot be in two minds about Pasternak. He did not wish to be a Soviet man and a Soviet writer—so let him get out of our country! (Applause)

Sergei Antonov: Comrades! Ever more frequently as the years go by the members of the Swedish Academy of Literature, as distinct from the Swedish Academy which awards prizes for science, are abdicating their great and sacred task—the selection of works of art worthy of inclusion in the world's artistic treasury—in favour of dirty political intrigue aimed at sowing enmity between peoples, enmity towards communism, and enmity towards our country.

It is not the first time that the five wise men who meet in the Swedish Academy of Literature to resolve these questions have awarded the Nobel Literature Prize to people who have not very much right to it. To be able to play this unseemly game the five wise men from the Swedish Academy of Literature have to search the world high and low to find suitable persons who, it seems, must on the one hand be popular figures and, on the other, must be willing to be marionettes, to act as puppets in this dirty game of political knavery.

As time goes by, it becomes harder to find these types because the forces of peace are on the increase whilst people of the kind who have been receiving Nobel Literature prizes in recent years are becoming fewer. An example of this type is Camus, the French collaborator, of whom the French themselves now speak with shame.

It is a great pity that the puppet chosen in 1958 for this dirty anti-Soviet job was a man who was in our writers organisation. They found their man in Pasternak!

The forty or fifty thousand American dollars which Pasternak won are not a prize but a reward for being an accomplice in a crime against peace and quiet on earth, against socialism and communism. This is the truth of the matter!

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I think Nobel would turn in his grave if he were to learn how his legacy is being spent (commotion in the audience), because he wrote in his will that he was specifically assigning these moneys for works that promote the triumph of the cause of peace.

But what has happened in actual fact? Where will all this end? Let's say it plainly so that it will be understood: When he wrote that novel, this man was drawing up a cannon and preparing to fire on his own men. He was warned. He received a businesslike, sobering letter. The letter told him—most politely, what's more—brother, you are about to fire on your own men. Thereupon Pasternak, as he writes in the letter published today, 'considering a Soviet writer's scope broader', moved his cannon overseas and began blazing away from there!

It might perhaps be said that he did not fully understand what he was doing, but letters were written to him in French newspapers and his picture was published in them, and people wrote and said that he was hitting out at communism. It was after this that he wrote the telegram replying to the offer of the award, saying that he was 'infinitely happy and proud'. This all looks very serious. When people speak of 'pure art', the truth is that this pure art, which can at first sight appear charming, turns into filthy art and anti-Soviet slander. This is what it comes to in the end.

Our decision to expel Pasternak from the Writers Union was taken too late, in my view. We could have taken this decision a year ago. We should add to it a further decision—that Pasternak should cease not only to be a member of the Writers Union but also to be a Soviet citizen. (Applause.)

S. S. Smirnov: I call on Boris Slutsky.

Boris Slutsky: A poet's obligation is to seek the recognition of his own people, not of his enemies. A poet should seek fame in his own country, not in foreign lands. The only thing that *messieurs* the Swedish academicians know about the Soviet Union is that it is where their dreadful battle of Poltava and the even more dreadful October Revolution took place. (Commotion in the audience.)

What is our literature to them?

In the year of Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy's death, the Nobel Prize was awarded for the tenth time. For the tenth time in succession the Swedish academicians failed to take notice of the genius of the author of *Anna Karenina*. So much for the fairness and competence of the Swedish judges! So you see the kind of people from whom Pasternak is willing to accept a prize and seek support!

Everything that we writers do, though we represent all manner of different trends, is designed directly and openly to assist the triumph of the ideas of communism throughout the whole world.

This year's Nobel Prize winner could almost as well be called the winner of the Nobel Prize Against Communism. It is a disgrace for a man who has grown up in our country to bear such a title. (Applause)

Galina Nikolaeva: Pasternak's story is one of betrayal. It contains one point of interest for me as a writer and as a person. This is that it has its own inner logic. To some extent it is the story of individualism taken to its ultimate limit.

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The story now reveals the basic truth that two years ago was still not clearly visible. It now stands most clearly revealed in its own kind of inner logic.

Many comrades who have spoken earlier have neither cared for nor appreciated Pasternak's poetry. I am one of those who have liked and appreciated many of his poems. I like his poems on the love of nature, or on Lenin, Schmidt, et cetera, but although individual lines in the poems have spoken to me, I have always wondered in disappointment why this man, the possessor of such extraordinary poetic gifts, should be so limited and withdrawn into his own little world. Whenever I have read him, I have put the book aside with an involuntary feeling of disappointed hopes.

I still feel, as I always have, that this man does not see what is going on and does not venture outside the little world in which he lives in order to see the people whom he writes about, people worthy of lofty poetic treatment. It always seemed that Pasternak would find a new direction, that sooner or later this would dawn on him.

The letter from *Novy Mir* colleagues is too mild and is clearly motivated by the same hope that sooner or later this individualist in our midst might see the need to change his ways.

Having read this novel about Doctor Zhivago, we can confidently state that one would hardly have expected even from Pasternak such a slap in the face for our people and the great things we are achieving.

When people were writing about the novel and about his being awarded the Nobel Prize and so forth, I too still nursed a certain hope that he might come here and say: 'I do not want this detestable prize and I admit, comrades, that I have fallen into the clutches of reactionaries'. That was what I hoped would happen. But instead, we have received that cowardly letter and that telegram, which changes nothing, saying that he was forced to reject the prize under pressure from public opinion (not under pressure from his own understanding of what had happened!).

This man never came even once to any of the meetings at which we showed such concern in discussing him. All things considered, we are forced to the unanimous decision, i.e. not only to expel him from the Union but to request the Government to see to it that he no longer bears the elevated title of Soviet citizen.

Some comrades say that it is dangerous to let him go freely to where he will be in his element. But we are not afraid of him, nor do we consider him dangerous; we are doing this because we find him repulsive. We know that we have many enemies overseas—well, let there be one more. The cause of communism will not be the worse off and we shall continue to build our communist society. I too subscribe to the view that there is no room for this man on Soviet territory. (Applause)

There is another lesson here for all of us, namely, that we should maintain the closest interest in public opinion, in the judgment of the people; devotion to the cause of communism must become the basis of the creative work of every Soviet writer. (Applause)

V. Soloukhin: Comrades! It is sometimes said that at certain particular times in his life B. Pasternak has been loyal to our society and Soviet regime but that he gradually moved away from this and gradually evolved

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into a renegade. I would say that this is wrong, for his intimate, drawing-room poetic talent speaks for itself. From time to time a number of all too specific ideas have found their way into his verse, which in other respects the people have found incomprehensible. Consider these lines:

Muffled against the wind,
I shouted in through the casement to the kids—
What a lovely millennium
We are having out here!

And he wrote that at a time when our country was going through such difficult times! One finds certain other ideas of his even more explicitly spelled out:

I am keeping an eye on the turn of events
And playing them as they come.
I am alone. There is phariseeism everywhere.
To live your life is not so simple as crossing a field. *

This is all very clearly and forthrightly expressed! He is speaking there of his isolation.

It is an empty gesture on great council meeting days,
When seats are allotted by the powers that be,
That they set a seat aside for the poet;
The seat is dangerous if it doesn't stay empty . . . .

A close look at these lines shows clearly the implication that a real poet must be in opposition to the society in which he lives! This is why *Doctor Zhivago* is no exception to the rest of his writing. It fits into the pattern.

It is said that he did not understand the civil war or the Revolution. But we are aware of excellent examples where the opposite was the case, for A. Tolstoy, the noted Russian writer, an intellectual, and what is more, a count, was a representative of the class which did not accept the October Revolution and yet he wrote the most vivid accounts of the civil war and was able to understand its significance. We know too how V. Bryusov and M. Gorky, the most cultured man of our times, reacted. This points to the fact that the whole work is conscious propaganda in favour of individualism, as you might expect from an internal emigré.

This is further borne out by the fact that he has failed to understand that the award of the Nobel Prize was not an act intended to foster the development of literature and art but a mere political act in the struggle against communism. Could anyone really fail to see this? B. Pasternak is by no means as naïve as many of us think.

Some comrades have expressed the idea that *Doctor Zhivago* is not particularly interesting for the Western reader, who might say that the emigré press over there has published a number of more damaging things about our country and people. Furthermore, *Doctor Zhivago* is about the 20s. which are really of very little interest. However, this book is from beginning to end a cold-war weapon against communism . . . .

* The last line is a Russian proverb (tr.).

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Could he really fail to understand this simple elementary fact, since he considers himself such an elevated intellect?

People are now wondering, since he is an internal emigré, whether he should not in actual fact become a real emigré? In that connection, the following similar situation comes to mind. When our Party was criticising Yugoslavia's revisionist policy, people began to say that she might suddenly break away irrevocably and go over to the other camp. But the wise Mao Tse-tung said in a speech that this would never be, because the Americans needed her to be in our camp. And so when Pasternak becomes a real emigré they will not need him over there. And we don't need him either, so he will quickly be forgotten. Some millionairess will have a car accident, and they will make a great fuss about her and completely forget Pasternak. This will be a proper punishment for him. He will be unable to say anything of interest and after a month he will be thrown aside like an empty egg-shell or a squeezed lemon. And that will be a proper punishment for the treachery he has committed.

S. Baruzdin: Comrades, tomorrow it will be a week since our people heard of the Pasternak affair, and this is worth saying because the Soviet people, that is to say, what we mean when we speak of Soviet man, has never known Pasternak as a writer. The people heard of him as a traitor. There is nothing more terrible for a man and a writer than to be seen by his own people after 40 years of Soviet rule to be nothing but a traitor. This is the most disgraceful thing about Pasternak.

And now a few words about Pasternak's letter. Comrades, what can one say about a man who, at a grave moment in his life, writes in black and white of 'the honour conferred on me, a modern writer living in Russia and, therefore, a Soviet writer . . . .' The only Soviet thing about Pasternak is that he lives in Russia where the Soviets are in power. Pasternak says so himself and doubtless this letter is known beyond this meeting of ours.

Need one say any more? There is a good Russian saying that every man is his own advocate.

I think that the very best thing is for Pasternak to clear off out of our country at the earliest possible moment. (Applause)

L. Martynov: Comrades, it seems that those present see eye to eye in assessing Pasternak's behaviour. We all wanted to help Pasternak to get out of that so-called ivory tower, whereas he himself had no wish to leave that tower for the fresh air of real life but sought out the cesspit.

This is perfectly evident. What can I add? A few days ago we were in Italy, the country where the novel was first published, and where, as a result, people have had time to get to know it, think about it and weigh it up. In fact, when a certain scientific worker with whom I talked in Florence criticised the novel harshly and said that Pasternak had understood nothing that had happened in the world and had not wanted to understand the October Revolution, one might well have thought that this was just the personal opinion of a single Italian. But later in a crowded hall in Rome the majority of people present applauded

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our Soviet assessment of this whole affair, and many got up and left rather than hear the confused objections of our opponent (there was only one, by the way), and people of different ages and professions surrounded us and expressed their approval. Then there was no doubt about that assessment of ours. I am convinced that this represents the way people everywhere are thinking now and will continue to think. Lively people who are striving for a better future are not in favour of the author of *Doctor Zhivago*. Even if the sensational ballyhoo of well-known organs of the foreign press turns Pasternak's head, the majority of mankind will not be taken in by such a song and dance and, as Soloukhin rightly remarked, interest in today's, or rather already yesterday's, sensation will be surpassed by some new sensation, whereas interest in and sympathy with our struggle for a better future, and for the welfare of mankind, will not wane but will daily increase.

Let Pasternak stay with the mischief-makers who flatter him with a prize, for progressive mankind is and will remain on our side.

B. Polevoi: Comrades, I do not want to be repetitious, for all our comrades who have been up to this rostrum to put their views have said what I intended to say myself.

I simply want to say to you, as a man who in the course of his duties as a writer has to listen to and read recorded versions of foreign broadcasts, how the whole gang of our most bitter enemies are reacting to Pasternak's novel and the reward he got for it. The Voice of America says 'An anti-communist in the communist camp'. Or take the headline from the West German journal *Der Stern*—'A Body Blow Against Communism.' Or one from the *New York Times* supplement—'A Colossal Assault on Soviet Culture'.

But as for these people who stage-managed this whole thing, who inspired it and exalted this vacuous book, they know what they have cooked up and they are revelling in it.

The hot war which raged in the past had its traitors. There was General Vlasov who along with his followers deserted to our enemies, fought against us, and ended his repulsive life as a traitor.

The cold war has its traitors too, and Pasternak is, in my view, a literary Vlasov, a man who whilst living with us and eating our Soviet bread, earning his living in our Soviet publishing houses, and enjoying all the benefits of a Soviet citizen, betrayed us, deserted to the enemy camp, and is now fighting on their side. A Soviet court had General Vlasov shot (voice from the audience—'hanged'), and the whole people approved of it because, as we rightly said, it was good riddance to bad rubbish. I think that a cold-war traitor should also be given a fitting and extremely heavy punishment. We should say to him on behalf of the Soviet public: 'Get out of our country, Mister Pasternak. We do not want to breathe the same air as you.' (Applause)

S. S. Smirnov: Dear comrades. There has been a number of insistent requests that we should close our debate. I must inform the meeting that 14 people have spoken. We still have many more on the list. The list reads: Evgeny Dolmatovsky, Sergei Vasilev, Mikhail Lukonin, Galina Serebryakova, Pavel Bogdanov, Pavel Arsky, P. Luknitsky,

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Semyon Sorin, V. Inber, Nina Ametova, Vladimir Dudintsev, Raisa Azarkh, and Kugultinov (on behalf of students attending advanced literature courses).

Voices: Let Dudintsev speak.

S. S. Smirnov: As chairman of the meeting I consider it undemocratic to call on Dudintsev and not on speakers listed before him. It would clearly be an infringement of democracy.

Voices from the floor: His name came up in earlier speeches. Pasternak in his letter equated his own novel with Dudintsev's.

S. S. Smirnov: But really, none of the speakers attempted to make such a comparison. Let any such comparison remain on Pasternak's conscience. I feel that elementary democracy requires that we should either close the debate or press on. It is proposed that the debate be closed. Shall we vote?

Those in favour of continuing the debate? (Minority)

Those in favour of closing the debate? (Clear majority)

Who is in favour of calling on Dudintsev to speak? (Minority)

There is a clear majority in favour of closing the debate.

I am to inform you that the Presidium has received a great number of notes in which comrades have associated themselves with the protest about Pasternak's conduct and have expressed their patriotic feelings. Such notes have come in from Irina Levchenko, Vasily Kulemin and others (reads list). They all warmly support the tone of our meeting and everything that has been said here. The heads of the Writers Union and Organisational Committee have asked me to inform you that the Writers Union and editors of newspapers and journals are still receiving an endless stream of telegrams from provincial, regional, and republican writers organisations, expressing indignation at Pasternak's actions and supporting the decision of the Joint Presidium to expel him.

I call on N. V. Lesyuchevsky to read the draft resolution. (Lesyuchevsky reads the resolution.) (Applause)

S. S. Smirnov: From your applause I take it that the resolution is adopted in substance? No objection? (No)

Are there any amendments to the resolution?

Comrade Bolotin: Does this resolution differ from the letter you mentioned at the beginning of the meeting?

S. S. Smirnov: Yes. It is an independent resolution.

Comrade Bolotin: You propose that comrades should associate themselves with that letter.

S. S. Smirnov: I consider that this resolution, which will be published, represents the opinion of the Moscow organisation, and this will be more correct and carry more weight. The letter was written before Pasternak's expulsion from the Union.

From the floor: I think that the word 'cosmopolitan' in the resolution should be changed to 'traitor'.

N. V. Lesyuchevsky: The draft resolution contains the word 'traitor' and also the word 'treachery', but a man who betrays his homeland and works in the service of international reaction is an anti-patriot and a cosmopolitan.

Voices: Hear, hear.

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S. S. Smirnov: So, if I understand it correctly, the meeting does not accept the amendment.
R. Azarkh: We should say in the resolution: 'The writers business meeting requests the Soviet Government to deprive Pasternak of Soviet citizenship'.
S. S. Smirnov: I think that our attitude is quite plainly stated and it is for the Soviet Government to take the final decision.
N. V. Lesyuchevsky: The wording in the resolution is as follows (reads the relevant passage in the resolution).
A. P. Kazantsev: In my view this understates the position. It is phrased as a question: 'Who needs him?' I think we should state that we have no need of him and we should request the Government to draw its own conclusion.
Comrade Lesyuchevsky: Yes, it starts with a question but ends with the reply 'Let him become a cosmopolitan . . .'
Comrade Trifonova: I think the expression 'the exile' sounds somewhat sympathetic. I propose that it be replaced by the word 'emigré'.
S. S. Smirnov: You have heard A. P. Kazantsev's amendment. I think that the existing wording is what we require.
Are there any supporters of Kazantsev's amendment?
From the floor:
Yes. You raised this point in your speech and your words were applauded. Vote on both proposals.
Why should the Soviet Government decide for itself without us? We should put a request to the Soviet Government and include precisely those words: 'Request the Soviet Government . . .'
S. S. Smirnov: There are two proposals.
'Request the Soviet Government to deprive Pasternak of Soviet citizenship. (Applause)
Let us vote: Those in favour of including these words in the resolution and making such an appeal to the Soviet Government, please raise your hands.
Those against? (1)
The amendment is adopted. Are there any further amendments?
From the floor: There is a sentence in the resolution which says that Pasternak has long been divorced from real life and from our people. This sentence is incorrect as he has never been in touch with our people and our life.
S. S. Smirnov: Our comrade says that Pasternak was never in touch with real life. Would comrade Lesyuchevsky please read out what the resolution says on this?
Comrade Lesyuchevsky: '. . . Long since divorced from life and from the people, a vain aesthete and a decadent . . .'
(*Voices from the floor*: That is well said.)
S. S. Smirnov: Perhaps we could say 'always divorced'. Are there any proposals? Do we need to make any amendment to this sentence? Then it is proposed that we accept the drafting as read out.
No objection? Carried.
Are there any more comments or amendments?

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V.Inber: The terms 'aesthete' and 'decadent' are purely literary expressions. They do not cover the concept of the future traitor. They are weak expressions.
S.S. Smirnov: In my view the wording is most precise.
Are there any other amendments? No? Any proposals?
(*Voices from the floor*: Let's adopt it *in toto*.)
Those in favour of adopting the resolution *in toto*, please raise your hands. Please put them down. Who is not in favour? Nobody. Abstentions? None.
The resolution is carried unanimously. (Applause)
Comrades, I declare the meeting closed.

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

LENIN

Tibor Szamuely

CONTEMPLATING THE VAST western literature on the Soviet Union, and vainly striving to keep abreast of its ever-increasing flow, one is nevertheless often struck by the numerous lacunae that still confront the student. Strangely enough, high up on the list of works that one has sorely lacked is a good biography of Lenin. The creator of the Communist Party and founder of the Soviet Union was for long given a wide berth by the biographers. Stalin has had, comparatively speaking, much better luck, and even the far lesser figure of Trotsky has found greater favour. A lifetime of plotting and purging certainly contains, at least on the surface, more drama, suspense, and general excitement than a story of obscure ideological debates on hair-splitting points of doctrine, which is what Lenin's life largely consisted of.

Nor does the actual quality of the published biographies offer much consolation. In the last two years we have had nothing to complain of, quantitatively speaking: three detailed biographies of Lenin have been published, in swift succession. Of the three only Mr Louis Fischer's work satisfies accepted academic standards (and remains immensely readable into the bargain), but for all its undoubted merits it suffers from a very serious flaw, inasmuch as fully five-sixths of the narrative is devoted to the period 1917 and after. As a result a balanced treatment of Lenin's development is lacking.

This paucity of literature on one of the supreme figures of modern history makes all the more welcome the appearance of Professor Adam B. Ulam's latest work.[1] The most unfortunate feature of the book is undoubtedly its title, for it is neither a history of the Bolsheviks, nor an intellectual and political history of the triumph of communism in Russia (whatever that may be), but a biography of Lenin—and a very good one to boot. One hesitates to call it the definitive biography—the nature of Lenin's historical achievement and the perdurability of the passions and controversies to which he gave rise make that an unattainable object (is there such a thing as a definitive biography of Napoleon? or Cromwell?)—but Professor Ulam has certainly written the best biography of Lenin to have appeared in the forty years since his death.

Lenin's life was inseparable from the history of his party and his State. Over and above that there was very little of interest. 'When we say "the Party" we mean "Lenin", when we say "Lenin" we mean "the party"', wrote Mayakovsky, and how right he was. The most difficult task confronting the biographer therefore is the necessity to steer a course between the Scylla of a trivial and necessarily largely imaginary interpretation of Lenin the Man, and the Charybdis of straightforward party history. Professor Ulam has passed this test with

[1] **The Bolsheviks: the Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia.** The Macmillan Company, New York, 1965. To be published in Britain by Secker and Warburg in the autumn.

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flying colours. His is a well-proportioned book that strikes a correct balance between the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary phases of Lenin's life, and between the various facets of Lenin as revolutionary organiser, statesman, theoretician, and human being. It shows an easy and thorough mastery of the sources, and an ability to analyse and evaluate them, and to weave the diverse threads into a single coherent narrative. The socio-economic background, indispensable to an understanding of Lenin's life, is sketched in considerable, but never superfluous detail; particularly good is the comprehensive chapter on the pre-Marxist Russian revolutionary tradition. The book is well written, lively, often witty.

Professor Ulam's work merits unreserved praise. This, of course, is not to say that his judgment, however acute and discerning, cannot and should not be challenged on certain points.

One such disputable issue is the question of Lenin's attitude to the intelligentsia. The author attaches great significance to what he regards as Lenin's deep and irrational hatred of the intelligentsia. He returns to this again and again, calling it the 'one great passion of Lenin's life that cannot be accounted for by politics, which as a matter of fact often clashed with his political judgment and undid or threatened to undo his rational designs', which 'runs like a thread through his personal and political life, and provides much if not most of the emotional intensity behind the revolutionary strivings' (p. 210). Professor Ulam says that Lenin was 'a member of the intelligentsia and yet unequalled in hatred for it' (p. 186), that 'there was something elemental and inexplicable in his passion against the intelligentsia' (p. 212), that this was a 'terrible hatred' (p. 527). Indeed, this passion constituted one of the central *personal* emotions of this strange man about whose inner feelings we really know so little, for 'when we try to penetrate the more intimate side of Lenin's nature . . . there are questions of really greater importance than his relationship to Inessa. What was the source of his savage passion against his own class?' (p. 285).

There is a considerable element of truth in this, as anyone who has read Lenin's bitter, often violent remarks on the subject can testify. But it seems to me that the author attributes an exaggerated importance to this feature of Lenin's ideological and psychological make-up. For one thing, his definition of 'intelligentsia' is rather uncertain: he speaks of the Kadets as the 'party of substantial intelligentsia: professors, doctors, engineers' (p. 238), of Witte as belonging to it 'by his upbringing and education' (p. 222). Now, Lenin himself would under no circumstances have accepted this definition, and neither would such authorities as Berdyaev or Ivanov-Razumnik (to say nothing of Witte and the Kadets themselves).

On the other hand, if we discount Lenin's habitual savagery in polemics, his attitude towards the intelligentsia does not seem to be markedly different from that of a host of other Russian revolutionaries. This was, in fact, an integral part of the Russian revolutionary tradition: the self-hatred of the intelligentsia as the logical concomitant to its idealisation, first of the 'people', then of the 'proletariat'. Even a moderate man like Lavrov could write, on the occasion of the centenary

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of the Pugachov rebellion, that 'the manifestos of this illiterate Cossack . . . contained more in the way of vital social principles, of strong laws, and of ineluctable stern forecasts of the future' than all the learned writings of the high-minded intellectuals of Russia, England, France, and the USA (P. L. Lavrov, *Izbrannye sochineniya na sotsialno-politicheskie temy*, vol. 2, Moscow, 1934, p. 135).

And Plekhanov—hardly a chastiser of the intelligentsia—wrote of it, already in the 1890s, that 'it had never possessed material and economic power, and now it has even lost the *power of ideas*. This is why it has now been reduced to playing the most miserable of parts, when it is capable only of pleading for the compassion of the Russian autocrat . . . Life is casting it aside like so much useless rubbish' (*Sochineniya*, vol. III, Moscow-Leningrad, 1928, pp. 249, 260). Lenin at his most rabid could scarcely have done better than that.

In fact, Lenin's views on the intelligentsia, though undoubtedly strong, were considerably milder than those of a number of Russian Marxists (Machajski, the Economists, and the post-revolutionary Proletcult are the first names that come to mind). In his writings—as Professor Ulam himself makes clear—he allotted the intelligentsia a far more important role than anyone else had previously conceived of. And it was not for denying, but rather for over-emphasising the significance of the intelligentsia that he was incessantly attacked. Rosa Luxemburg, for instance, said: 'If we assume the viewpoint claimed as his own by Lenin and we fear the influence of intellectuals in the proletarian movement, we can conceive of no greater danger to the Russian party than Lenin's plan of organisation. *Nothing will more surely enslave a young labour movement to an intellectual elite hungry for power than this bureaucratic straitjacket . . .*' (Rosa Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism?*, Ann Arbor, 1961, p. 102).

The issue of Lenin's relationship to the intelligentsia is, of course, a comparatively minor one, and if I have perhaps dwelt upon it at too great length this only serves to underline the general soundness of Professor Ulam's approach and of his interpretation of the manifold aspects of Lenin's life. Much of it is fresh and original. From the first chapter, with its lively debunking of the insufferably pompous Soviet legends regarding Lenin's parentage, the Ulyanov family's home life, brother Alexander, the difficulties young Lenin had to overcome, etc., the reader's attention never flags.

Professor Ulam's most important contribution to our understanding of Lenin and of the development of the Soviet state is contained in the last part of his book. Here he diverges, at a number of crucial points, from views that are already becoming traditional. He sees the focal point of the tensions and crises of Lenin's last years in the events preceding and following the eleventh Party Congress, when 'the Communist Party was in danger of disintegration' (p. 539). The underlying essence of the crisis that faced Lenin and his colleagues has remained unsolved to the present day:

> The greatest trouble with the system was its hopeless lack of clarity. Fiction was piled upon fiction, paradox upon paradox. A grass-roots democracy was supposed to coexist with dictatorship,

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> socialism with capitalism, intra-Party democracy with an oligarchical rule. At what point did honest criticism, expected of every Communist, degenerate into a deviation or anarchism? Where was the separating line between the decisiveness and ruthless devotion to the cause that every official was to demonstrate, and bullying and 'the lack of feeling for the people'? (p. 535).

Bewildered by problems to which he had no solution, undermined by his first stroke, Lenin unexpectedly became the helpless prisoner of the system he had created and of methods that he had himself devised (Professor Ulam shows, most amusingly, how Lenin was hoist by his own petard: the 'class-medical philosophy' which he had used to deal with the ailments of the party members who were making nuisances of themselves—pp. 516-518). The Politburo, which had every reason to be worried by his increasingly erratic (from their point of view) behaviour, now became his medical attendant—in effect, his gaoler. The sick man's desperate attempts to by-pass this conspiracy or to break the solidarity of its members were unavailing. 'To a lesser or greater extent *all* the members of the top leadership shared mixed feelings and fears as to Lenin's future role and *all* decided to present a united front' (p. 554).

In stressing *all* the author specifically includes Trotsky. Indeed, in his brilliantly reasoned account of Lenin's last great political battle, over the Georgian issue, Ulam shows Trotsky as having played a part very different from the one portrayed in his later self-exculpatory description—'pathetic in its half-truths and attempts to gloss over the facts' (p. 574)—which has been largely accepted by most historians. Stalin actually comes out of this distasteful business, if not better, then at least more straightforward than Trotsky. The latter, it seems, was less than honest, both with Lenin and with his colleagues: enjoying the confidence of both, supporting neither side, remaining aloof, and biding his time. He emerged from the affair with little credit: 'he had shown himself both devious and fainthearted' (p. 573).

The story of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky belongs elsewhere, for Professor Ulam's book ends with the death of Lenin. It is 'only' a biography of Lenin, and one that we have long awaited: carefully conceived, thoroughly researched, well written. A pleasure to read and to recommend to others.

ROSA LUXEMBURG

Z. A. B. Zeman

BEFORE MR. NETTL REACHES the one-quarter stage in his biography of Rosa Luxemburg,[1] and the half-way point in her active political life, he tells us that she had already achieved her only tactical victory and reached the high-water mark of her prestige. The page is 195, the year 1903.

[1] J. P. Nettl, **Rosa Luxemburg.** 2 vols. Oxford University Press. £6 6s.

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The reader begins to settle himself down more comfortably: there are still over 600 pages to go.

And yet the quality of Rosa Luxemburg's life, and the author's persistence in finding out all there was to be known about her, compel our attention. Rosa was a revolutionary whose relatives ran a business in Warsaw with the telegraphic address '*Luxembourgeois*'; she was the kind of person who has curtains in her prison cell; she trusted the intuition, about people, of her cat; she kept on getting into financial difficulties because of her liking for small luxuries, and a friend said of her that her macro-economics were sounder than her micro-economics. She had a passion for politics and for privacy; she made a name for herself as a socialist politician although she always moved on the fringes of political power. Mr Nettl brings all this out very well indeed. He has not written a stark political biography, and he is sophisticated about the connections between his heroine's private and political life. But he consistently overestimates Rosa Luxemburg's historical significance: sometimes one wishes for a more solid subject for the monumental, two-volume treatment.

Born in the same year as the second German Empire, she outlived it by four months. A bright, sharp girl with a slight limp, she left Warsaw in 1889 for Switzerland, where she wrote a first class dissertation (as a schoolgirl, she had always been at the top of her class) for the University of Zürich on the industrial development of Poland. She arrived as a Marxist, which meant little more than that her interests would move in a particular direction, and that her life in Russian Poland, had she stayed there, might have become somewhat uncomfortable. Her Swiss years were decisive for young Rosa. She met the leading Russian revolutionaries as well as Leo Jogiches, with whom she lived for many years, and with whom she had a personal relationship even more stormy than their political association. She made her first political speeches, and wrote her first articles; the enemies she made in Zürich proved even more enduring than the friends.

In a way, it was a small world she lived in. It was inhabited by Polish and Russian exiles, with their tiny, inconstant organisations, their small, highly perishable magazines, their petty quarrels in which theories and personalities—both highly prized possessions, because the exiles had little else—were woven into intricate patterns. But they knew that they were taking part in an international movement, based on a scientific theory, a movement of the future which would go from strength to strength. (Even in their wildest dreams they probably did not envisage the extent to which their hopes would one day be realised.) They had the example of the German SPD before their eyes: a manifold mass organisation preparing, in the 1890s, to claim power in the state. Although Rosa Luxemburg never entirely abandoned either the Russian or the Polish movements to their fate, it was the German party to which she dedicated her life. After nine years in Zürich, she moved to Berlin in 1898; she left her friends behind and gained wider horizons.

Foreigners in the ranks of the SPD were not unusual: there were the Swedes, the Dutchmen, and the East Europeans: in the last group Alexander Helphand (Parvus) and Julian Marchlewski had arrived

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before Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Radek. Among the foreign comrades in the party, the East Europeans were the most distinct, exotic, and articulate group, and they never properly merged—contrary to Mr Nettl's opinion regarding Rosa—into the SPD background. They seemed unable to reconcile themselves to the petty-bourgeois drabness of the German party; they were uncompromising revolutionaries, and they always had a second string to play in the Russian or the Polish organisation. They took little part in the dull routine work of the party in Germany, and they never acquired much interest in its organisation. They became notorious because they were colourful, but there was a penalty to be paid for their notoriety and for their colour: they never came near the core of political power, either in the party or in the state. Yet all the time they desired some kind of recognition, or, better still, a concrete task against which to match their restless, abundant energies. The appointment to teach at the party school in Berlin was the reward that Rosa Luxemburg eventually received: she was very glad of it, despite its insignificance.

Nevertheless, not many of Rosa Luxemburg's activities in Germany were really calculated to bring her nearer the ultimate goal of political endeavour, namely, political power. It looked as if some feminine perversity, some inexplicable scruples, were holding her back. In Berlin, soon after her arrival, the great revisionist controversy helped to advance her career, while at the same time she was evolving arguments that were most unlikely to endear her to the leadership of the party. She took the extreme revolutionary as against Bernstein's evolutionary view, a position that appealed to the Russian rather than the German socialists. From then on she used similar controversial issues in a similar way, and the better known she became to the rank-and-file of the party, the more she fell out of favour with its leadership. Mr Nettl gives us a very good description of her differences with the SPD leaders, with the trade unionists, and of the simultaneous growth of her popularity. But he leaves a lot unsaid.

AS A FOREIGNER and an intellectual, Rosa Luxemburg of course found it more congenial to take part in theoretical controversies than in routine work at grass-root level. At the same time, she never gave due observance to the fact that the party was largely German in the first place, unintellectual in the second, and unrevolutionary in the third. And by ignoring basic facts, she consigned herself, as well as her theories, to the limbo of political ineffectiveness. Since revolution—glorious and spontaneous—lay at the very heart of her thought and action, Rosa Luxemburg's historical significance must be measured against her actual, comparatively low, revolutionary achievement. Mr Nettl believes in its chances of making an impact in Africa.

In Germany, her simpler-minded comrades in the SPD got the impression that there was a short step from her views to barricades, bombardment, and blood. There was in fact little for them to be frightened of: Rosa Luxemburg's ideas on revolutionary action were rather quaintly personal, and wholly out of place. She suffered from the occupational hazards of the East European immigrants in the SPD, and nowhere was this more obvious than in her

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predilection for revolutions. She must have been the last revolutionary to have returned to Russia in December 1905, at a time when the movement had obviously failed; she was soon imprisoned for a few months, and duly bailed out by her family in Warsaw. She returned to Germany full of revolutionary zeal. She went up and down the country making speeches and writing tracts, much admired and slightly feared by the timid comrades of the rank-and-file, with their hazy historical memories of mainly unsuccessful revolts against authority, who were ever ready to please her by singing the *Internationale* in the rhythm of a slow funeral march, but to go no further. And Rosa's message was simple—that taking part in a revolution could be a splendid, personally liberating experience. But there was no way of reproducing the Russian social conditions in Germany; the East Europeans in the SPD, Rosa included, never quite understood this. It was rightly said of her that she indulged in *Revolutionismus*, a belief in some blind mass crash-through, the aim of which was left unspecified. It appeared that the release of revolutionary energy was an end in itself for Rosa Luxemburg.

Nor did she make any significant contribution to the fund of revolutionary expertise that the Russians started building up after 1905. Lenin's preoccupation with party organisation on the one hand, and with armed uprising on the other, was of little interest to Rosa, and it can be assumed that she did not see the connections between the two activities. Helphand and Trotsky had embarked on their attempt to revise Marxist theory in the light of Russian conditions at the end of 1904, a cooperation that resulted in Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution on which Rosa had, for a time, no comment to make. The relationship between war and revolution in general, and the Russo-Japanese war and the 1905 revolution in particular, as well as the international reverberations of revolutions, received little more than a passing glance from Rosa. She talked a lot about the 1905 revolution, but she had learned nothing from it.

The same combination of popular appeal and political ineffectiveness marked her activities before and after the German revolution in 1918. Mr Nettl brings out well the manner in which the affairs of the early Polish Social Democrat party and then of the *Spartakusbund* were conducted on the basis of a 'peer group'—a loose society of independent equals, associated for a particular purpose, and in sharp contrast to the way in which, say, Lenin's Bolshevik party was run—the former being the only kind of organisation that Rosa could endure. But such an instrument, especially when it was linked with a belief in revolutionary spontaneity, proved too blunt. Rosa Luxemburg lived long enough to make a lasting personal imprint on German communism; for the last time, distinction came her way, without political power.

Mr Nettl has given us all there was to be found out about that fascinating life. Opening his book is like turning on a high-pressure water-hose: the stream of narrative is steady and relentless. There are many occasions when he is clearly unable to leave out some hard-searched for detail, or his own reflections on it. Without intending to do so, we get to know the author's views on schizophrenia, promiscuity, a group of learned men called 'behavioural scientists', the best way

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of crossing frontiers illegally, and many other topics of interest. These reservations apart, here we have a definitive biography of Rosa Luxemburg. She is unlikely ever again to receive as much dedication as Mr Nettl has lavished on her in his study.

TWO COLD WAR BOOKS

Paul Seabury

IF SIZE, ENERGY EXPENDED, staying-power, and continued marketability are signs of a book's importance, Professor Dana F. Fleming's *The Cold War and its Origins* is without question the foremost among recent works on the cold war. It has 1115 pages of text; it spans a forty-three year period from 1917 to 1960; with approximately 2,000 footnotes from a rich variety of sources, it provides a vast and often vivid scrapbook of memories. Begun in 1947, when, as its author says, 'it seemed more than probable that we would go on into a third world war within one lifetime', it was completed in 1961.

Like the Albert Memorial, a work of this magnitude has had a survival capacity far greater than the widespread criticism it aroused when it first appeared. According to its American publishers, it is now in its fourth printing. A new work on the same subject, David Horowitz's *Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War*, relies principally upon Fleming's historical account through 1960, condenses Fleming's scope, expands his general thesis, and updates it.

Baruch, in his *Public Years*, claimed not only to have been the first to use the term 'cold war' in public, in a speech before the South Carolina legislature, but also remarked that at the end of the war, 'with the help of Professor D. F. Fleming I made a series of studies to try to find out how I would feel on various issues if I were a Russian'. Through Fleming, he says, he became aware of Russian 'suspicions and fears' (p. 389).

This seems to have inspired Professor Fleming to undertake his thirteen-year study; certainly it has affected his writing and established his vantage-point. One of his motives is the hope of reaching conciliation-through-understanding: 'I have sought', he says in his introduction, 'at every stage to present the other side, how it looks to "the enemy", in the belief that this is essential to the avoidance of the final grand smash'.[1] But his book transcends the original impulse: his intention is to act as historian-referee of the conflict, and show the 'reasons for our loss of the cold war'. To serve as mirror for Soviet impressions and to act as impartial referee is to combine conflicting purposes; it is a question whether either is accomplished.

[1] p. xiii. Fleming does not appear to read Russian. There is no bibliography in his book, but the footnotes and index do not reveal the use of any primary or secondary Soviet sources, except for occasional citations from works by American or English writers.

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Fleming's thesis runs as follows: the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 was never properly understood in the West, and this lack of understanding gave rise to a continuing series of unreasonable and frequently hysterical western reactions; these reactions finally led in 1947 to the Truman Doctrine (which Fleming believes to be 'the rashest policy ever enunciated by any American leader', a policy which for 'the first time in history' was aimed at 'the encirclement of a great power', p. 1046). The cold war, however, actually began with the intervention of western imperialists in Russia in 1918. American and western leaders after 1917 persistently failed to discern that their policies served only to confirm the Soviet leaders' pathological picture of America and the West; thus from the beginning Soviet policies were defensive reactions to western policies; western attempts to 'contain' the Soviet Union simply resulted in a confirmation of 'Marx's most apocalyptic prophecy'; attempts to check Soviet expansion 'strengthened the hand of every die-hard Marxist and every extreme Russian nationalist among the Soviet leadership'.[2]

In itself this has long been a familiar thesis; Fleming's version of it has the merit of being devoid of ideological cant. He is not a historical determinist; no 'historical forces' or 'objective factors' are brought in to explain why American policy managed so consistently to pursue such an irrational course of action. Deeds, words, and opinions speak for themselves; to read this book is in a sense to re-experience every major crisis in American-Soviet relations—as though one were re-reading nearly half a century of the *New York Times* and the *Nashville Tennessean*, which are Fleming's principal sources. The 'devil theory' used by American historical revisionists in the past to expose policy-makers is not employed; Fleming frequently condemns American statesmen but rarely probes their motives; he does not imitate Charles Beard's technique of scholarly innuendo. Harry Truman is not accused of beginning the cold war in order to get re-elected. In the absence of such motivational analysis, the baffled reader might well wonder why error was so persistently pursued for so many decades by so many statesmen in so many places. But to Fleming error it is, and it is the error of nearly half a century of tragic mistakes in judgment; the wicked yet may mend their ways, else why should such an angry jeremiad have been written in the first place?

There is a peculiar asymmetry in Fleming's thesis. To borrow the terminology of the policy sciences, Fleming's account of the cold war draws and dwells profusely upon western (and especially American) declaratory policy and action policy both (with a Greek chorus of Air Force generals and Southern senators making loud noises in the background). Yet when dealing with the Soviet side, action-policy is stressed; declaratory policy and propaganda are ignored. In this lengthy work, Soviet ideology is almost completely absent; there are only two references to Lenin in the entire book (one recalls that he returned to Russia in 1917, the other notes that he was a 'genius' without whom 'the Bolsheviki might have failed to seize power'). There is no reference

[2] pp. 1046–47. The words are those of William A. Williams, a Wisconsin historian whom Fleming quotes approvingly.

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to the Cominform, if the index, and my memory, serve rightly. Major Soviet doctrinal issues do not exist here. Vast numbers of pages are devoted to American theoretical debates, and to the voluminous maunderings of McCarthyites, Southern senators, and premature Goldwaterites, yet one looks almost in vain for evidence of theoretical speculation or similar inflammatory utterances from the 'other side'.[3]

To Fleming, 'necessity of state', the *Staatsraison*, is the commanding element of Soviet policy at all times (perhaps this is one reason why Marxist ideology and propagandist Muscovite utterances receive so little attention), and for him, to explain these *Realpolitik* activities is also to pardon them. *Realpolitik* when pursued by others receives less kindly treatment.

Another odd aspect of Fleming's book is his awakening of certain sleeping dogs, which this reviewer had thought were no longer matters of historical conjecture. He is under the impression that the Katyn forest massacre is still an unsolved mystery. He notes that the 'evidence is conflicting', that an American journalist held that 'neither' version of the crime was 'more credible than the other', but that the 'belief' in the guilt of the Russians 'is still held by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk'. 'On balance', the evidence 'indicates that the Russians killed the officers' (p. 228). On the question whether the Korean war began as South Korean aggression against the North, Fleming exhumes the old mysteries: 'Was it possible that the North Koreans were the ones who were surprised? There was no compelling reason for them to attack'. Why had Dulles gone to Korea that very month? Why had MacArthur's aides in Tokyo whispered among themselves, in John Gunther's account of events there on 25 June, that 'the South Koreans have attacked North Korea'? Hadn't Rhee himself once told Americans defiantly that he would not 'much longer tolerate a divided Korea'? Says Fleming: 'We do not know that the South Koreans put these threats into practice. However . . .' (p. 599). But if it was the North that attacked the South, Fleming has no doubts that the Russians did not order the attack (and if they had, he would no doubt say it was necessary for them to do so).

THIS VENTURE INTO CONCILIATORY historiography does no service either to legitimate historiography or to conciliation. For one thing, it has meant that in case after case, throughout the book, 'historical truth' is somehow to be found 'halfway' between western and Soviet versions of events when Fleming is concerned with the reasons for disagreeable Soviet behaviour and Soviet intentions; yet when dealing with western behaviour and western intention, such scrupulous impartiality vanishes and a tone of high moralistic certitude enters.

The effect upon later writings may be seen in Mr David Horowitz's *Free World Colossus*, a work greatly indebted to Mr Fleming's findings, and designed to provide 'explanations' for American behaviour which Fleming himself shunned. To take one instance: Horowitz, following Fleming, goes to some pains to note that Soviet suspicions of the United

[3] *Pravda*, for instance, is cited only eight times in the index: all in a benevolent tone: 'on Fulton, 353; friendly gesture by, 429; on Bevin and Anglo-Russian alliance; 434; on Acheson's total diplomacy, 531; on necessity of co-existence, 538; protested resumed cold war, 761; on defense of China, 933; hopeful of Summit, 996'.

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States during the second world war had substantial foundation; serious western pledges were not kept; western leaders had been less than candid in dealing with their Russian counterparts. The most important of these broken pledges, says Horowitz, was the pledge of a second front in 1942.

> On May 29, 1942, Molotov came to Washington and was 'assured' that the United States was preparing for a second front and expected to open it in 1942 . . . Yet the second front was not opened until June 6, 1944, or more than a year and half later than it was promised (p. 45).

Turning to *The Cold War and its Origins*, we discover that the word quoted, 'assured', was not used officially in Washington. Horowitz actually has quoted Fleming: 'Molotov was assured that we were preparing a second front and that we expected to open it in 1942 (p. 149).' Fleming's sole source for this assurance is Robert Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins:* yet when we turn to this, we discover a much more complex situation. Here is Sherwood, working from notes of the meeting:

> What answer [Molotov asked Roosevelt] shall I take back to London and Moscow on the general question that has been raised? What is the President's answer with respect to the second front?

To this blunt question the President answered—with characteristic evasiveness—

> that Mr. Molotov could say in London that, after all, the British were even now in personal consultation with our staff officers on questions of landing craft, food, etc. We expected to establish a second front. General Arnold would arrive next day . . .

No mention of a 'promise'.

> The reference [says Sherwood] to the Second Front which Molotov wrote and which appeared in the public statement issued on June 11 was: 'In the course of the conversations full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942'.

The British, says Sherwood, gave Molotov the following aide memoire on the subject:

> We are making preparations for a landing on the Continent in August or September 1942 . . . Clearly, however, it would not further either the Russian cause or that of the Allies as a whole if, for the sake of action at any price, we embarked on some operation which ended in disaster . . . We can therefore give no promise in this matter. [4]

Molotov evidently then had fewer certainties of this 'promise' than Professor Fleming or Mr Horowitz have now, for on his return to Moscow, according to Sherwood, whom they take as their source, Molotov in a long speech at a special session of the Supreme Soviet

[4] Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 159–62.

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'expressed nothing more definite than his *hope* for a Second Front in 1942' (p. 171). Perhaps a case could be made for Mr Fleming's version of this 'broken pledge', but if so, different methods of historical research would have to be employed.

One specially curious feature of Mr Horowitz's work is perhaps best summed up by the title of his final chapter: 'The Unity of America's Cold War Program'. In the black hagiography of the American radical right, successive Washington administrations have been accused of 'amoral' 'softness' towards communism and to the Soviet Union; in the hagiography of the new revisionist left, however, successive Washington administrations have had no purpose in mind but the commitment 'to the eventual destruction of communism generally'.[5] In addition to this somewhat limited purpose of American policy, Horowitz sees a still more grandiose one: American cold war policy has had a 'counter-*revolutionary*' rather than a 'counter-*expansionary*' character, which only the confusing events of Europe in the late 1940s concealed (p. 413).

Here a clear divergence can be seen between Fleming and Horowitz. The main burden of Fleming's book, which carries history down to the end of the Eisenhower administration, is that the United States had failed in its mistaken policy of *containment*; two key signs of that failure were the continued growth in power of the Soviet Union, and America's inability to impose its will on Moscow by *force majeure*, to solve outstanding cold war issues. For these reasons, says Fleming, the United States has 'lost' the cold war. For Horowitz, however, whatever distinction existed between the idea of containment and liberation has from the beginning made no sense, since it has been the principal aim of America to crush any revolution which signified 'radical change outside the lines laid down by Washington' (p. 423).

To show how this could be so, he devotes an entire chapter to the subject of 'Containment into Liberation', describing with some accuracy the catastrophic crescendo of American advances into North Korea, MacArthur's ill-starred liberationist adventure which resulted in Chinese intervention and provoked the Truman-MacArthur dispute over containment versus liberation. The Eisenhower administration in 1953 explicitly agreed to a return to containment, acknowledging the 38th parallel and the *status quo ante* as grounds for peace. Yet this fact—i.e., the fact that the conflict was actually terminated on terms less than liberationist—is not only not mentioned (the reader is not even informed that the war ended, much less *how*), but the author in the next chapter notes that 'it is one of the ironies of this period that while Eisenhower's nomination was a victory for the moderate wing of the Republican party, his election . . . brought the right wing to power' with all its 'Manichean assumptions' (p. 143). General MacArthur would not have been amused.

One might wonder why it was that the American military after 1952 became so infatuated with weaponry whose targets could only be a

[5] Horowitz, p. 408. He finds in this commitment the key which explains why there is a 'fundamental conflict between the whole structure of the American cold war program and the strategic objective of a European settlement and withdrawal'.

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'conservative' and 'non-expansionist' Soviet Union, and so neglected counter-insurgency techniques until the early 1960s, if Horowitz's central thesis is to be taken seriously. If, as he contends, the United States opposed all 'radical change outside the lines laid down by Washington', this presumably would make the leaders of revolutionary movements like Ben Bella and Sukarno (whom American policy assisted at critical moments), agents of American imperialism. Most students of the colonial-nationalist revolution today would probably agree that the pace of political change in the non-western world was sharply accelerated by the competitive dialectic of American and Soviet encouragement of nationalism in these areas since 1945. But not Mr Horowitz; when he does mention instances of American support for non-capitalist regimes, it is simply to show that these are exceptions, or simply further examples of American imperialism. (His reference to American aid to the British Labour government in 1946 is a footnote to the effect that 'Not even England escaped America's neo-imperialism'. In 1946 the United States offered England a loan whose discriminatory terms brought her 'to her knees', p. 70).

Heads I win, tails you lose: refusal to aid revolutions or social reform movements is explained by American counter-revolutionary motives; aid to them can be explained as imperialistically-motivated. Horowitz objects to Manicheanism, viewing the world as split between the forces of darkness and light, when it informs the thinking of others; but the impression of this reviewer is that neo-Manicheanism is hardly a cure for the disease.

RATIONALITY REVISITED

Alfred Zauberman

PETER KENDE'S WORK [1] moves on two planes. One, taking up the bulk of the book, is Hungary's most recent economic history, offering an admirable analysis of the expansion at the turn of the forties, the crisis gathering around the mid-fifties, and the rhythm regained towards the end of the decade. On the other plane Kende addresses himself to the more general problem of rationality in a collectivist economy and its determinants; this gives his work its title. For the purposes of his inquiry he identifies collectivist economy with one normatively planned and this is defensible: all collectivist economies so far known to us are planned in a mandatory fashion; their workability or otherwise, when either un-planned or planned in a non-normative way, is, I believe, an open question that can probably find an empirical answer only.

To get his conceptual framework, M. Kende usefully re-traces the familiar ground from Barone and Pareto onwards via Oskar Lange-Lerner to latter-day welfare economics. Somehow he arrives at a concept of the planner's 'anti-rationality' and lands at the disturbing

[1] Peter Kende, **Logique de l'Economie Centralisée** (Un Exemple: la Hongrie), Paris 1964.

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question: anti-rationality, is it irrational?; a question which, when posed in this way, he quite sensibly answers with a 'yes and no' (p. 498). The paradox he believes he is confronted with is, I submit, only a pseudo one. In fact M. Kende could easily avoid it by his own essentially sound path of reasoning. He starts from the proposition that economic rationality is a category of 'economie des choix' (p. 444)—a proposition reasonable in itself but equivocal in this context. Testing what he quite legitimately labels the system of a 'Robinson Crusoe planner' against his definitions, he asks: 'Is this "irrational"? No: the system simply avoids economic rationality in order to follow other rules' (p. 447). But he does reach the conclusion that 'in the last analysis the "rationality" of a planned economy can be judged only in relation to the sum total of its goals' (p. 496). If my reading of this proposition is correct, this would mean that while the concept of the economic agents' rationality does relate their behaviour to the aims pursued, it is not concerned with the nature of ultimate aims. Hence the economist *qua* economist cannot say anything about such goals. If he tries to do so he is trespassing in the fields of political or moral philosophy, as were most of the sovietologists in the debates of the early 1950s to which M. Kende apparently owes some inspiration. To the economist the planner's rationality is a matter concerned with consistency and efficiency as postulates of the logic of the planner's behaviour. It is also from this and only this angle that the mechanisms employed in running the economy—direct or indirect guidance, the market mechanism—is relevant for judging the rationality of normatively planned systems. Indeed economic rationality as such is not definable, with any sufficient degree of generality, as either a macro or a micro concept: whether it is the one or the other depends on whose scale of values is adopted in the system. Though it is true that an important school of thought in Soviet planning theory today is making an interesting attempt to integrate observable micro-preferences into the normative planner's objectives, M. Kende does not deal with this. He does mention the Kornai-Liptak game-theoretical model of planning, but seeks in that construct something which cannot be found there.

PROBLEMS OF RATIONALITY in centralist systems were patently of absorbing interest to Oskar Lange in the last years of his life, when he was trying to fit them into what he saw as the general science of rational activity—'praxeology' (which owes its origin to Slutsky and von Mises, and its wider recognition to Kotarbinski). In a paper on the subject which appeared last year, a few months after his death,[2] Lange argues that the 'praxeological principle' is both narrower and broader than the subject of political economy since, on the one hand, the latter is concerned with broader problems than those of behaviour in accordance with rationality postulates, and, on the other, its principle rules in domains other than economics. Whether this provides a sufficient raison d'être for a new science may be a matter of opinion; but at worst

[2] Oskar Lange, 'Znaczenie prakseologii dla ekonomii politycznej', in *Materialy Prakseologiczne*, no. 20, 1965.

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the re-drawing of inter-disciplinary frontiers is unlikely to do harm to its subject.

In the same paper Lange contends that the praxeological principle under competitive capitalism was effectively guiding the profit-maximising firm only (he seems to have in mind such factors as external economies and diseconomies in the atomistic competitive system). The operational area of the principle, he argues further, has widened under monopoly capitalism to embrace trusts and large concerns as well. Finally, he says, 'socialism is moving one step further: it can be interpreted as an attempt to apply the principle of rational activity not only within an individual enterprise or concern, but also within the national economy as a whole'. In this article he ignores a major snag to which he had given a good deal of attention elsewhere. When addressing an audience at the University of Bologna in 1963,[3] he asked whether one can validly talk of a single objective for the economy under socialism, and whether it can be expressed by a single numerical index. This question has become a central one in the debates in the Soviet Union, although some economists, like Kantorovich, are trying to evade it on the ground that it is still inadequately explored. Lange attacked it with considerable rigour in his book on optimal-decision-making, published a year before his death.[4] He showed there that the problem of multiplicity of aims could be solved, *but only under certain conditions*. This matter apart, the obstacles to rational growth promotion, and the planning and running of a mandatory system, are the limitations in techniques and knowledge at the centre (on the latter point Lange's last work is also noteworthy for its analysis of decision-making when estimates are available or when there is complete uncertainty). The work is illuminating both on the logic of the system and the technical barriers: this is due largely to the apparatus of formalisation which, as always in Lange, is as simple as possible and, in this case, quite beautiful.

BOOKS ON RUSSIA, THE USSR, AND COMMUNISM

J. D.

BETWEEN THEM, these two excellently produced bibliographies* give the student and librarian as complete a guide to the literature of the subject as anyone could expect. Since 1943, when Mr. Griersen published his

[3] Oskar Lange, 'Il ruolo della matematica nella pianificazione economica', in *Statistica*, 1963.

[4] Oskar Lange, *Optymalne Decyzje* (Warsaw, 1964).

* Paul L. Horecky, ed. **Russia and the Soviet Union:** a Bibliographic Guide to Western-Language Publications. University of Chicago Press, London, 1965, 473 pp. 67s. Thomas T. Hammond, ed. **Soviet Foreign Relations and World Communism.** A selected, annotated Bibliography of 7,000 books in 30 languages. Princeton University Press. Oxford University Press, London, 1965. 1,240 pp. £10.

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useful little *Books on Soviet Russia* (limited to English-language publications up to 1942), their number has grown so great that the need for a *catalogue raisonnée* became urgent, not only for new entrants into the field, who have to start at the beginning, but also for those who have spent the greater part of their working lives studying these questions.

The volume edited by Mr. Horecky, of the Slavic and Central European Division of the Library of Congress, follows on the one published a few years ago under the same auspices which listed publications in the Russian language; it puts the emphasis on English-language publications and on the more recent period, and excludes the natural sciences as such, though not their social and organisational aspects. There are 30-odd contributors, mostly from the United States, although specialists in Europe were drawn in as consultants. The main headings used (every bibliographer will agree that there is no completely satisfactory way of dividing the subject) are broad enough to require the minimum of cross-referencing. The comments on the books, varying in length from two to a dozen lines, indicate the value of the work and show no bias. The index lists authors and titles in straight alphabetical order.

The bibliography edited by Professor Hammond (the contributors listed number more than a hundred) covers four major fields: Soviet diplomacy and economic relations since 1917; communist movements since 1917; aspects of Soviet foreign policy and communist policy; and the principal internal developments in communist countries other than the USSR. The volume is divided into three parts, the first chronological, the second divided regionally and by countries, and the third deals with 'special topics' not amenable to either variety of classification, such as communist ideology and tactics, Soviet military power, relations with the League of Nations and United Nations, etc. Unpublished dissertations submitted to American and British Universities, regarded as unusually meritorious, have also (perhaps unnecessarily) been included.

Professor Hammond is commendably frank about the difficulties encountered in editing the work, forestalling the criticisms which are only to be expected, since no two users ever have the same requirements. To assist those with less specialised needs, some of the entries in each sub-section are classified as 'A' (the top ten), and some as 'B' (the next twenty). This is an extremely useful device, though the present reviewer does not in all cases share the estimates these notations imply.

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